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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis consists of three self-contained chapters that contribute to the research
fields of business cycles, monetary policy, and banking regulation. All three topics are
directly linked to the financial crisis of 2007 and the European debt crisis during 2012.
Both crises have significant effects on the real economy, on the interplay between the
fiscal and the monetary authority, and on the regulation of the banking sector.
The second chapter, therefore, analyzes the reaction of the German business cycle
to both crises. It investigates their effects on the real economy by conducting a business
cycle decomposition and explicitly looking at the importance of foreign demand and
price shocks. Both are especially interesting for Germany as this country is an export-
oriented economy. The crisis led to immense foreign demand shocks and foreign prices
shocks. It is, however, neither empirically nor theoretically clear which of the two effects
(demand or price) dominated the impacts of the financial and European debt crisis on
the German economy. Francois and Woerz (2009) stress that a drop in relative prices
is a sign for a potential loss in terms of competitiveness, whereas a drop in quantities
simply shows that there is less use for the goods in demand.
The third chapter investigates the optimal monetary reaction to a temporarily
shortsighted fiscal authority. It is characterized by its preference for financing gov-
ernment spending through higher debt rather than higher taxes. A problem that is
explained by political uncertainty in that the politicians have a finite and time-varying
horizon. This tendency to finance government spending predominantly by government
debt leads to high public-debt-to-GDP ratios. During 2007, and especially during
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2012, these high public-debt-to-GDP ratios cast serious doubt on the solvency of sev-
eral southern European countries during the European debt crisis. A temporarily
myopic fiscal authority is associated with this so-called debt bias, which can be an
independent source of business cycle fluctuations (see Kumhof and Yakadina 2007).
Therefore, the third chapter presents the optimal monetary policy reaction to a tem-
porarily shortsighted fiscal authority that minimizes the distortion caused by this fiscal
shortsightedness.
The forth chapter investigates the recent European implementation of the Basel III
regulation package. The financial crisis of 2007 was the motivation for a stricter banking
regulation in Europe: The regulation aimed at reducing the overall probability and
consequences of a future banking crisis similar to the crisis seen in 2007. However, the
European implementation of Basel III is quite special regarding European government
bonds. Banks that invest in European government bonds do not have to hold any
equity against them. All bonds issued by European governments are seen as riskless
assets and investments in these bonds can be fully financed by debt. Therefore, the last
chapter investigates how fully debt-financed government bonds influence the optimal
design of an equity requirement constraint.
In all three chapters I use dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models
which have become standard tools in the field of macroeconomics. Using a DSGE
structure puts discipline on the reduced-form parameters of the state-space model,
which are less likely to change in response to changes in the policy, making these models
robust to the Lucas (1976) critique. Authors such as Smets and Wouters (2007) and
Edge, Kiley, and Laforte (2010) proved the forecasting power of these models.
I will now present the three chapters in more detail: Chapter 2, beside specify-
ing and estimating a parsimonious open economy DSGE model, provides a detailed
historical decomposition of the German business cycle based on the estimation and
investigates the relative importance of foreign demand and foreign price effects for the
German economy. Concretely, it studies the effects of the financial crisis of 2007 and
the European debt crisis during 2012 on the German business cycle. The tight con-
nectivity of a globalized economic system accelerated the spill-over effects. Both crises
naturally affected the German economy as it is highly integrated in the world economy.
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Therefore, my thesis starts with an investigation of the reaction of the German business
cycle to this immense economic turmoil. Since the German economy became more and
more export-oriented over time, the severe drop in international trade during 2007 -
2009 came as a serious assault on the German export sector. Real exports dropped
by about 18 percent between the first quarter of 2008 and the second quarter of 2009,
while imports dropped by 12 percent. The dominant negative reaction of the export
sector could be a sign that the crisis was mainly located at the foreign demand side.
Import prices decreased by about 11 percent between the second quarter of 2008 and
the third quarter of 2009, while export prices fell by only 3 percent. Consequently,
the terms of trade, defined as export prices divided by import prices, rose during the
same period. As Mann (1999) points out, a rise in the terms of trades could mean
that the rest of the world is willing to pay higher prices for German exports goods.
It means that German exports can purchase more imports, which in turn implies that
the German income can support a higher standard of living. Thus, the terms of trade
could be used as a measure of competitiveness of an economy. However, rising exports
can lead to a rising trade surplus. Taken together, the crisis led to immense foreign
demand shocks and foreign prices shocks. It is, however, neither empirically nor theo-
retically clear which of the two effects (demand or price) dominated the impacts of the
financial and European debt crisis on the German economy. Francois and Woerz (2009)
stress that a rise in relative prices is a sign for a potential gain in the competitiveness,
whereas a drop in the quantities simply shows that there is less use for the demanded
goods. Therefore, negative demand effects would signify that the demand dropped be-
cause the global economy cooled down. However, positive price effects would indicate
that the German economy improved its competitiveness. Using a DSGE model and
Bayesian estimation techniques I find that during the financial crisis of 2007 - 2009 the
German economy was hit by a series of negative foreign demand shocks, while at the
same time price shocks had positive impacts on the growth rate of the GDP. These
positive price effects worked mainly through heavily falling import prices. The German
export sector clearly profited from rising terms of trade, which could be indicative of
the competitiveness of this sector. This effect could not be seen during the European
debt crisis, where positive price effects were not present. In addition, I confirm the
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results of Ohanian (2010) who stresses that, in contrast to the U.S. economy, the Ger-
man economy suffered from a reduction in its productivity. I also confirm the findings
of Gerke et al. (2012) that the monetary policy was not expansive enough, and those
of Drygalla (2016) who finds that the fiscal policy stimulated the German economy
during the recession, albeit only to a small extent except when the output was already
expanding again. For the European debt crisis one can not find stimulating effects.
Chapter 3 analyzes the optimal monetary policy reaction to a temporarily short-
sighted fiscal authority. Understanding the interplay between fiscal and monetary
policy is not only important in general, but significant especially before and during a
crisis.
That governments prefer financing government spending mainly by debt can be
seen by the fact that since 2006 the average debt-to-GDP ratio of the OECD countries
has risen from 74.6 percent to 111 percent in 2015. The literature on political economy
explains part of these findings by introducing a dimension of political uncertainty in
that the politicians have a finite and time-varying horizon. According to Grossman
and Huyck (1988), political myopia is the result of an expected finite planning hori-
zon associated with the expected fiscal authority’s probability to survive in power (see
also Rieth 2011). In addition, Kumhof and Yakadina (2007) argue that such political
uncertainty gives rise to positive and significant long-run debt level and to short-run
debt bias. A temporarily myopic fiscal authority is associated with this so-called debt
bias, which is related to political polarization or turnover (see Hatchondo, Martinez,
and Roch 2015). The short-run debt bias is associated with negative shocks to the
fiscal authority’s discount factor. Such shocks give rise to populist tax cuts, which
can be an independent source of business cycle fluctuations (see Kumhof and Yakad-
ina 2007). Business cycle fluctuations clearly affect the welfare of the agents living in
the economy. Therefore, a benevolent monetary authority wants to react optimally
to political business cycles caused by a temporarily shortsighted fiscal authority. In
this chapter I describe this optimal monetary policy reaction. This chapter is in line
with the literature that investigates the interaction between the fiscal and monetary
authorities. Adam (2011), for example, derives the optimal monetary and fiscal policy
under commitment in dependency to the level of the fiscal authority debt. However,
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as the author stresses, ”the [...] paper focused exclusively on technology shocks. Other
shocks, e.g., shocks to agent’s discount factors give rise to additional sources of budget
risk, as they move the real interest rates at which the government can refinance its
outstanding debt.” (Adam 2011, , p. 71) Thus, Adam (2011) does not investigates
distortions caused by a fiscal authority. Niemann and Hagen (2008), Niemann (2011)
and Niemann, Pichler, and Sorger (2013) describe the interactions of monetary and
fiscal policy in a strategic game where none of them can commit to future actions. In
their model, the fiscal authority is always impatient, always causing adverse welfare
effects, which is a quite strong assumption. Rieth (2011) investigates an impatient
fiscal authority. He examines the transition dynamics induced by a fiscal authority
that permanently has a higher discount factor than private households. However, an
optimal monetary reaction is not presented. Kumhof and Yakadina (2007), Juessen
and Schabert (2013), and Hatchondo, Martinez, and Roch (2015) use a lower fiscal
authority discount factor to model political uncertainty induced by a finite planning
horizon. They investigate political business cycles caused by fluctuations in the plan-
ning horizon resulting from discount factor shocks. However, they do not investigate an
optimal monetary policy response to these fluctuations. Thus, this chapter contributes
to the literature by investigating the optimal monetary response to business cycles
caused by shocks to the fiscal authority’s discount factor. Both authorities can fully
commit to their behavior and are in the long-run fully benevolent. I use a parsimonious
infinite-horizon economy with sticky prices, monopolistic competition, a distortionary
labor income tax, and an exogenous shock to the fiscal authority’s discount factor.
One aspect of the fiscal shortsightedness is its myopia. A temporarily myopic fiscal
authority is characterized by a shift from tax-financed to debt-financed fiscal policy.
The second aspect of fiscal shortsightedness is as follows: The fiscal authority does
not internalize the reaction of a benevolent central bank to a temporarily myopic fiscal
policy. Hence, my argument is similar to that made by Niemann (2011), who states
that the implication of fiscal myopia is the failure to internalize the systematic re-
sponse of future policies to variations in the future state of the economy. I derive the
following results: A fiscal authority that is hit by a temporary discount factor shock
increases the public spending and decreases the labor income tax financed by higher
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public debt. A lower labor income tax reduces the marginal cost for producers, thus
leading them to lower their prices. Consequently, inflation falls, but its volatility and
price dispersion increase. With the volatility of the tax rate and the inflation rate
rising, the distortions in the economy increase. Therefore, the central bank’s optimal
response is to reduce these distortions. The central bank achieves this by reducing
the money supply in order to reduce seigniorage revenues. Lower seigniorage revenues
lower the fiscal authority’s income. Therefore, the fiscal authority cannot lower the
tax rate as much. This leads to higher tax revenues. Therefore, debt accumulation
is smaller, and consequently, there are fewer price movements. Thus, the volatility of
the inflation rate shrinks and price dispersion declines. As a result, the central bank
can reduce the volatility of inflation and the labor income tax rate, thus reducing the
welfare costs and increasing overall welfare compared to an economy where the central
bank uses either a constant money growth rate or a standard policy as proposed by
Taylor (1993).
Chapter 4 analyzes a different aspect of the financial crisis: Since the financial
crisis of 2007, the regulation of the banking sector stands in the focus of the current
political and academic debate. Therefore, this chapter investigates the design of an
optimal equity requirement constraint.
Owing to the financial crisis, the Basel II banking regulations were adjusted. This
reform is known as Basel III. However, the European equity requirement constraint
favors government bonds strongly. Banks that invest in European government bonds
do not have to hold any equity against them. All bonds issued by European govern-
ments are seen as riskless assets and investments in these bonds can be fully financed
by debt. Therefore, I investigate in this chapter the effects of government bonds on
the optimal design of an equity requirement constraint. More specifically, I investi-
gate the impact of safe assets (here government bonds) on a long-run optimal equity
requirement constraint. Recent papers have proved the optimality of introducing an
equity requirement constraint using models with financial frictions. Authors such as
Martinez-Miera and Suarez (2012), Bigio (2014), Nguyen (2014) and others focus on
studying why an equity requirement constraint is useful and analyzing the effects of a
stricter constraint on the economy. However, none of them analyze how the optimal
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design of an equity requirement constraint is influenced by the amount of safe assets.
I analyze the long-run optimality and therefore the maximization of the steady-state
value of the welfare. As the equity requirement regulation has a long-term perspective,
and not a business-cycle perspective like the countercyclical capital buffers, I choose
to focus on the model’s stationary competitive equilibrium. The model is a simplified
version of the model of Christiano and Ikeda (2014). I extend their model by intro-
ducing safe assets (e.g. government bonds). The model contains the following agents:
A representative household composed of equal fraction of savers and bankers, good
and bad firms, final goods producers, mutual funds, and a government. The private
savers consume the final output goods and save by investing in riskless bonds issued by
mutual funds. They own the banks and the firms. The mutual funds use the savers’
deposits to give loans to a diversified set of banks. Free entry and perfect competitions
among the mutual funds lead to zero profits. Banks borrow from mutual funds. They
offer firms loans. The banks make loans to one firm each making their asset side risky.
However, banks can increase the probability to find firms of the good type by exerting
costly unobservable search effort. In addition, banks can invest in riskless govern-
ment bonds. The following results are obtained: The higher the amount of government
bonds, the stricter the equity requirement constraint must be. The reason is as follows:
The key role of banks in this model is the identification of good debtors by exerting
costly search effort. However, the model contains an agency problem between banks
and their creditors: Hidden action. Therefore, the banks’ effort is not observable. As
shown by various authors (such as Spremann 1987), a hidden action problem leads to
an effort level lower than the socially optimal one. Only if banks have a sufficiently
high amount of equity, the incentives of exerting search effort are increased. Thus, an
equity requirement constraint mitigates the distortions caused by the hidden action
problem: A higher amount of equity leads to a higher amount of effort as shown by
Christiano and Ikeda (2014). In this case, the classic skin-in-the-game argument is
at play. Besides, the hidden effort problem, a binding limited liability constraint is
present, which is why the Modigliani-Miller theorem does not apply here. Therefore,
an increase in the banks’ leverage reduces the bank’s incentive to exert costly search
effort. As this chapter shows, the limited liability constraint distorts the banks’ choice
7
of exerting costly search effort to find good debtors. The distortion is caused by the
non-zero interest spread stemming from the binding limited liability constraint: As
effort is non-observable, the banks’ creditors demand state-dependent interest rates as
the creditors of banks with poorly performing assets must participate in losses. If the
bankers’ creditors do not offer a contingent debt contract, there will be no compen-
sation for the possibility that the banks receive a low return on its investment and
simply default. Therefore, banks have to pay a higher interest rate to their creditors
in case they have found a good debtor, as Christiano and Ikeda (2014) show. In ad-
dition, I demonstrate that a higher amount of government bonds reduces the interest
rate spread charged by the banks’ creditors: An increase in government bonds also in-
creases the return of banks with poorly performing assets, leading to a weaker limited
liability constraint. This reduces the interest spread paid by the banks and increases
the incentive to exert costly effort. Thus, on the one hand government bonds positively
affect the banks’ effort. On the other hand, they are safe assets and so banks cannot
influence the return of government bonds by increasing the search effort. Thus, the
higher the amount of government bonds, the lower the incentive to search for good
loans tends to be. In addition, following the European implementation of Basel III,
government bonds can be fully financed with debt. Hence, the higher the amount of
government bonds, the higher the amount of banks’ debt is, increasing banks’ leverage.
As long as the limited liability is binding, increasing debt increases this distortion of
the effort choice. To compensate this, a stricter equity requirement regulation is neces-
sary. To sum up, there are two frictions in the model: A hidden action problem and a
limited liability constraint. Therefore, one can make a second-best argument: To reach
the first-best case, one needs two instruments, which are the amount of government
bonds and the equity requirement regulation. In fact, the chapter shows that one can
reach the first-best case by increasing both the amount of government bonds and the
risk-weight on loans, i.e. a stricter equity requirement constraint.
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Chapter 2
The Importance of Foreign Demand
and Price Shocks for the German
Business Cycle
2.1 Introduction
The financial crisis of 2007 - 2009 originated in the U.S. financial market and then
spread rapidly around the world. The tight connectivity of a globalized economic
system accelerated this spillover even more. Since sound financial markets are the
foundation of a sound real economy, the problems in the banking system disturbed
fast into the real economy. The resulting global recession led to a massive drop in
international trade. Shortly, after that immense negative impact on the global economy,
a second crisis emerged in 2009. Rising doubt about the solvency of several southern
European governments led to a serve distrust in the sustainability of the euro. In
addition, rising uncertainty as to how governments should stimulate investments in the
short run, and formulate regulatory and economic policy in the long run, led firms to
reduce their investments. Julio and Yook (2012) showed that political uncertainty leads
firms to reduce investment expenditure. Both crises naturally affected the German
economy due to its high integration in the world economy.
Since 1991 the German economy has become increasingly export-oriented. The net-
export-to-GDP-ratio increased from minus 0.02 percent in the first quarter of 1991 to
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7.06 percent in the last quarter of 2016. In addition, the German export-to-GDP ratio
constantly increased from 24 percent in 1991 to over 46 percent in 2016. Therefore,
it is not surprising that Germany suffered heavily from the global drop in demand
during 2007 - 2009 and from the drop in demand of the southern European countries
during the European debt crisis. As a result, the recession of 2009 has enveloped to be
the most severe one for Germany since World War II: Gross domestic product (GDP)
dropped by about 5 percent in the first quarter of 2009. In addition, the European debt
crisis led to negative quarterly GDP growth rate during 2012. At its high, the growth
rate was about minus one percent. Since 1991, there have been only five quarters with
a growth rate lower than that in 2012.
The severe drop in international trade during 2007 - 2009 hit the German export
sector critically (see Figure 2.1): Real exports dropped from 103.75 index points in
the first quarter of 2008 to 84.74 index points in the second quarter of 2009. This
was a decrease of about 18 percent. At the same time, the German imports dropped
from 97.56 index points (first quarter of 2008) to 85.71 index points (second quarter
of 2009) - a decrease of about 12 percent. The dominant negative reaction of the
exports could indicate that the crisis was mainly located at the foreign demand side.
Consequently, this led to a decrease of the German export surplus: from about 43
billion euro (first quarter 2008) to about 21 billion euro (first quarter 2009). In addition,
prices of exports and imports also reacted quite strongly to the international crisis (see
Figure 2.2). Import prices decreased from 104.4 points (second quarter of 2008) to
92.5 index points (third quarter of 2009) - a reduction of about 11 percent. Export
prices however, fell from 99.8 index points (second quarter 2008) to 96.8 index points
(third quarter 2009) - a reduction of only 3 percent. Consequently, the terms of trade
defined as export prices divided by import prices rose in the same period. As import
prices include a high share of commodity prices, which have a high volatility, they
fell much more strongly than export prices. As Hummels and Klenow (2005) show
richer countries export higher quantities at modestly higher prices, along with higher
quality. Thus, the smaller reaction of export prices could be interpreted as a sign for
a higher quality of German export goods. Thus, these goods cannot be substituted
easily and German exporters were not forced to decrease their prices as much. It is,
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however, neither empirically nor theoretically clear which of the two effects (demand or
price) dominated the impacts of the financial and European debt crisis on the German
economy. As Haddad, Harrison, and Hausman (2010) argue, one would expect that
if the decline in trade was mostly driven by a negative demand shock, then both
prices and quantities would be negatively affected. However, if supply side shocks were
important, with a reduction in trade credit leading to a reduction in supply of traded
goods independently of the negative demand shock, then one would have expected less
downward pressure, and possibly upward pressure, on prices (see Haddad, Harrison,
and Hausman 2010).
In this chapter, I investigate the effects of the foreign price and the foreign demand
channel on German exports and imports and thus on the German GDP. I also analyze
which of the two was more important in the context of the financial crisis of 2007 -
2009 and the European debt crisis. My work is partly motivated by the findings of
Enders and Born (2016), who show that in Germany the trade channel was twice as
important for the transmission of the crisis as the financial channel, as well as by the
findings of Ohanian (2010), who suspects that the crisis in Germany worked mainly
through a reduction in productivity. He investigates the crisis from a Neoclassical
perspective. I instead see the crisis through the lens of a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) model that features both channels in order to assess their quanti-
tative relevance. As Flotho (2009) argues, using a DSGE structure puts discipline on
the reduced-form parameters of the state-space model, which are less likely to change
in response to changes in the policy. Thus, these models are robust to the Lucas
(1976) critique. As DSGE models can be rewritten in a reduced-form VARMA model,
they stand in direct competition to VARMA models in general. However, Smets and
Wouters (2007) and Edge, Kiley, and Laforte (2010) show that DSGE models are com-
petitive with VARMAs in terms of forecasting power. Having a structural model and
data for prices and quantities of exports and imports, a historical decomposition at
the posterior mean of the estimated parameter is performed. I use this decomposition
to investigate the importance of the different shocks included in the model. Moreover,
I test how robust the results of the historical decomposition of the German business
cycle are compared to the results found in the literature.
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The following insight is obtained: During the financial crisis of 2007 - 2009, the
German economy was hit by a series of negative foreign demand shocks. At the same
time, however, foreign price shocks had a positive impact on the growth rate of the
GDP, mainly because import prices fell much more than export prices. One can con-
clude that due to the rise in the relative prices and thereby a potential gain in the
competition strength, the drop in the foreign demand for German goods was damp-
ened, thus leading to a smaller decline in the German GDP. In comparison to the
financial crisis of 2007 - 2009 the European debt crisis showed a different pattern: For-
eign price shocks had negative implications. In addition, as Gadatsch, Hauzenberger,
and Stähler (2016) also show, the fiscal policy’s contribution to real GDP growth was
negative in the last quarter of 2012. In both periods the monetary policy was not
expansive enough leading to a negative impact of the monetary shock on the German
GDP growth rate.
Figure 2.1: Real exports and imports
Notes: Real exports and imports (both chain indices: 2010=100), and the net-exports
of Germany (right y-axis in billion Euro). Quarterly frequency.
Related to my research question, several authors investigate the importance of dif-
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Figure 2.2: Real export and import prices, and the terms of trade
Notes: Real export and import prices (both chain indices: 2010=100), and the terms
of trade of Germany (right y-axis). Quarterly frequency.
ferent shocks for the transmission of the 2007 - 2009 financial crisis. Enders and Born
(2016) analyze the effects of the trade and the financial channel and assess which of the
two was more important in the transmission of the crisis. They found that, calibrated
to German data, the model predicts the trade channel to be twice as important for
the transmission of the crisis as the financial channel. For the UK, the reverse holds.
Drygalla (2016) studies the effects of fiscal policy in an estimated DSGE model for
the case of the German stimulus packages during the Great Recession. Thus, he also
conducts a historical decomposition of the German business cycle and finds that, over
the entire time period considered, fiscal shocks had only marginal effects on output.
Far greater had been the influence of foreign shocks which is not surprising given the
export orientation of the Germany economy (see Drygalla 2016). Gadatsch, Hauzen-
berger, and Stähler (2016) also investigate the effects of fiscal policy during the global
financial crisis starting in 2007. Their historical decomposition suggests that discre-
tionary fiscal measures indeed pushed up quarter-on-quarter GDP growth during the
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crisis. In terms of annualized quarter-on-quarter growth rates, this positive effect im-
plies a contribution of 1.2 pp for Germany and 0.12 pp for the rest of the euro area
(see Gadatsch, Hauzenberger, and Stähler 2016). They also show that negative foreign
shocks played a major role in the decline of German GDP in 2008. Ohanian (2010), who
investigates the 2007 - 2009 economic crisis from a Neoclassical perspective, concludes
that in contrast to the U.S. economy the main distortions of the German economy
came from a drop in productivity while the employment rate was in fact higher than
the level consistent with the marginal product of labor. This was partly driven by the
short-time work program of the German government. Of course, if output falls and the
input factors of the production function do not fall by the same amount, it only means
that the productivity of the input factors must have decreased. Gerke et al. (2012) use
a historical shock decompositions of real GDP growth since 2005 to perform a model
comparison exercise. For Germany they find that the most driving factors underlying
the recent financial crisis are shocks stemming from abroad, from the demand side, and
from productivity changes.
Other authors look especially at the great trade collapse that occurred in late 2008.
As Baldwin (2009) notes, this drop was sudden, severe, and synchronized - the steepest
fall of world trade in recorded history and the deepest fall since the Great Depression.
In particular, export-oriented countries suffered naturally heavily from this decline.
Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2009) emphasize that a large part of the recent drop in the level
of trade is linked to price rather than volume effects. Francois and Woerz (2009) stress
that a drop in the relative price is a sign for a potential loss in the competitiveness,
whereas a drop in quantity simply shows that there is less use for the demanded goods.
Haddad, Harrison, and Hausman (2010) decompose the great trade collapse into
price and quantity effects. However, they do not use a DSGE model. Their findings
suggest that the intensive rather than extensive margin mattered the most. On average,
quantities declined and prices fell. Price declines were driven primarily by commodities
(see Haddad, Harrison, and Hausman 2010). Haddad, Harrison, and Hausman (2010)
point out that a decline in trade that is mostly driven by a negative demand shock leads
both prices and quantities to fall. However, Haddad, Harrison, and Hausman (2010)
stress that if the supply side is dominant, meaning a reduction in trade credit leading
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to a reduction in the supply of traded goods independently of the negative demand
shock, then one would expect less downward pressure and possibly upward pressure
on prices. In addition, they find that across all products, both prices and quantities
fell significantly in the U.S. and the E.U. Thus, demand shocks have played a major
role. The author find that Germany had above-average quantity effects compared to
other countries, but a smaller (near zero) price effect. This indicates that these effects
might have had different signs and acted as another motivation to investigate price and
quantity effects and their impact on the German GDP.
In this context, my contribution to the literature is the following one. Besides
specifying and estimating a parsimonious open economy DSGE model, I provide a
detailed historical decomposition of the German business cycle based on the estimation
and investigate the relative importance of foreign demand and foreign price effects
for the German economy. I also compare the financial crisis of 2007 - 2009 and the
European debt crisis and make a robustness check by comparing my results with the
results found in the literature.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 describes the model’s
design; Section 2.3 discusses the data and the estimation methodology; Section 2.4
presents and discusses the results of the historical decomposition; Section 2.5 concludes
the work.
2.2 Model
I use a quantitative dynamic-optimizing business cycle model of a small open economy.
The assumption of a small open economy allows me to treat the specific origin of the
financial crisis and the European debt crisis as exogenous to the economy in question
(see also Enders and Born (2016) for a similar approach). The model is a variant of
Kollmann (2001). The DSGE model used in this chapter has a detailed export and
import sector. The domestic country produces intermediate goods for the production
of final goods, which are used in the country and exported abroad. The final goods
sector uses domestic intermediate goods and imported foreign intermediate goods to
produce final goods for both private and public consumption, as well as for private
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investments. The model’s parameters are estimated using Bayesian techniques. As
data I use different macroeconomic data and data for import and export prices provided
by Bloomberg1.
2.2.1 The representative household
The preferences of the representative household are described by the following period
utility function:
u(Ct, Lt) = exp
(
ZCt
) (Ct − hCt−1)1−ψ
1− ψ −exp
(
ZLt
)
χ
L1+γt
1 + γ , 0 < h < 1, ψ > 0, γ > 0, χ ≥ 0,
where Ct stands for the private consumption. h denotes the degree of the habit persis-
tence2. Lt is the labor supply of the household. ψ measures the inverted intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, and γ represents the elasticity of the labor supply. χ is a
scaling parameter to adjust the steady-state of labor supply. ZCt and ZLt are exogenous
preference shocks following each an AR(1) process:
Zit = ρZiZit−1 + Zi,t, i ∈ {C,L},
with 0 ≤ ρZi ≤ 1. Zi,t are zero-mean, serially uncorrelated, normally distributed
innovations with standard deviation σZi .
The representative household accumulates capital Kt in the following manner:
Kt+1 = Kt(1− δ(ut)) + It exp
(
ZIt
)
− Φ(It, It−1)It, (2.1)
where It stands for the investments at time t. ZIt is an exogenous shock following an
AR(1) process (see Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti 2010):
ZIt = ρZIZIt−1 + ZI ,t,
with 0 ≤ ρZI ≤ 1. ZI ,t are zero-mean, serially uncorrelated, normally distributed
1The names of the two time series in the Bloomberg terminal are as follows: GRBUIMP Index for
German import prices and GRBUEXP Index for German export prices.
2See Ravn, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2006) for a discussion of the difference between external and
internal habit formation.
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innovations with standard deviation σZI . Φ(It, It−1) is an investment adjustment cost
function (see Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 2005):
Φ(It, It−1) = 0.5ΦI
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
, ΦI > 0,
where ΦI measures the level of the capital adjustment costs.
Households are assumed to own physical capital. Owners of physical capital can
control the intensity with which the capital stock is utilized (see Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe 2012): ut measures the capacity utilization in period t. The effective amount
of capital services supplied to firms in period t is given by utKt. I assume that in-
creasing the intensity of capital utilization entails a cost in the form of a faster rate of
depreciation. Hence, δ(ut) is an increasing and convex function of the rate of capacity
utilization:
δ(ut) = δ0 + δ1(ut − 1) + δ22 (ut − 1)
2, 0 ≤ {δ0, δ1, δ2},
δ0 corresponds to the rate of depreciation of the capital stock in the deterministic
steady-state in which ut is unity. δ1 governs the steady-state level of ut. δ2 defines the
sensitivity of capacity utilization to variations in the rental rate of capital.
The household maximizes its life-time utility:
max
{Ct, Lt, Kt+1, It, ut, Bt+1, Dt+1}
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(Ct, Lt), 0 < β < 1, (2.2)
where Et denotes the mathematical expectation operator conditional upon information
available in period t. β is the discount factor. Bt andDt are riskless nominal foreign and
domestic government bonds. The maximization problem is restricted by the following
period budget constraint:
etBt+1+Dt+1+PtCt+PtIt = WtLt+etBt(1+R∗t−1)+Dt(1+RDt−1)−Tt+PtRKt Ktut+Πt,
(2.3)
where et is the nominal exchange rate, expressed as the domestic currency price of
foreign currency. Bt−1 denotes nominal bonds which pay a nominal interest rate R∗t in
foreign currency. The domestic government bonds Dt pay a nominal interest rate RDt .
Wt stands for the nominal wage. Tt are nominal tax payments. Capital services utKt
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pay a return RKt . The household is the owner of the firms and thus receives nominal
dividends Πt. Pt is the price of the final goods used for private and public consumption
as well as for investments.
The household’s optimization problem involves maximizing (2.2) given (2.1) and
(2.3). The first-order conditions associated with this optimization problem are:
λtPt = exp
(
ZCt
)
(Ct − hCt−1)−ψ − βh exp
(
ZCt+1
)
(Ct+1 − hCt)−ψ,
Wtλt = χ exp
(
ZLt
)
Lγt ,
µt + Et
(
β
(
λt+1Pt+1R
K
t+1ut+1 − µt+1(1− δ(ut+1))
))
= 0,
µt
(
Φ(It, It−1) + ΦI
It
It−1
(
It
It−1
− 1
)
− eZIt
)
−λtPt = βEt
(
µt+1ΦI
(
It+1
It
− 1
)(
It+1
It
)2)
,
λtPtR
K
t Kt + µtKt (δ1 + δ2(ut − 1)) = 0,
λtet = βEt (λt+1et+1(1 +R∗t )) , (2.4)
λt = βEt
(
λt+1(1 +RDt )
)
, (2.5)
where λt and µt are Lagrange multipliers of the period budget constraint and of the
capital accumulation equation. Setting (2.4) and (2.5) equal, the uncovered interest
rate parity between the domestic and the foreign government bond interest rates is
obtained.
To avoid the non-stationary problem, R∗t is debt-elastic (see Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe 2003):
R∗t = R∗,ss + κ
(
e−etBt+1 − 1
)
, κ > 0,
where R∗,ss is the steady-state value of the foreign interest rate. κ is strictly positive
and measures the elasticity of the interest rate with respect to the current foreign level
of debt denominated in domestic currency. See Hristov (2016) for a similar approach.
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2.2.2 The production sector
There are two types of firms producing two different goods - intermediate goods and
final goods. All producers of each type have identical technologies and enjoy the same
demand. Final goods producers act under perfect competitions. In contrast, there is
monopolistic competition in the intermediate goods market. Final goods producers
need domestic and foreign intermediate goods to produce the final goods for private
and public consumption as wells as for private investments. Intermediate goods are
tradable whereas final goods are not.
Domestic final goods production
The final goods producers are in a perfect competition to each other. Therefore, the
price of the final goods is equal to the marginal cost of production. Final goods used
for consumption and investment are sold exclusively in the home country. They are
not tradable. Final goods are produced with domestic and foreign intermediate goods.
Final goods producers use the aggregated intermediate goods to produce final goods
Zt. They use a constant elasticity of substitution production function of the following
form:
Zt = exp (AZt)
(
(αd) 1ϑ (Qdt )
ϑ−1
ϑ + (1− αd) 1ϑ (Qmt )
ϑ−1
ϑ
) ϑ
ϑ−1
, 0 < αd < 1, ϑ > 0,
where αd measures the importance of the foreign intermediate goods. A higher αd
means a higher home bias. ϑ is the domestic demand elasticity. AZt is exogenous and
measures how productive the final goods producers are. It follows an AR(1) process:
AZt = ρAZAZt−1 + AZ,t, 0 ≤ ρAZ ≤ 1,
where the zero-mean, serially uncorrelated innovations AZ are normally distributed
with standard deviation σAZ .
The quantity index of domestic intermediate goods Qit with i ∈ {d, m} is given
by:
Qit =
(∫ 1
0
(qit(s))
1−ν
ν ds
) ν
1−ν
, ν > 1. (2.6)
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ν is the elasticity of domestic demand for the differentiated domestic intermediate
goods. qdt (s) and qmt (s) are quantities of the domestic and imported type s intermediate
goods. Let pdt (s) and pmt (s) be the prices of these goods. Cost minimization of the final
goods producers implies for their demand:
qit(s) =
(
pit(s)
P it
)−ν
Qit, (2.7)
where the price index P it is defined by:
P it =
(∫ 1
0
(pit(s))1−νds
) 1
1−ν
,
and
Qdt = αd
(Pdt
Pt
)−ϑ
Zt,
Qmt = (1− αd)
(Pmt
Pt
)−ϑ
Zt.
Perfect competition in the final goods market implies that the good’s price Pt is equal
to the marginal production cost:
Pt =
(
αd(Pdt )1−ϑ + (1− αd)(Pmt )1−ϑ
) 1
1−ϑ .
Domestic intermediate goods production
Each intermediate goods producer produces a differentiated intermediate good yt(s)
indexed by s ∈ [0, 1]. Consequently, the elasticity of substitution between the inter-
mediate goods is not infinite. For the production of individual intermediate goods
intermediate goods producers need capital ut(s)Kt(s) and labor Lt(s) from the repre-
sentative household. They use the following production function:
yt(s) = exp (At) (ut(s)Kt(s))α Lt(s)1−α, 0 < α < 1, (2.8)
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where At is exogenous and measures the productivity of the intermediate goods sector.
It follows an AR(1) process:
At = ρAAt−1 + A,t, 0 ≤ ρA ≤ 1,
where the zero-mean, serially uncorrelated innovations A are normally distributed with
standard deviation σA.
The domestic intermediate goods producers satisfy two demands: The domestic
demand for intermediate goods used in the domestic final goods production qdt (s) and
the foreign demand for domestic intermediate goods used in the production of the
foreign final goods qxt (s). Thus, the total demand is given by:
yt(s) = qdt (s) + qxt (s). (2.9)
The foreign demand for domestic intermediate goods is equivalently to Equation (2.6)
given by:
qxt (s) =
(
pxt (s)
Pxt
)−ν
Qxt , (2.10)
where pxt (s) is the price for the domestic intermediate goods denominated in the foreign
currency. The price index Pxt for exported domestic intermediate goods is given by:
Pxt =
(∫ 1
0
(pxt (s))1−νds
) 1
1−ν
.
And the quantity index of the exported domestic intermediate goods Qxt is given by:
Qxt =
(∫ 1
0
(qxt (s))
1−ν
ν ds
) ν
1−ν
.
Firms in the intermediate goods sector can change their prices every period. However,
they face quadratic price adjustment costs á la Rotemberg (1982). They maximize
the net present value of all period t profits discounted with the household’s stochastic
discount factor:
max
{ut(s)Kt(s), Lt(s), pdt (s), pxt (s)}
Et
∞∑
j=0
SDFt,t+jΠt(s),
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where SDFt,t+j is the stochastic discount factor defined as:
SDFt,t+j = βj
λt+jPt+j
λtPt
.
The period t real profit is Πt(s). It is given by:
Πt(s) =
pdt (s)
Pt
qdt (s) +
etp
x
t (s)
Pt
qxt (s)
− Wt
Pt
Lt(s)−RKt ut(s)Kt(s)
− 12Φ
P d
(
pdt (s)
pdt−1(s)
− 1
)2
qdt (s)−
1
2Φ
Px
(
pxt (s)
pxt−1(s)
− 1
)2
qxt (s),
where ΦP d > 0 and ΦPx > 0 measure the degree of the price adjustment costs. The
firms’ first-order conditions given the demand functions (2.7) and (2.10) as well as the
production function (2.8) and the total demand (2.9) are as follows:
RKt = ξt exp (At)α(ut(s)Kt(s))α−1Lt(s)1−α,
Wt
Pt
= ξt exp (At) (1− α)(ut(s)Kt(s))αLt(s)−α,
(
pdt (s)
Pdt
)−ν (1− ν) 1
Pt
+ ξtν
1
pdt (s)
− ΦP d
(
pdt (s)
pdt−1(s)
− 1
)
1
pdt−1(s)
+ 12Φ
P d
(
pdt (s)
pdt−1(s)
− 1
)2
ν
1
pdt (s)

= −(Qdt )−1Et
SDFt,t+1ΦP d
(
pdt+1(s)
pdt (s)
− 1
)
pdt+1(s)
pdt (s)2
(
pdt+1(s)
Pdt+1
)−ν
Qdt+1
 ,
(
pxt (s)
Pxt
)−ν et(1− ν) 1
Pt
+ ξtν
1
pxt (s)
− ΦPx
(
pxt (s)
pxt−1(s)
− 1
)
1
pxt−1(s)
+ 12Φ
Px
(
pxt (s)
pxt−1(s)
− 1
)2
ν
1
pxt (s)

= −(Qxt )−1Et
SDFt,t+1ΦPx
(
pxt+1(s)
pxt (s)
− 1
)
pxt+1(s)
pxt (s)2
(
pxt+1(s)
Pxt+1
)−ν
Qxt+1
 ,
where ξt is the Lagrange multiplier of the production function (2.8). The total demand
(2.9) has already been inserted.
Foreign intermediate goods are sold domestically by importers. They have monop-
olistic power and set the import price as a markup over the foreign price level (see
Mark 2001, p. 228):
pmt (s) = et
ν
ν − 1 exp (P
∗
t ) ,
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where P ∗t is the foreign price index. It is assumed to follow an AR(1) process:
P ∗t = ρP ∗P ∗t−1 + P ∗,t, 0 ≤ ρP ∗ ≤ 1,
where the zero-mean, serially uncorrelated innovations P ∗ are normally distributed
with standard deviation σP ∗ .
The foreign country
The foreign demand for domestic intermediate goods is given by:
Qxt =
( Pxt
exp (P ∗t )
)−η
exp (Z∗t ) , η > 0,
where η is the foreign demand elasticity. Z∗t is the foreign demand following an AR(1)
process:
Z∗t = ρZ∗Z∗t−1 + Z∗,t, 0 ≤ ρZ∗ ≤ 1,
where the zero-mean, serially uncorrelated innovations Z∗ are normally distributed
with standard deviation σZ∗ .
2.2.3 The government
The government consumes Gt and finances its consumption by issuing government
bonds Dt and a lump-sum tax Tt. Thus, its period budget constraint is given by:
PtGt + (1 +RDt−1)Dt = Dt+1 + Tt.
Gt follows a simple linear rule:
Gt = GssY ss(1−ρG)+ρGGt−1 +ρY
(
Yt
Yt−1
− 1
)
G,t, 0 ≤ ρG ≤ 1, 0 < Gss < 1, ρY ∈ R,
where the zero-mean, serially uncorrelated innovations G are normally distributed with
standard deviation σG. Gss is the steady-state public-spending-to-GDP-ratio.
The central bank sets the nominal interest rate by following a standard Taylor rule
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similar to Born, Peter, and Pfeifer (2013):
1 +RDt
1 +RD,ss =
(
1 +RDt−1
1 +RD,ss
)ρR [( pit
piss
)ν1 ( Yt
Yt−1
)ν2]1−ρR
exp(ZM ,t),
with 0 ≤ ρR ≤ 1, ν1 > 0, and ν2 > 0. ZM ,t are zero-mean, serially uncorrelated,
normally distributed innovations with standard deviation σZM . pit = PtPt−1 is the gross
inflation rate.
2.2.4 Market clearing conditions
The standard market-clearing conditions are applicable to final goods:
Zt = Ct + It +Gt.
The nominal GDP PtYt is measured by:
PtYt = PtZt + etPxt Qxt − Pmt Qmt .
For the current account it holds:
etBt+1 = etPxt Qxt − Pmt Qmt + etBt(1 +R∗t−1).
2.3 Estimation
In this section, I describe how the model is estimated. First I describe the data and
their transformations. I then go on to describe the calibration of the non-estimated
parameters, and the prior choices, and finally I discuss the estimated posterior distri-
butions and their corresponding means.
2.3.1 The data
I use eleven quarterly macroeconomic time series. These are time series for the GDP,
private and public consumption, private investments, labor hours worked, exports and
imports, export and import prices, CPI inflation, and the interest rate set by the
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monetary authority. All series start in the first quarter of 1991 and range until the
last quarter of 2016. All data except export and import prices and the interest rate
are data from the German statistical bureau and are seasonally adjusted at the source.
They are chained indices where the year 2010 equals 100. Export and import price
indices are delivered by Bloomberg3. For the interest rate I use a shadow interest rate
calculated by Wu and Xia (2017). Because this model is linear, it potentially allows
nominal interest rates to go negative and faces difficulties in the zero lower bound
environment, which is present in the euro area since the end of 2012. To account for
unconventional monetary policy and the non-linear behavior of the main interest rates,
the shadow rate can be an appropriated tool (see Wu and Xia 2016).
To estimate a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, one has to specify
observation equations. This means that the data used for estimation has to be coherent
to the data produced by the model (see Pfeifer 2017). Thus, as the model’s variables
are all stationary, the data have to be transformed so that they, too, become stationary.
To that end, I use the following transformations:
• The time series of the GDP, private and public consumption, private investments,
exports, imports, and labor hours worked are non-stationary. All data are divided
by the total number of population to get per capita units. After taking the
logarithm, the first differences are calculated. The resulting quarterly growth
rates are demeaned. This gives stationary time series with zero mean.
• The terms of trade are calculated by dividing the export prices by the import
prices. This time series is logarithmized. The first differences are calculated and
the resulting quarterly growth rates are demeaned. I use the terms of trade as a
measurement of the competitiveness of the German economy. As Mann (1999)
points out, a rise in the terms of trade could mean that the rest of the world is
willing to pay higher prices for German exports goods. It means that German
exports can purchase more imports, implying that the average German income
can support a higher standard of living. An improvement in the terms of trade is
thus associated with a higher standard of living. However, rising exports can lead
to a rising trade surplus. If a trade surplus is unsustainable, then an improvement
3Code: GRBUIMP Index, GRBUEXP Index
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of the terms of trade is not a good measure of competitiveness anymore (see Mann
1999).
• The interest rate is quoted as the net interest rate in percentage points and in
an annualized form. In contrast, the model is written in quarterly frequency and
considers gross interest rates (see Pfeifer 2017). Therefore, the interest rate has
to be transformed in the following way:
RD,obst =
(
1 + R
D,data
t
100
) 1
4
,
where RD,datat is the shadow interest rate calculated by Wu and Xia (2017) and
RD,obst the time series used in the estimation. Since RD,obst has a clear falling
trend, the series is logarithmized and first differences are calculated. Finally, the
time series is demeaned as well.
Figure 2.3 presents all the transformed time series. A detailed description of the data
can be found in the Appendix 2.A.1. The main findings are as follows:
• The demeaned GDP growth rate was significantly low during the Great Recession.
In the first quarter of 2009, the quarterly demeaned growth rate was minus 4.91
percent. The European debt crisis also had a negative impact on the GDP
growth rate: Between the second quarter of 2012 and the first quarter of 2013,
the quarterly growth rates were all negative - the maximum being minus 0.8
percent.
• Private investments react strongly to the financial crisis. In the first quarter of
2009, the demeaned growth rate was minus 13 percent. Moreover, during the
European debt crisis private investments fell significantly. Between the second
quarter of 2011 and the first quarter of 2013, real private investments decreased
by 13 percent.
• During the financial crisis, exports fell much more than imports. In the first
quarter of 2009, the demeaned growth rate of real exports was about minus 15
percent, whereas of the rate of real imports was about minus 7 percent. The same
pattern can be found during the European debt crisis around the year 2012.
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Figure 2.3: Demeaned quarterly growth rates
Notes: This figure shows the demeaned quarterly growth rates for the GDP, private
and public consumption, private investments, hours worked, exports, imports, export
prices, import prices, the CPI, terms of trade and the shadow interest rate of the Eu-
ropean Central Bank. The two shaded areas mark the both crises which are analyzed.
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• The demeaned quarterly growth rate of the terms of trade increased during the
financial crisis by more than 5 percent in the first quarter of 2009. This was
mainly driven by the fact that import prices fall stronger than export prices. In
contrast, until the first quarter of 2012, the terms of trade showed a series of
negative quarterly growth rates, because import prices rose more than export
prices. However, since the first quarter the terms of trade increased mainly
because import prices fell again.
2.3.2 Calibration, prior selection, estimation settings, and es-
timation results
The model is estimated using Bayesian estimation techniques with the software package
Dynare 4.6.0 4 (see Adjemian et al. 2011) and solved with a first-order perturbation.
Calibration and prior selection
Most of the model’s parameters are estimated using Bayesian estimation techniques.
Seven are set by hand. In particular, the depreciation rates for private capital is set
to δ = 0.025, implying an annual depreciation of 10 percent. The discount factor β is
set to 0.994 in order to match the inverse of the average quarterly gross real interest
rate over the sample period. The Gss is the steady-state of the public spending and
equals the empirical mean of the public-spending-to-GDP ratio. The parameter δ1
governs the steady-state level of ut. I set this parameter at a value consistent with a
unit steady-state value of ut (see Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 2012). The share of private
capital in the production function is set to 0.32 so as to match the steady-state share
of labor income to GDP to its sample average of 68 percent (see Drygalla 2016). αd
is set in such a way that the steady-state import-to-GDP-ratio equals the empirical
mean of 29.83 percent. In addition, like Hristov (2016), I set labor to a steady-state
value of 0.2. Table 2.1 summarizes the chosen parameter values.
The priors for the estimated parameters can be found in Table 2.2. Priors are
chosen following standard approaches in the literature. Some means are set to reflect
their empirical counterparts or values already found in the literature.
4I use the latest available version on 15.08.2017.
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Table 2.1: Calibrated parameter values and steady-state values
Parameter Value
β 0.9940
α 0.3200
δ 0.0250
Gss 0.1883
u 1.0000
PmQm/Y 0.2983
L 0.2000
In order to find the mode of the likelihood function, I use a covariance matrix
adaptation evolution strategy algorithm of Hansen and Kern (2004), which is an evolu-
tionary algorithm for difficult non-linear non-convex optimization. To guarantee con-
vergence of the Markov chain the number of replications for the Metropolis-Hastings
algorithm is set to 2,500,000. I also follow Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2012) and use a
measurement error to solve the problem that, up to the first-order, the resource con-
straint of the model economy postulates a linear restriction among the observables. As
the government sector is very simplified, I account for this by assuming a measurement
error on the time series of the government spending. I do not assume an error in the
observation equation for the GDP like Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2012), because the
main goal of this chapter is a historical decomposition of the German GDP. Thus,
assuming a measurement error on the observation equation of the GDP would lead to
a deviation of the model’s time series of the GDP from the empirically observed time
series. As I intend to decompose the observed GDP, I abstract from a measurement
error in the observation equation of this time series.
Bayesian estimation results
Results for the posterior distribution of the estimated parameters and shocks variances
are documented in Table 2.2. The plots of the posterior distributions can be found
in the Appendix 2.A.2. Mean and highest posterior density intervals are taken from
the posterior distributions, which are based on a Markov chain with 2,500,000 draws,
where the first 10 percent are used for burn-in. The acceptance ratio of the chain is
about 30.19 percent. This is near the optimal acceptance rate of 23.4 percent proposed
by Roberts, Gelman, and Gilks (1997) and commonly chosen acceptance ratios.
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Table 2.2: Priors and posteriors for Germany. Results from the Metropolis-Hastings
algorithm (2,500,000 draws).
Prior Posterior
Dist. Mean Stdev. Mean Stdev. 5% 95%
h beta 0.500 0.1000 0.319 0.0801 0.1881 0.4469
γ gamm 2.000 0.5000 4.578 0.5771 3.6172 5.5026
ψ gamm 1.500 0.2000 1.561 0.1936 1.2429 1.8760
η gamm 1.200 0.1000 0.694 0.0173 0.6690 0.7183
ϑ gamm 0.500 0.1000 0.224 0.0193 0.1927 0.2563
ν norm 5.000 5.0000 5.142 0.4831 4.3551 5.8968
Φ gamm 2.000 1.5000 0.159 0.0810 0.0535 0.2706
Φd gamm 50.000 10.0000 35.220 9.3153 20.1309 49.8546
Φx gamm 50.000 10.0000 74.873 11.4787 55.9339 93.3906
δ2 gamm 0.050 0.0200 0.006 0.0024 0.0022 0.0096
ρG beta 0.750 0.1000 0.886 0.0362 0.8281 0.9464
ρpi∗ beta 0.750 0.1000 0.627 0.0491 0.5467 0.7076
ρZI beta 0.750 0.1000 0.731 0.0854 0.5959 0.8657
ρA beta 0.750 0.1000 0.993 0.0033 0.9881 0.9982
ρAZ beta 0.750 0.1000 0.967 0.0106 0.9504 0.9836
ρZL beta 0.750 0.1000 0.995 0.0024 0.9915 0.9986
ρZ∗ beta 0.750 0.1000 0.817 0.0259 0.7743 0.8590
ρZC beta 0.750 0.1000 0.790 0.0670 0.6868 0.8973
ρR beta 0.750 0.1000 0.819 0.0265 0.7775 0.8620
ν1 norm 1.700 0.1000 1.597 0.1095 1.4149 1.7761
ν2 gamm 0.120 0.0500 0.066 0.0203 0.0331 0.0976
ν3 gamm 0.120 0.0500 0.122 0.0210 0.0872 0.1554
ρy norm 0.000 0.5000 0.175 0.0580 0.0807 0.2706
κ gamm 0.050 0.0250 0.004 0.0010 0.0019 0.0052
pi∗ invg 0.010 2.0000 0.040 0.0059 0.0300 0.0486
ZL invg 0.010 2.0000 0.028 0.0033 0.0225 0.0332
A invg 0.010 2.0000 0.005 0.0005 0.0039 0.0056
AZ invg 0.010 2.0000 0.002 0.0002 0.0017 0.0025
G invg 0.010 2.0000 0.005 0.0004 0.0039 0.0051
Z∗ invg 0.010 2.0000 0.021 0.0015 0.0186 0.0235
ZC invg 0.010 2.0000 0.021 0.0039 0.0151 0.0273
ZI invg 0.010 2.0000 0.008 0.0022 0.0049 0.0110
ZM invg 0.010 2.0000 0.002 0.0002 0.0016 0.0023
Gobs invg 0.001 0.0100 0.011 0.0008 0.0098 0.0124
Note: beta stands for the Beta distribution; norm for the Normal distribution; gamma
for the Gamma distribution; invg for the Inverse Gamma distribution.
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Table 2.3 shows the Geweke (1991) convergence tests based on means of draws
250,000 to 1,375,000 vs 1,375,000 to 2,500,000. Accordingly, all parameters converge.
A look at the trace plots also confirms convergence: No drifts are present.
Next, I discuss the estimated parameter values and compare them to values found
in the literature:
• h measures the degree of habit persistence of private households. The posterior
mean of 0.319 is line with Drygalla (2016).
• γ measures the inverse Frisch elasticity. While the real business cycle literature
often models a relatively high Frisch elasticity of two (see Prescott 1986) or more
(see King, Plosser, and Rebelo 1988), recent papers of Bayesian DSGE model
estimation found far smaller values for the Frisch elasticity in a New Keynesian
model framework. For example, Justiniano and Primiceri (2008) argue for values
between 0.25 and 0.5. These findings are in line with some micro-data based
studies like Pistaferri (2003) or Kliem and Uhlig (2016). Thus, the prior has a
high standard deviation accounting for the parameter uncertainty. The estimated
posterior mean of γ is 4.578, leading to a Frisch elasticity of about 0.21. This is
in line with values commonly chosen in the DSGE literature.
• ψ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The posterior mean of 1.134 is
near the estimate of Drygalla (2016) for the German economy.
• η and ϑ measure the demand elasticity. Their posterior means are 0.694 and
0.224 respectively. Empirical estimations find strongly varying values for η and
ϑ. Heathcote and Perri (2002) estimate values slightly below one5. Hooper and
Marquez (1993) find average values for the German price elasticity of about 1.06
for exports and 0.5 for imports. The posterior means of η and ϑ are lower than
these findings but are similar to the values chosen by Kollmann (2001).
• The steady-state value for the markup of the price over marginal cost of the price
of the imported goods is estimated to be 1
ν−1 = 0.1944. This is consistent with
the findings of Martins, Scarpetta, and Pilat (1996) for the G3 countries (see also
Kollmann 2001), who finds values for the markup of 22 percent.
5See also Coeurdacier (2009) for a discussion
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Table 2.3: Geweke Convergence Tests, based on means of draws 250,000 to 1,375,000
vs 1,375,000 to 2,500,000. p-values are for χ2-test for equality of means.
Posterior p-values
Parameter Mean Stdev. No Taper 4% Taper 8% Taper 15% Taper
pi∗ 0.0395 0.0059 0.0000 0.8154 0.8061 0.7946
ZL 0.0280 0.0033 0.0000 0.5571 0.5876 0.6000
A 0.0048 0.0005 0.0000 0.7703 0.7935 0.8006
AZ 0.0021 0.0002 0.0000 0.4156 0.4080 0.4233
G 0.0045 0.0004 0.0000 0.3120 0.3388 0.3175
Z∗ 0.0211 0.0015 0.0000 0.5192 0.5469 0.5694
ZC 0.0213 0.0039 0.0000 0.2548 0.1545 0.1007
ZI 0.0078 0.0022 0.0000 0.8875 0.8809 0.8851
ZM 0.0020 0.0002 0.4391 0.9804 0.9815 0.9815
Gobs 0.0111 0.0008 0.0000 0.6921 0.6898 0.7343
h 0.3170 0.0796 0.0000 0.2779 0.2046 0.1758
γ 4.5863 0.5783 0.0000 0.1876 0.2222 0.2603
ψ 1.5612 0.1938 0.0000 0.4627 0.4388 0.4413
η 0.6943 0.0173 0.0000 0.4848 0.4672 0.4131
ϑ 0.2245 0.0193 0.0000 0.6213 0.6224 0.6313
ν 5.1413 0.4799 0.0000 0.8178 0.8281 0.8340
Φ 0.1569 0.0791 0.0000 0.8332 0.8237 0.8285
Φd 35.0754 9.2852 0.0000 0.6586 0.6353 0.6125
Φx 75.0422 11.5118 0.0000 0.6058 0.6036 0.6273
δ2 0.0059 0.0024 0.0000 0.8030 0.8104 0.8186
ρG 0.8862 0.0361 0.0000 0.0951 0.1048 0.0873
ρpi∗ 0.6258 0.0493 0.0000 0.3107 0.2248 0.2031
ρZI 0.7318 0.0846 0.0000 0.8445 0.8417 0.8453
ρA 0.9931 0.0033 0.2785 0.9737 0.9754 0.9762
ρAZ 0.9666 0.0105 0.0000 0.5417 0.5739 0.5882
ρZL 0.9949 0.0024 0.0030 0.8526 0.8448 0.8440
ρZ∗ 0.8168 0.0258 0.0000 0.6194 0.6639 0.6987
ρZC 0.7913 0.0664 0.0000 0.4428 0.4050 0.3956
ρR 0.8186 0.0265 0.0000 0.8297 0.8351 0.8342
ν1 1.5954 0.1095 0.9448 0.9982 0.9979 0.9979
ν2 0.0658 0.0202 0.0000 0.2901 0.2792 0.2588
ν3 0.1218 0.0209 0.0000 0.8936 0.8970 0.8952
ρy 0.1753 0.0578 0.0000 0.0858 0.1020 0.0694
κ 0.0036 0.0010 0.0433 0.9427 0.9427 0.9437
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• Φ measures the investment adjustment costs and partly controls the variance of
investments in the model. The posterior mean is 0.159. The relative volatility of
the investments’ growth rate to the GDP’s growth rate in the model is σ∆I
σ∆Y
= 4.65.
This is near the empirical counterpart of σ∆Iobs
σ∆Yobs
= 4.05.
• ΦPd and ΦPx are in line with the findings of Keen and Wang (2007), who give
advice for realistic values for the price adjustment cost parameter. Given that
the markup of 19.4 percent and given that the discount factor is 0.994 one can,
according to Keen and Wang (2007), calculate the percentage of reoptimizing
firms. The posterior means for ΦPd and ΦPx are 35.22 and 74.87, leading to a
share of reoptimizing firms of 28.7 percent and 20.7 percent respectively. This is
in line with the findings of Drygalla (2016).
• The posterior mean for δ2, which measures the sensitivity of capacity utilization
to variations in the rental rate of capital, equals 0.006 and is smaller than the
estimate of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2012) for U.S. data.
• All of the nine exogenous variables exhibit a high degree of persistence, with the
respective AR(1) parameters ranging from 0.627 to 0.995.
• The estimated parameters of the monetary policy rule show a high persistence
of 0.819. This is not surprising considering that the data shows extended pe-
riods without any change in the time series values. Additionally, the reaction
parameters show that the central bank acts countercyclically by increasing the
interest rate whenever the inflation rate (ν1 = 1.597) and the output (ν2 = 0.006)
deviate positively from their long-run value or whenever the output growth rate
(ν3 = 0.122) is positive.
• κ measures the elasticity of the interest rate with respect to the current foreign
level of debt. It is quite small and in line with the value found in Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe (2003).
• The standard deviations of the shock processes range between 0.002 for the mon-
etary policy and 0.040 for the foreign inflation shock.
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• The posterior mean for κ is equal to 0.004. This is small and similar to value in
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003).
Appendix 2.A.2 compares the prior and posterior distributions of all estimated param-
eters. All posterior distributions show well-behaved shapes. Tests prove the identifi-
cation of all estimated parameters in the model. I use the identification toolbox for
Dynare developed by Ratto and Iskrev (2011).
2.4 Decomposition
Based on the estimation in the previous section and on the derived smoothed shocks
using the Kalman smoother, one can investigate which shocks mainly caused the neg-
ative German quarterly GDP growth rates during 2008 - 2009 and then again during
2012. In the first period, the financial crisis spread out worldwide, while in the second
period the European debt crisis reached its peak. Figures 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 show the
historical decomposition of the German quarterly GDP growth rate from 1999 until
2016. There are nine shocks in the model. The two technology shocks of the interme-
diate and final goods sector are added to one shock simply named technology shock.
The colored bars correspond to the contribution of the respective smoothed shocks to
the deviation of the endogenous variables from their steady-state values.
I start the discussion with the historical shock decomposition of 2008 - 2009. In the
interpretation of the shock contribution regarding the government spending shocks, one
must keep in mind that I assume an observational error on the time series of government
spending. Thus, the estimated innovations of the government spending shocks depend
on the empirical time series plus the estimated observation error. Figures 2.4 and
2.5 show that over five quarters (2008q2 - 2009q2) the German GDP had negative
quarterly growth rates. In the second quarter of 2008, when the financial crisis that
had originated in the U.S. economy spread over the world, the German export-oriented
economy, which is fully integrated in the financial and non-financial economy of the
world, began to feel the global economic cooling. Real GDP dropped by 0.48 percent on
quarterly basis. According to the model this drop can be explained by a negative shock
stemming mainly from the foreign inflation, the productivity shock, and the private
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Figure 2.4: Historical decomposition of the demeaned German GDP quarterly growth
rate
Notes: Historical decomposition of the demeaned German GDP quarterly growth rate
(black solid line). Contributions of the nine model shocks at the posterior mean of
the estimated parameters. The coloured bars correspond to the contribution of the
respective smoothed shocks to the deviation of the smoothed endogenous variable from
its steady-state.
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Figure 2.5: Historical decomposition of the demeaned German GDP quarterly growth
rate around the year 2009
Notes: Historical decomposition of the demeaned German GDP quarterly growth rate
(black solid line) around the year 2009. Contributions of the nine model shocks at
the posterior mean of the estimated parameters. The coloured bars correspond to
the contribution of the respective smoothed shocks to the deviation of the smoothed
endogenous variable from its steady-state.
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investments shock. A negative shock on the capital accumulation equation through the
investment shock reduces the transformation rate of investment goods into productive
capital goods (see Equation (2.1)). Firms had obviously reduced their investments due
to increasing uncertainty about the future demand. This uncertainty also reduced the
labor demand translating into a reduction in the number of hours worked by minus
0.38 percent on quarterly basis. This is a negative shock to the labor market. However,
private consumption shrank slightly, with a small negative effect on the German GDP
growth rate. As exports do not fall as much as predicted by the model, the foreign
demand shock is estimated to have a positive effect on the GDP growth rate.
Shocks from abroad were dominated by a negative foreign price shock. Import
prices rose stronger than export prices leading to falling terms-of-trade and therefore
to more expensive imports. In total, this shock accounts for about 48 percent of all
negative shocks, which is in line with findings for example by Gadatsch, Hauzenberger,
and Stähler (2016) and Haddad, Harrison, and Hausman (2010). These results show
that the fall in the GDP growth rate in the second quarter of 2008 was mainly driven
by an increasing uncertainty on the firm side and a drop in the relative prices of the
export and import sectors.
In the third quarter of 2008 the German GDP fell further. The quarterly growth
rate was demeaned minus 0.59 percent. In contrast to the preceding quarter, there
were positive impulses from the private investment side as private investments rose
by demeaned 3.68 percent, compensating the majority of negative shocks. Negative
impulses came from the labor market, from abroad, from the government spending side,
and from the monetary policy. The government reduced its spending from the second
to the third quarter by nearly one percent, which reduced overall demand leading to
a further decline of the GDP. Interestingly, the German government spending had a
negative impact on the GDP quarterly growth rate. This negative impact is a hint that
government spending was actually too small to stimulate German economy. According
to the results of Drygalla (2016), fiscal policy had a negative impact in the third and
fourth quarters of 2008, while stimulating the German economy since the first quarter
of 2009 albeit only to a small extent and in the strongest manner when output was
already expanding again.
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The importance of the foreign shocks switched. In the third quarter of 2008 the
impact of the negative foreign demand shock dominated the foreign price shock, which
was slightly positive. It is quite interesting how differently German export and imports
reacted to the slowdown of the global economy. While import prices fell, imports rose
also driven by a stable private consumption. In contrast, exports fell while export
prices rose. Thus, the foreign demand shock was bigger than the foreign price shock.
In total it accounted for about 42 percent of all negative shocks. These negative foreign
demand shocks were an indicator for the upcoming cooling of the global trade.
An indicator that firms got worried about the future economic development of
Germany can be found in the hours worked. They decreased by about 0.64 percent
between the first and third quarter - a reduction of 94 million hours. The labor shock
explains 8.8 percent of the GDP drop in the third quarter of 2008. However, as the
reduction in hours worked does not fully explain the decline in the GDP, the rest of
the GDP reduction is explained by a negative productivity shock. This is in line with
the findings of Ohanian (2010). Ohanian (2010) stresses that in contrast to the U.S.
economy the German economy suffered from reduced productivity.
Ohanian’s findings can be supported by the decomposition of the fourth quarter
of 2008. In this quarter things changed dramatically as the crisis became more severe.
The demeaned quarterly GDP growth rate dropped to minus 2.1 percent. Such a
decrease had been rarely seen before. It is mainly explained by a drop in productivity
and a combination of negative foreign demand, labor, and monetary policy shocks.
Positive effects were coming from the foreign prices.
The negative effect of the monetary policy is a hint that the central bank did not
decrease the interest rate aggressively enough. The interest rate was not low enough
according to given inflation and output growth rates, leading to an estimated negative
impact of the central bank. A finding also confirmed by Gerke et al. (2012).
In addition, as hours worked dropped by 0.58 percent on a quarterly basis, but
GDP dropped by more than 2 percent the majority of the decrease is associated by a
decline in productivity. This is in line with the argumentation of Ohanian (2010) and
the findings of Gadatsch, Hauzenberger, and Stähler (2016).
The shocks from abroad worked in opposite directions. There was a negative
38
impact of the foreign demand shock, because global demand lowered real exports by
demeaned 7.1 percent on a quarterly basis. However, the terms of trade improved by
demeaned 6.7 percent, as import prices decreased far more than export prices. This
is a strong hint that the German export sector profited from falling import prices, of
which a high share are commodity prices, making production cheaper. This increase
of the terms of trade is a sign for a potential gain in the competition strength. The
same argumentation can be found in Francois and Woerz (2009).
In the first quarter of 2009 the German economy dropped heavily. The demeaned
quarterly growth rate was about minus 4.9 percent. Part of this decline is explained by
a reduction in productivity. The other part is mainly explained by negative impacts
stemming from investment, foreign demand, and the monetary policy shocks. Private
investments reacted strongly to the increasing risk in the markets, with a demeaned
negative growth of 12.9 percent on a quarterly basis, leading to a strong negative
impact on the GDP.
As Baldwin (2009) reports, the collapse of global trade was massive: While during
the crisis years of 1982 and 2001 the drops were relatively mild, growth from the
previous year quarter reached minus 5 percent at the most. The decrease in the third
and fourth quarter 2008 was much worse. The OECD reported for both periods that
world trade flows had been 15 percent below their previous year levels (see Baldwin
2009, p. 1). This severe reduction in global demand is mirrored by the strong negative
impact of the foreign demand shock in Figures 2.4 and 2.5. However, positive operating
price effects reduced this negative demand effect. In fact, the terms of trade improved
further by demeaned 1.2 percent, as export prices fell less than import prices.
The second quarter of 2009 showed first signs of economic improvement. Even
if the demeaned quarterly GDP growth rate was still minus 0.14 percent, compared
to the growth rate of the previous quarter this was clearly a turning point. Positive
impulses came mainly from abroad as real German exports stabilized. In addition, the
monetary policy had positive effects. This is mainly because the world trade began to
rise again, as seen by the increase in the total imports of the OECD countries by 1.27
percent on quarterly basis between the first and the second quarter of 2009. In addition,
the expansive monetary policy had positive impacts on the financial system improving
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lending conditions for firms and reducing the overall uncertainty. In addition, private
consumption fell by 1.5 percent having a negative impact on the German GDP. In all,
the German GDP was lifted up by a series of positive demand shocks also stemming
from the government side. This time negative effects were coming from the productivity
side, the foreign inflation and the private investments.
To sum up, the crisis period in Germany, lasting from the third quarter of 2008
to the second quarter of 2009, is characterized by a series of negative foreign demand,
negative investment shocks, a decline in total productivity, and a monetary policy
that was not expansive enough. However, on the plus side, positive impulses of the
foreign price shock stabilized the German economy and prevented the GDP from falling
even more. In particular, the reaction of the German export prices in relation to the
German import prices clearly signifies the competitiveness of the German export sector
and prevented the German economy from experiencing a far deeper recession. In total
the trade channel (here measured as the absolute sum of the foreign price and foreign
demand shocks) is on average three times larger than the investment shocks. This is
similar to the results found by Enders and Born (2016), who report that calibrated to
German data, their model predicts the trade channel to be twice as important for the
transmission of the crisis as the financial channel.
Next, I discuss the historical decomposition of the German GDP quarterly growth
rates around the year 2012. The European debt crisis began in 2009, reaching its
peak between 2011 and the end of 2013. It led investors to question the solvency of
European governments, especially of several southern countries. Rising uncertainty
in the markets had negative spillover effects on the economic situation in the euro
area. Several euro area member states were unable to fulfill their obligations, leading
to massive uncertainty regarding the stability of the euro. The crisis had significant
adverse economic and labor market effects: The unemployment rate in the euro area
reached 12 percent in 2013. Consequently, the crisis had negative effects on economic
growth, not only of the crisis states, but of the entire euro area as well. In 2016
Germany was the leading EU economy, accounting for over a fifth (21.1 percent) of
the euro area GDP. In addition, as it has a dominant export sector, the German
economy was negatively hit by the ongoing turmoil in the euro area, too. The export
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Figure 2.6: Historical decomposition of the demeaned German GDP quarterly growth
rate around the year 2012
Notes: Historical decomposition of the demeaned German GDP quarterly growth rate
(black solid line) around the year 2012. Contributions of the nine model shocks at
the posterior mean of the estimated parameters. The coloured bars correspond to
the contribution of the respective smoothed shocks to the deviation of the smoothed
endogenous variable from its steady-state.
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orientation of Germany led to an immense trade-surplus and increasing dependency
on foreign demand. Between 1991 and 2016 the German current account balances rose
from minus 1.42 percent to 8.34 percent of the GDP. This surplus simply means that
Germany is lending money to other countries to finance their consumption of German
exports (see Lane 2012). The current account imbalances reallocate resources from
high-income to low-income countries, leading to an income convergence. However, if
these capital inflows are used to finance rather unproductive sectors (such as the real
estate sector seen for example in Spain or Ireland) and delay adjustment to structural
shocks, then the accumulation of external imbalances builds up massive macroeconomic
risk (see Lane 2012).
In Figures 2.4 and 2.6 one can see that in Germany between the second quarter of
2012 and the first quarter of 2013 the demeaned quarterly growth rates were negative.
In the last quarter of 2012 the German demeaned growth rate was the lowest at about
minus 0.8 percent, followed by an equally low growth rate of minus 0.5 percent in the
first quarter of 2013.
Compared to that of the financial crisis of the years 2007 - 2009 the decomposition
of the European debt crisis shows a different picture. First of all, the labor market
shocks and private consumption shocks had a greater contribution than before. Private
sector consumption shock led to a reduction in the German GDP growth rate. During
the second quarter of 2012 and the first quarter of 2013, all demeaned quarterly growth
rates of the private consumption were negative. Clearly, German households consumed
under the trend level as the rising uncertainty surrounding the economic outlook led
to reduced consumption.
In all four quarters (2012q2 - 2013q1), the labor market shock had a negative
impact on the quarterly GDP growth rate. During this period, the hours worked were
reduced by minus 0.23 percent, combined with a decline in productivity of the German
economy which was the strongest in the first quarter of 2013. In that quarter, the
productivity shock accounted for over 36 percent of all negative shocks.
Besides reducing the hours worked, firms also reduced the real investments by
3.02 percent. Therefore, negative private investment shocks were present. In fact,
the increasing uncertainty regarding the stability of the European economy and of the
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euro area led German firms to shrink their production by reducing the input factors
and their investments into productive capital, fearing a prolonging downturn of future
demand. As several southern European countries were fighting their high public debt
by running fiscal austerity programs, the overall demand for imports of German goods
dropped as well. As Broyer, Petersen, and Schneider (2012) point out, German exports
to the euro area should have risen by 20.6 percent since 2010. However, the increase
came in at only 7.7 percent. According to the authors this difference of 12.9 percentage
points is attributed to the European debt crisis. Therefore, once again the drop in the
GDP in the third quarter of 2012 was caused by a negative foreign demand shock. This
time, however, compared to the first quarter of 2009, the third quarter of 2012 was
mainly characterized by a drop in real exports. Real exports fell by minus 1.4 percent
between the third and fourth quarters of 2012, whereas real imports nearly stayed flat.
Moreover, export and import prices changed most between the second and third
quarters of 2012. As real import prices rose more than real export prices the terms of
trade fell. Therefore, this time the foreign inflation shock had negative effects over all
quarters. From the third quarter of 2009, the terms of trade started falling constantly,
mainly because import prices rose more than export prices.
Interestingly, the effect of the government spending shock turned out to be negative
in the last quarter of 2012, also confirmed by the results of Gadatsch, Hauzenberger,
and Stähler (2016). This could be the effect of the reduction in the gross public
investments by nearly minus 2.9 percent between the third and the final quarters of
2012, and a sign that the German fiscal policy was not expansive enough. The same
holds true for the monetary policy. In the last quarter of 2012 and the first quarter of
2013, the monetary policy shock had a negative impact on the German GDP growth
rate. This is because the shadow interest rate did not fall as much as one would expect
given the inflation rate and the GDP growth rate.
2.5 Conclusion
The financial crisis of 2007 - 2009 and the European debt crisis of 2012 had an impact
through various channels on the German economy. As the German economy is highly
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integrated in the world trade and has a strong export-oriented economy I explore in
this chapter the importance of the foreign demand versus the foreign price shocks for
the German business cycle. A drop in relative prices would be a sign for a potential
loss in the competition strength, whereas a drop in quantities would simply show that
there is less use for the demanded goods.
Using a DSGE model and Bayesian estimation techniques I find that during the
financial crisis of 2007 - 2009 the German economy was hit by a series of negative
foreign demand shocks, while at the same time price shocks had positive impacts on
the growth rate of the GDP. These positive price effects worked mainly through heavily
falling import prices. The German export sector clearly profited from rising terms of
trade, which could be a sign for the competitiveness of this sector. This effect could not
be seen during the European debt crisis, where positive price effects were not present.
In addition, I can confirm the results of Ohanian (2010) who stresses that in con-
trast to the U.S. economy the German economy suffered from reduced productivity.
I can also confirm the findings of Gerke et al. (2012) that monetary policy was not
expansive enough and the findings of Drygalla (2016) who finds that the fiscal policy
stimulated the German economy during the recession, albeit only to a small extent and
strongest when output was already expanding again. For the European debt crisis one
cannot find stimulating effects.
44
2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Data
There are several important characteristics of the demeaned time series:
• The big drop in the GDP in the first quarter of 2009 after several smaller neg-
ative growth rates was of historical size. A negative quarterly growth rate of
nearly 5 percent has never been seen since 1991. The most negative quarterly
growth rate only reached 1.6 percent in the first quarter of 2003. However, the
economy recovers fast. The first positive growth rate can already be found in the
third quarter of 2009 followed by two high positive quarterly growth rates of 1.7
percent in the second quarter of 2010 and 1.5 percent in the first quarter of 2011.
Compared to the influence of the financial crisis the European debt crisis did not
have such a negative impact on the German economy. However, the quarterly
GDP growth rate was about minus 0.8 percent in the last quarter of 2012; Till
1991 the quarterly growth rate was only five times lower. Even if the quarterly
growth rate did not fall as much as in 2009, one can be aware of four negative
demeaned growth rates in a row since the second quarter of 2012.
• In contrast to the time series of the GDP growth rates, the private consumption
shows a quite different pattern. As the first rumor about a potential house price
bubble in the U.S. spread around the world, private consumption reacted to the
increased uncertainty leading to a drop of about minus 2.2 percent in the first
quarter of 2007. As the crisis became more serve, a second decrease happened
in the third quarter of 2009: The demeaned quarterly growth rate was of about
minus 1.5 percent. In general, the reaction of the private consumption to the
financial crisis and the European government debt crisis was smaller than the
reaction of the GDP. Interestingly, despite the huge negative growth rate of the
GDP in the first quarter of 2009, the private consumption had a positive quarterly
growth rate of about 0.3 percent at the same time. One can be generally aware
of a lagged and smoothed response of private consumption.
During the European debt crisis a different pattern of the private consumption
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was present. Since the second quarter of 2012 until the first quarter of 2013 the
demeaned quarterly growth rate were negative.
• In front of the financial crisis growth rates start climbing from minus 4.7 percent
in the second quarter of 2001 to 8.9 percent in the first quarter of 2007. However,
the financial crisis hit private investments massively. In the first quarter of 2009
the private investment growth rate was minus 13 percent after about minus 4
percent in the last quarter of 2008. In fact there were many positive quarterly
growth rates of the private investments before the breakout of the financial crisis.
In addition, the volatility of the growth rates is much bigger than the volatility
of the GDP growth rates. Given that, the influence of private investment shocks
on the GDP growth rates should be expected to be quite big.
As the first rumor regarding the credibility of the Greek government spread out,
investment started decreasing. Since the second quarter of 2011 investment fell
constantly till the first quarter of 2013 by about 13 percent.
• On the other hand the production factor labor showed a less strong reaction. Al-
though hours worked declined, the growth rate was only about minus 1.4 percent
in the first quarter of 2009. In fact, this can be partly explained by the German
labor law, which does not allow fast dismissals, leading to a less responsive be-
havior of the hours worked. Thereby, this stabilized the private consumption as
households were less exposed to losing their employment. However, a relatively
stable number of hours worked while GDP growth rates dropped strongly can
only be explained by a decline in productivity and/or capital reduction. This is
also what Ohanian (2010) diagnosed for the recession distortions for Germany.
Gerke et al. (2012) found a similar result.
During the European debt crisis, one can see similar to the GDP a reduction in
the hours worked. The biggest reduction was present in the first quarter of 2013:
A drop of 0.38 percent per quarter.
• With respect to the trade sector, exports and imports show a quite correlated
behavior. Preceding the Great Recession, net-exports showed a period of quite
strong increases from the last quarter of 2000 until the second quarter of 2008.
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However, the fall in net-exports (see Figure 2.1) since the second quarter of 2008
was mainly driven by a drop in exports. The fall was nearly 19 percent between
the second quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009, whereas imports fell
by only 13 percent during the same period. The most negative growth rate can
be found in the first quarter of 2009. The negative growth rate of real exports
was about 15 percent, and that of real imports of about 7 percent. This is not
surprising as the export-oriented German economy is naturally quite dependent
on global demand, which was strongly negatively affected by the financial crisis
caused by the collapse of the U.S. house price bubble. Moreover, one can be
aware of a relatively stable private consumption which also partly stabilized the
import sector. Interestingly, since the end of 2010, exports and imports growth
rates had showed a smaller volatility much like the volatility of the GDP growth
rate.
In contrast, the European debt crisis had not such a negative impact on exports
or imports of Germany. During 2012, exports and imports were quite stable.
Exports, however, dropped in the last quarter of 2012 by about 1.4 percent on a
quarterly basis. At the same time, imports rose constantly.
• The import and export prices showed a different pattern. Before the massive drop
in the GDP growth rate in the first quarter of 2009 the terms of trade constantly
fell, meaning that Germany was able to export relatively cheaper than to import.
Import prices fell much stronger than export prices. Import prices fell in the first
quarter of 2009 by nearly 10 percent, whereas export prices fell only by nearly
5 percent. Since 2012 import prices have constantly fallen while export prices
remained nearly unchanged, leading to a rise in the terms of trade. At the same
time the export-import ratio declined. There was also a period of many negative
growth rates since the beginning of 2013. In general, import prices fluctuated
more than export prices. This is not only because import prices include very
volatile commodity prices but also because Germany exports high-quality goods
not easy to substitute, leading to stable export prices.
• Public consumption showed more stable growth rates. Both crises have only
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a small to nearly no effect on public consumption. However, since the second
quarter of 2007 there are more positive growth rates of the public consumption
than before. This led to an increase in the average growth rate from 0.17 percent
per quarter to 0.22 percent per quarter. Since 2012 one can also observe that the
growth rates are less volatile.
• The shadow interest rate showed two strong drops: The first associated with the
financial crisis located in the U.S. in the third quarter of 2008 and the second
with the public debt crisis in the euro area in the first quarter of 2012. These
drops simply reflect the stimulating monetary policy the European Central Bank
had used to mitigate the negative impacts of these crises. Starting 2009, the time
series of the growth rates was more volatile, reflecting the higher activity of the
European Central Bank. They used unconventional monetary policy leading to
a strong negative shadow interest rate of about minus 4.5 percent per year in the
fourth quarter of 2016.
• The demeaned quarterly inflation rate dropped significantly during the financial
crisis. Between the last quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2010 the inflation
rate was always negative. During the European debt crisis the inflation rate
was also negative or only slightly positive. Interestingly, since the last quarter
of 2013 the inflation rate was mainly negative. This time in a comparable size
to the inflation rate during the financial crisis. As Reinhart and Rogoff (2010)
argue, periods after a financial crisis are associated with very slow growth and
deflation.
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2.A.2 Plots
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Figure 2.7: Priors and posteriors
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Chapter 3
Optimal Monetary Policy Reaction
to a Temporarily Shortsighted
Fiscal Authority
3.1 Introduction
In almost every country fiscal authorities increase public spending financed mainly by
raising public debt. The unpopular pay-back and reduction of this debt by increasing
taxes and decreasing public consumption does often not happen to the extent necessary,
increasing debt even further. Thus, since 2006 the average debt-to-GDP ratio of the
OECD countries has risen from 74.6 percent to 111 percent in 2015. It comes to a
rollover of public debt - a convenient tool used by incumbent politicians. Of course, this
cannot happen systematically as this would lead investors to stop buying government
bonds for fear of a Ponzi scheme.
The literature on political economy explains part of these findings by introducing a
dimension of political uncertainty in that the politicians have a finite and time-varying
horizon. Kumhof and Yakadina (2007) use this assumption to explain why the fiscal
authority cares more about the welfare of households in the near future. This is a
typical example of fiscal myopia. According to Grossman and Huyck (1988), political
myopia is the result of an expected finite planning horizon associated with the expected
fiscal authority’s probability to survive in power (see also Rieth 2011). In addition,
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Kumhof and Yakadina (2007) argue that such political uncertainty gives rise to positive
and significant long-run debt level and to short-run debt bias. The short-run debt bias
is associated with negative shocks to the fiscal authority’s discount factor. Such shocks
give rise to populist tax cuts, which can be an independent source of business cycle
fluctuations (see Kumhof and Yakadina 2007). In contrast, a permanent high debt can
be associated with a permanent myopia of the fiscal authority, i.e. it has always a lower
discount factor than the private sector. A permanent myopic fiscal authority leads to a
permanent accumulation of public debt. Thus, one can distinguish between two effects
discussed in the literature - a permanently myopic fiscal authority leading to high public
debt accumulation and temporarily myopic fiscal authority associated with the so-called
debt bias related to political polarization or turnover (see Hatchondo, Martinez, and
Roch 2015). The effects of polarization on fiscal dynamics are discussed in Azzimonti
(2011). As this temporary deviation form the benevolent planner’s behavior causes
business cycle fluctuations, as shown by Kumhof and Yakadina (2007), it is natural to
ask how a monetary authority should react to temporary fiscal myopia.
Therefore, instead of focusing on long-run distortions stemming from a perma-
nently shortsighted fiscal authority, I concentrate on a temporarily shortsighted fiscal
authority. The shortsighted behavior is caused by a temporary discount factor shock.
Consequently, the fiscal authority is fully benevolent in the long-run, which also guar-
antees the non-existence of a Ponzi scheme. In addition, I assume that, as Niemann
(2011) observes, the fiscal authority fails to fully internalize the consequences of its
current myopia. Niemann (2011) argues that an important implication of fiscal my-
opia is the failure to internalize the systematic response of future policies to variations
in the future state of the economy. I follow this argument by assuming that the fis-
cal authority is unable to internalize the monetary policy response to its temporary
shortsightedness. Thus, the fiscal authority is not only myopic but also shortsighted.
Consequently, the aim of the chapter is to answer the following question: What is the
optimal monetary response to a temporarily shortsighted fiscal authority?
Using a standard New Keynesian model along the lines of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2007), I introduce a fiscal authority’s discount factor shock. I thus follow Eggertsson
and Woodford (2003), who use a discount factor shock to model myopic households.
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One aspect of the fiscal shortsightedness is its myopia. A temporarily shortsighted
fiscal authority is characterized by a shift from tax-financed to debt-financed fiscal pol-
icy. This means that it is willing to reduce taxes and/or to increase public spending
temporarily at the cost of higher future debt. In fact, the fiscal authority underesti-
mates the welfare costs generated by the future increase in distortionary taxes, which
are needed to service the higher debt, since its discount factor differs temporarily from
the discount factor of the private households. However, these welfare costs are only
present temporarily as the fiscal authority is only temporarily myopic. Thus, the fis-
cal authority’s behavior is generally welfare maximizing. In the long-run, there are
no distortions. One can interpret these discount factor shocks as political preference
shocks, which lead the fiscal authority to prefer higher consumption today. These
political preference shocks can be caused, for example, by elections. Malley, Philip-
popoulos, and Woitek (2007) model elections explicitly and their impact on fiscal pol-
icy. Niemann (2011) argues that the fiscal myopia is taken as a primitive of the model.
Therefore, it is important to understand that such myopia can arise endogenously in
a political-economic context such as electoral concerns among politicians. With the
decline in political uncertainty, the fiscal authority gets back to the long-run consistent
and benevolent policy. In contrast to the fiscal authority, the central bank always has
the same discount factor as the private households and thus shares the same objective
function. Therefore, the central bank maximizes households’ utility by reacting opti-
mally to the distortions in the economy. The distortions are caused by the temporarily
shortsighted behavior of the fiscal authority. By changing the distortionary labor in-
come tax rate, the fiscal authority induces changes in firms’ marginal costs, leading to
price movements. The overall higher volatility of the economic variables causes welfare
to decline. Fiscal myopia is only one of the two aspects of the fiscal shortsightedness
in this model.
The second aspect of fiscal shortsightedness is the following: The fiscal authority
does not internalize the reaction of a benevolent central bank to a temporarily short-
sighted fiscal policy. Therefore, the fiscal authority maximizes households’ lifetime
utility assuming that the central bank follows the long-run consistent monetary policy
rule, i.e. a constant real money growth rate. Hence, my argument is similar to that
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made by Niemann (2011), who says that an implication of fiscal myopia is the failure
to internalize the systematic response of future policies to variations in the future state
of the economy. I extend this argument further by assuming that the fiscal authority
fails to internalize the optimal response of the monetary policy.
I derive the following results: a fiscal authority that is hit by a temporary dis-
count factor shock increases the public spending and decreases the labor income tax
financed by higher public debt. A lower labor income tax reduces the marginal cost
for producers, thus leading them to lower their prices. Consequently, inflation falls,
but its volatility and price dispersion increase. With the volatility of the tax rate and
the inflation rate rising, the distortions in the economy increase. Therefore, the central
bank’s optimal response is to reduce these distortions. The central bank achieves this
by reducing the money supply in order to reduce seigniorage revenues. Lower seignior-
age revenues lower the fiscal authority’s income. Therefore, the fiscal authority cannot
lower the tax rate as much as under a long-run consistent monetary policy, i.e. under
a constant money growth rate. This leads to higher tax revenues. Therefore, debt
accumulation is smaller, and consequently, there are fewer price movements. Thus,
the volatility of the inflation rate shrinks and price dispersion declines. Consequently,
the central bank can reduce the volatility of inflation and the labor income tax rate,
thereby reducing the welfare costs and increasing overall welfare compared to an econ-
omy where the central bank uses either the long-run consistent or a standard rule-based
policy as proposed by Taylor (1993).
This chapter is in line with the literature that investigates the interaction between
the fiscal and monetary authorities. Adam (2011), for example, derives the optimal
monetary and fiscal policy under commitment in dependency to the level of the fiscal
authority debt. However, as the author stresses, ”the [...] paper focused exclusively
on technology shocks. Other shocks, e.g., shocks to agent’s discount factors give rise
to additional sources of budget risk, as they move the real interest rates at which the
government can refinance its outstanding debt.” (Adam 2011, , p. 71) Thus, he does
not investigates distortions caused by a fiscal authority. Niemann and Hagen (2008),
Niemann (2011) and Niemann, Pichler, and Sorger (2013) describe the interactions
of monetary and fiscal policy in a strategic game where none of them can commit to
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future actions. In their model, the fiscal authority is always impatient, always causing
adverse welfare effects, which is a quite strong assumption. Rieth (2011) investigates
an impatient fiscal authority. He looks at the transition dynamics induced by a fiscal
authority that permanently has a higher discount factor than private households. How-
ever, an optimal monetary reaction is not presented. Kumhof and Yakadina (2007),
Juessen and Schabert (2013), and Hatchondo, Martinez, and Roch (2015) use a lower
fiscal authority discount factor to model political uncertainty induced by a finite plan-
ning horizon. They investigate political business cycles caused by fluctuations in the
planning horizon resulting from discount factor shocks, but also do not investigate an
optimal monetary policy response to these fluctuations. Thus, this chapter contributes
to the literature by investigating the optimal monetary response to business cycles
caused by shocks to the fiscal authority’s discount factor.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 describes the economic
model; Section 3.3 presents the fiscal and the monetary policy; Section 3.4 shows the
model’s parametrization; Section 3.5 examines the dynamics according to a discount
factor shock and presents the optimal monetary response; Section 3.6 concludes the
chapter.
3.2 The model
I use a parsimonious infinite-horizon economy with sticky prices, monopolistic compe-
tition, and a distortionary labor income tax. Households demand money to fulfill a
cash-in-advance constraint. The fiscal authority finances its consumption by levying a
distortionary labor income tax, receiving seigniorage from the central bank, and issuing
one-period, nominal, risk-free non-state-contingent bonds.
In each period, households supply labor to firms and consume a set of differentiated
goods. Each differentiated good is produced by a single firm in a monopolistically com-
petitive environment. Prices are assumed to be sticky á la Calvo (1983). Households
can invest in riskless government bonds. The fiscal authority levies a distortionary
labor income tax. Taxes and bonds are used to finance public consumption. More-
over, households face a cash-in-advance constraint, as they need money to buy goods.
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Money is supplied by a central bank.
3.2.1 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of identical households of mass one. Each
household has preferences defined over private consumption Ct, labor effort Nt, and
public spending Gt. Households maximize the sum of discounted period utility with
respect to their period-by-period budget constraints:
max
{Ct,Nt,Bt,Mt}
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Ct, Gt, Nt), 0 < β < 1,
where Et denotes the mathematical expectation operator conditional on information
available at time t. β is the discount factor and U is a strictly concave period utility
function strictly increasing in its first and second arguments, strictly decreasing in its
third argument. For the period utility function, I assume the following functional form
U(Ct, Gt, Nt) =
(Ct(1−Nt)γ)1−σ
1− σ +
G1−ψ
G
t
1− ψG , σ > 0, γ > 0, ψ
G > 0.
The consumption good is a composite good containing a continuum of differentiated
goods, Ct(i):
Ct =
(∫ 1
0
Ct(i)1−
1
 di
) 1
(1−1/)
,  > 1, (3.1)
where  measures the intratemporal elasticity of substitution across different varieties
of consumption goods. The level of Ct(i) is given by
Ct(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−
Ct,
which is the solution of minimizing the total expenditure,
∫ 1
0 Pt(i)Ct(i)di, for any given
level of Ct, subject to Equation (3.1). Pt(i) denotes the nominal price of a good of
variety i at time t. Pt denotes a nominal price index given by
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
Pt(i)1−di
) 1
1−
.
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The households’ period-by-period budget constraint is provided by
CtPt +
(
Bt
1 + it
)
+ Φ2B
2
t +Mt = Bt−1 +Mt−1 + (1− τWt )WtNt + Tt, (3.2)
whereWt is the nominal wage for a given amount of labor. Bt are non-state contingent,
riskless, nominal bonds issued by the fiscal authority. it is the nominal interest rate. Tt
are nominal dividends from ownership of firms. Mt are nominal money holdings. τWt
denotes a tax on labor income. Pt is the price for the consumption good. Φ measures
the size of the transaction costs that must be paid to a financial intermediary when
households enter the capital market, maintaining either a short or a long position in
real fiscal authority bonds. The transaction costs imply that an increase in the level of
fiscal authority debt leads to an increase in the interest rate of fiscal authority bonds.
The transaction costs ensure the existence of a well-defined steady-state. This being
just a tool to ensure a well-defined steady-state, I set Φ very small, so that the results
are not biased by the value of Φ. Kumhof and Yakadina (2007) also use this kind of
transaction costs.
In addition, households have to buy products with money, meaning they face a
cash-in-advance constraint:
Mt ≥ νmCtPt, νM > 0, (3.3)
where νM measures the fraction of consumption held in money. Like Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2007), I use λtµt as the Lagrange multiplier of the cash-in-advance constraint
and λt as the Lagrange multiplier of the households’ budget constraints. The first-order
conditions of the households’ problem with respect to Ct, Nt, Mt, and Bt are:
UC,t = λt(1− µtνM), (3.4)
−UN,t = (1− τWt )wtλt, (3.5)
λt(1 + µt)− βEtλt+1 1
pit+1
= 0, (3.6)
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λt
( 1
1 + it
+ Φbt
)
= βEtλt+1
1
pit+1
, (3.7)
where pit ≡ PtPt−1 is the gross inflation rate, wt is the real wage, and bt are the real
bonds.
3.2.2 Firms
Each good’s variety i is produced by a single firm in a monopolistically competitive
environment. Each firm i uses labor services Nt(i) as the single input factor. The
production technology is given by
Yt(i) = Nt(i)1−α, 0 < α < 1,
where Yt(i) is the output of good i. For the firms’ price setting behavior, I assume
price setting á la Calvo (1983). Prices are sticky, as in each period a fraction θ ∈ [0, 1)
of randomly picked firms is not allowed to change the nominal price of the good it
produces. The remaining (1 − θ) firms choose prices optimally. Firms choose their
price P ∗t which maximizes their profit:
max
P ∗t
∞∑
k=0
θkEt
(
Qt,t+k(P ∗t Yt+k|t −Ψt+k(Yt+k|t))
)
, (3.8)
where Qt,t+k ≡
(
βk λt+k
λt
1
pit+k
− Φbt
)
denotes the stochastic discount factor and Ψt the
cost function.1 The maximization of the (3.8) subject to the demand equation
Yt+k|t =
(
P ∗t
Pt+k
)−
Yt+k, (3.9)
where Yt+k|t denotes output in period t + k for a firm that has last reset its price in
period t and Pt is the aggregate price index2, leads to the following first-order condition
of firms’ optimization problem:
∞∑
k=0
θkEt
(
Qt,t+kYt+k|t
(
P ∗t −

− 1MCt+k|tPt+k
))
= 0,
1The definition of Qt,t+k follows directly from the households’ first-order condition (3.7).
2It is given by: (Pt)1− = θ (Pt−1)1− + (1− θ) (P ∗t )1−.
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where one used that MCt+k|t = ψt+k|t/Pt+k and ψt+k|t = Ψ′t+k(Yt+k|t). Rewriting this
equation yields (by dividing by Pt+k):
∞∑
k=0
θkEt
Qt,t+k
(
P ∗t
Pt+k
)−1−
Yt+k
(
P ∗t
Pt+k
− 
− 1MCt+k|t
) = 0. (3.10)
Following Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007), I write (3.10) in a recursive representation.
I define
x1,t ≡ Et
∞∑
k=0
θkQt,t+k
(
P ∗t
Pt+k
)−1−
Yt+kMCt+k|t.
Solving forward and using the demand Equation (3.9) leads to:
x1,t = (P˜ ∗t )−1−YtMCt + θEt
(
β
λt+1
λt
1
pit+1
− Φbt
)
pit+1
(
P˜t
∗
P˜ ∗t+1
)−1−
x1,t+1, (3.11)
where P˜ ∗t ≡ P
∗
t
Pt
denotes the relative price of any good whose price was adjusted in
period t in terms of the composite good. Define in addition
x2,t ≡ Et
∞∑
k=0
θkQt,t+k
(
P ∗t
Pt+k
)−−1
Yt+k
P ∗t
Pt
.
Solving forward and using the demand Equation (3.9) leads to:
x2,t = Yt(P˜ ∗t )− + θEt
(
β
λt+1
λt
1
pit+1
− Φbt
)
pi−1t+1
(
P˜t
∗
P˜ ∗t+1
)−
x2,t+1. (3.12)
Thus,

− 1x1,t = x2,t. (3.13)
3.2.3 The public sector
The fiscal authority chooses the public consumption Gt, the labor income tax rate τWt ,
and the fiscal authority debt Bt. It has access to a distortionary labor income tax,
issues one-period non-state-contingent bonds, and receives seigniorage revenues from
the central bank. The fiscal authority’s period-by-period budget constraint is then
given by
GtPt +Bt−1 +Mt−1 =
Bt
(1 + it)
+ τWt NtWt +Mt. (3.14)
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The central bank has one instrument, the monetary base.3 Thus, the central bank’s
task is to satisfy the households’ money demand and to transfer seigniorage revenues
to the fiscal authority. I define real seigniorage revenues Ψt as follows
Ψt = mt − mt−1
pit
.
A more detailed description of the fiscal authority’s and the central bank’s behavior
can be found in Section 3.3.
3.2.4 The equilibrium
I restrict my analysis to symmetric equilibria, where all households and firms behave
in an identical way. There will be no arbitrage opportunities and the markets will be
clear. The goods market clearing condition is
Yt = Gt + Ct. (3.15)
Firms can differ with regard to their prices, which may lead to dispersed prices. Thus,
market clearing of the goods market implies:
N1−αt =
∫ 1
0
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−
Yt di.
This can be rewritten as
N1−αt
Yt
=
∫ 1
0
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−
di︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡St
⇔ Yt = N
1−α
t
St
. (3.16)
St measures the price dispersion induced by the assumed nature of price stickiness (see
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 2007). Rewriting St yields
St =
∫ 1
0
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−
di,
3See McCallum (1999) for the similarity between an interest and a monetary base rule.
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⇔ St = (1− θ)
(
P ∗t
Pt
)−
+ (1− θ)θ
(
P ∗t−1
Pt
)−
+ ...,
⇔ St = (1− θ)
∞∑
j=0
θj
(
P ∗t−j
Pt
)−
.
Alternatively, by using that P
∗
t
Pt
≡ P˜ ∗t :
St = (1− θ)(P˜ ∗t )− + θpitSt−1. (3.17)
Thus, for the real marginal cost it holds:
MCt =
wt
(1− α)N−αt S−1t
. (3.18)
Lastly, the aggregate price index can be rewritten to describe the inflation rate:
1 = θpi−1+t + (1− θ)
(
P˜ ∗t
)1−
. (3.19)
Definition 1. For the given fiscal policy {bt, Gt, τWt } and monetary policy {mt}, sat-
isfying the fiscal authority budget constraint (3.14), a competitive equilibrium is a set
of sequences {Ct, Nt, Yt, wt, P˜ ∗t , pit, it, x1,t, x2,t, St,MCt, λt, µt}∞t=0, satisfying (3.3)-(3.7),
(3.11), (3.12), (3.13), (3.15), (3.16), (3.17), (3.18), (3.19) and the transversality con-
dition for an initial value for the real fiscal authority debt.
3.3 The behavior of the public sector
I expand the standard New Keynesian model presented above with a temporarily short-
sighted fiscal authority. One aspect of this fiscal shortsightedness is fiscal myopia.
Temporary fiscal myopia is modelled by a shock χt to the fiscal authority’s discount
factor in line with Primiceri, Schaumburg, and Tambalotti (2006). The government
maximizes households’ utiltiy:
E0
∞∑
t=0
χtβ
tU(Ct, Nt, Gt)
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The fiscal authority maximizes households’ lifetime utility using
(
βG
)t
= χtβt as its
discount factor. As χt follows an AR(1) process with mean one, the fiscal authority’s
discount factor βG equals the households’ discount factor β in the long-run. Thus, in
the absence of political uncertainty, the fiscal authority is fully benevolent. However, if
a positive shock hits χt, the fiscal authority weights current utility temporarily higher
than the households’ do, leading the fiscal authority to increase its consumption. This
makes the issuance of new debt relatively attractive for the fiscal authority, since it is
willing to pay a higher interest rate than that demanded by the households, resulting
in a debt bias (see Rieth 2011). The fiscal authority finances the increase in public
consumption by increasing its debt and lowering the labor income tax, supporting a
temporary consumption boom similar to that shown by Kumhof and Yakadina (2007).
This fiscal myopia is only one of the two aspects of fiscal shortsightedness in this model.
The second aspect of fiscal shortsightedness is the following one: The fiscal authority
does not internalize the reaction of a benevolent central bank to a temporarily myopic
fiscal policy. Therefore, the fiscal authority maximizes households’ lifetime utility based
on the assumption that the central bank follows the long-run consistent monetary policy
rule, i.e. a constant real money growth rate. Hence, my argument is similar to that
of Niemann (2011), who says that an implication of fiscal myopia is the failure to
internalize the systematic response of future policies to variations in the future state of
the economy. I take this argument further by assuming that the fiscal authority fails to
internalize the optimal response of the monetary policy. The optimal monetary policy
is described in detail in Section 3.5.
On the contrary, the central bank’s discount factor βM is always equal to the
households’ discount factor β. Thus, the central bank always maximizes the households’
lifetime utility and is fully benevolent.
Sections (3.3.1) and (3.3.2) describe the fiscal and monetary authority’s optimiza-
tion problem in greater detail.
3.3.1 The fiscal authority’s optimization problem
The fiscal authority maximizes the net present value of households’ lifetime utility
given the long-run consistent central bank behavior described by mt
mt−1
pit = piSS. piSS is
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the steady-state value of the gross inflation rate. The complete optimization problem
and the corresponding first-order conditions are described in the Appendix 3.A.3. It
is important to note that, using this representation of the optimization problem of the
fiscal authority, I incorporate both aspects of the fiscal authority’s shortsightedness:
The fiscal authority does not internalize the central bank’s optimal reaction and it can
have a different discount factor than the households.
I begin by solving the model under a temporarily shortsighted fiscal authority
given a constant money growth rate consistent with the long-run monetary policy. The
behavior of the fiscal authority is derived using the primal approach to the Ramsey
problem. First, one derives a sequence of implementability constraints by substituting
prices it and wt and the tax rate τWt in the households’ budget constraint (3.2) using
the households’ first-order conditions (3.5) and (3.7) and the definition of the firms’
marginal costs (3.18) and iterating forward. Using the transversality condition as well
as the definition of firms’ profits, one ends up with:4
λt
pit
bt−1 = Et
∞∑
j=0
βjλt+j
[
Ct+j − EtΦb2t+j + Et
Φ
2 b
2
t+j +mt+j −mt+j−1
1
pit+j
+ UN,t+j
λt+j
Nt+j
−N1−αt+j S−1t+j +MCt+j(1− α)N−αt+jS−1t+jNt+j
]
.
(3.20)
The transversality condition (3.20), along with the equilibrium conditions and the as-
sumed behavior of the monetary authority, form the constraints of the fiscal authority’s
optimization problem. Based on the corresponding first-order conditions of this opti-
mization problem, I can approximate the fiscal authority’s policy by linear functions.
Since the model is solved using a linear approximation, one can use a linear approxi-
mation of the fiscal authority’s behavior without any significant loss of accuracy. This
approximation is found by using linear regressions of the fiscal authority’s instruments
(the fiscal authority’s real debt bt and public spending Gt).5 To minimize the loss
of information, I choose a high number of simulated periods and use all observable
4The complete derivation can be found in the Appendix 3.A.1. The implementability constraint for
the fiscal authority is also the same for the central bank. The optimization problem of the central
bank is explained in Section 3.3.2.
5I do not have to regress the labor income tax, since, given the debt and public spending, taxes are
completely determined.
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predetermined variables as regressors. I use the following regression equations:
bt − bss =φbb(bt−1 − bss) + φbχ(χt−1 − χss) + φbS(St−1 − Sss)
+ φbm(mt−1 −mss) + φbλ(λt−1 − λss) + φbP˜ ∗(P˜ ∗t−1 − P˜ ∗ss) + φbχχt ,
(3.21)
Gt −Gss =φGb(bt−1 − bss) + φGχ(χt−1 − χss) + φGS(St−1 − Sss)
+ φGm(mt−1 −mss) + φGλ(λt−1 − λss) + φGP˜ ∗(P˜ ∗t−1 − P˜ ∗ss) + φbχχt ,
(3.22)
where (·)ss stands for the corresponding steady-state value. Only predetermined vari-
ables (namely the lagged price dispersion St−1, lagged government bonds bt−1, lagged
real money holdings mt−1, the lagged Lagrange multiplier of the households’ optimiza-
tion problem λt−1, lagged optimal firms’ price P˜ ∗t−1, as well as the exogenous lagged
discount factor shock χt−1 and its corresponding innovation χt ) are used as explanatory
variables mimicking the standard state space representation.
Next, I solve the model and simulate the economy for 50,000 periods. I then run
the two regressions (3.21) and (3.22). For the given parameters (see Section 3.4) Table
3.1 reports the estimation results.
Table 3.1: Estimated parameters for the linear approximation of the fiscal policy solving
the model with a Taylor approximation of order one and simulating the model for 50,000
periods.
Parameter φbb φbχ φbS φbm φbP˜ ∗ φbλ φbχ
Value 0.8653 0.2337 22.283 -431.028 -6.40e-03 -0.3232 0.0310
Parameter φGb φGχ φGS φGm φGP˜ ∗ φGλ φGχ
Value -0.0085 0.0074 -0.1644 11.845 -2.18e-04 0.0091 0.0223
The estimation results give insight into the fiscal authority’s behavior. The fiscal
authority’s bonds have a high autocorrelation. As expected, the government bonds
and the public consumption increase in the fiscal authority’s weight χt on the current
period’s outcomes. In addition, the coefficient φbm measuring the effect of real money
holdings on real fiscal authority bonds is negative, indicating that higher seigniorage
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revenues render debt financed fiscal policy less necessary.
The policy functions (3.21) and (3.22) describe the behavior of a temporarily short-
sighted fiscal authority. Therefore, I can isolate the inefficiency caused by a temporarily
shortsighted fiscal authority. In the next step, I solve the central bank’s optimization
problem by taking these policy function as given. Thus, the central bank acts optimally
by considering the fiscal authority’s shortsighted policy described by Equations (3.21)
and (3.22). A detailed description of the monetary policy can be found in the following
section.
3.3.2 The central bank’s optimization problem
The central bank’s optimization is described by the maximization of the households’
lifetime utility given the equilibrium conditions and the behavior of the temporarily
shortsighted fiscal authority. As the central bank’s discount factor βM is always equal to
the households’ discount factor β, the central bank is fully benevolent. The first-order
conditions of this optimization problem describe the optimal monetary policy under full
commitment, considering the behavior of the temporarily shortsighted fiscal authority.
The transversality condition (3.20), the equilibrium conditions, and the behavior of the
fiscal authority described by (3.21) and (3.22) are the constraints of the central bank’s
optimization problem. The mathematical description of this optimization problem as
well as the derivation of the corresponding first-order conditions can be found in the
Appendix 3.A.2.
3.4 Parametrization
This section describes the parametrization of the model. All parameters are chosen to
match quarterly data. The discount factor shock χt follows a stationary AR(1) process
χt = χρ
χ
t−1 exp (χt ) ,
where χt is white noise with a mean of zero. For the discount factor shock, the persis-
tence value ρχ is set to a modest value of 0.6. The standard deviation of the innovations
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is σχ = 0.01.6
Since the period utility function has the same functional form as in Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe (2007), the values I assign to the preference parameters are similar to those
used by these authors: σ = 2, so that the intertemporal elasticity of consumption,
holding the hours worked as constant, is 0.5; γ is set to 1.7, given that in the deter-
ministic steady-state households allocate on average about 20 percent of their time to
work, as it is the case in the U.S. economy according to Prescott (1986). I choose the
elasticity with respect to public spending ψG to be 1.1367, matching the fact that in
the deterministic steady-state, public spending is 20 percent of GDP, which is in line
with postwar U.S. data.
The households’ discount factor β is 0.9902, which is consistent with an annual
real rate of interest of 4 percent (see Prescott 1986). I follow Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2007) in setting the price elasticity  to be 5. The fraction of firms that can change
their price in any given quarter measured by θ is 0.8. This value implies that on average
firms change their price every five quarters.
The production function is Cobb-Douglas with (1−α) as the cost share of labor. It
is set to 0.7 in line with the empirical findings that in the U.S. economy wages represent
about 70 percent of total production costs.
Since monetary aggregate M1 is about 17 percent of annual GDP during the period
1960 - 1999, I set the steady-state ratio of M to Y to be 0.68. Lastly I set the transaction
costs parameter Φ to be 0.01. This value is quite arbitrary, as higher values of Φ only
lead to a faster convergence of the bonds after a discount factor shock. I set it to
this small number just to exclude the existence of a unit root and to prevent that the
results are biased by the transaction costs. Table 3.2 summarizes the chosen parameter
values.
6In a robustness analysis, I have varied the values for the persistence and the standard deviation of
the discount factor shock. The results presented below do not change qualitatively.
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Table 3.2: Model’s parametrization matching quarterly data.
Parameter Value Parameter Value
β 0.9902 ψG 1.1367
σ 2.0000 γ 1.7000
Φ 0.0100 θ 0.8000
 5.0000 ρχ 0.6000
G/Y 0.2000 σχ 0.0100
m/Y 0.6800 α 0.3000
3.5 The optimal central bank reaction to a tem-
porarily shortsighted fiscal authority
This section describes the optimal monetary response to a temporary increase of χt by
analyzing impulse response functions.7 The fiscal authority becomes more impatient,
since it now prefers higher current utility than before the discount factor shock has
occurred. It simply discounts the future more.
I present three different monetary policies: the optimal monetary behavior derived
in Section 3.3.2 and two other monetary policy regimes to compare how much the
optimal monetary policy differs from the long-run consistent monetary policy and a
standard New Keynesian monetary policy. To summarize:
1. The long-run consistent monetary policy sets the real money growth rate con-
stant:
mt
mt−1
pit = piSS. (3.23)
2. The ”standard” New Keynesian monetary policy is the optimal response to a fiscal
authority consumption shock in a standard New Keynesian model abstracted
from a discount factor shock. This rule has a similar interpretation as the well-
known policy rule proposed by Taylor (1993). The derivation of this policy is
described in more detail below.
The rationale for this comparison is as follows: The first rule describes a monetary
authority that does not take into account the fiscal authority’s behavior. Instead,
7All results are calculated using Dynare 4.4.2 for MatLab. The software package is available at
http://www.dynare.org.
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it passively follows a given rule, which is, however, consistent in the long-run. The
second policy considers the fiscal authority’s behavior and is derived using the Ramsey
approach. However, this policy describes the behavior of a monetary authority in a
standard New Keynesian model, where a discount factor shock is not present. By
comparing this policy with the optimal one, I ask whether and how much the central
bank has to adjust its standard policy to temporary fiscal shortsightedness.
I start the analysis by investigating the reaction of a number of endogenous vari-
ables of interest to a temporary increase in χt, where the central bank sets the real
money growth rate constant (see Figure 3.1). The fiscal authority becomes temporar-
ily shortsighted and increases its consumption by about 0.3 percent of its steady-state
value. For a myopic fiscal authority, the issuance of new debt becomes relatively more
attractive since it is willing to pay a higher interest rate than that demanded by the
households. This in turn induces a debt bias. Thus, the fiscal authority finances its
higher spending by increasing its debt and by additionally reducing the labor income
tax, generating a consumption boom, as illustrated by Kumhof and Yakadina (2007).
However, since debt has to be repaid, the income tax rate increases slowly and stays
over its steady-state value at maximum 0.024 percent after 32 quarters. Higher public
debt also leads to an increase in the nominal interest rate. As the labor income tax
rate falls, households supply more labor. The impact causes marginal costs to fall, as
they are a negative function of the tax rate.8 This induces firms to lower prices. With
declining inflation, the central bank increases today’s money supply to keep the real
money growth rate constant. Equation (3.23) shows a negative link between today’s
money stock and today’s inflation given past money supply. As the cash-in-advance
constraint holds, higher real money holdings go tandem with higher private consump-
tion. Overall, these effects lead the output to rise above its steady-state value by about
0.07 percent. Thus, it can be concluded that the monetary authority under the first
policy regime supports the fiscal authority’s shortsightedness by increasing the money
supply and thus the fiscal authority’s seigniorage revenues.
By considering the optimal monetary policy (see Figure 3.1), one can detect clear
differences in the central bank’s behavior compared the long-run consistent monetary
8The negative relation can be seen by inserting the real wage in Equation (3.18) into the intratemporal
labor decision (3.5).
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Figure 3.1: Impulse responses to a temporary increase in the fiscal authority’s discount
factor
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Note: The impulse response functions are percent-deviations from the corresponding
steady-state values (y-axis). The fiscal authority’s debt is not measured in logs as its
steady-state is near zero. The x-axis is measured in quarters. A first-order approxima-
tion is used.
policy. As before, the fiscal authority increases its spending by almost 0.3 percent,
but finances it with less debt accumulation and a higher labor income tax rate than in
the case of the long-run consistent monetary policy. Instead of the tax rate decreasing
by about 0.17 percent, it falls only about 0.125 percent. This change is induced by a
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conservative monetary authority, which does not support the temporary fiscal short-
sightedness. The central bank’s goal is to maximize households’ welfare, which is why
it tries to minimize all welfare costs induced by a shortsighted fiscal authority. In the
presence of nominal rigidities, inflation volatility entails welfare costs because it gen-
erates price dispersion. The income tax rate’s volatility also causes welfare costs due
to the distorting tax. Thus, the central bank attempts to lower both volatilities. To
achieve this, the central bank uses money supply actively to reduce the volatility of the
inflation and of the tax rate. In fact, it lowers money supply, thereby reducing the fiscal
authority’s income from seigniorage. This leads the fiscal authority to reduce its tax
cut, since forgone seigniorage revenues have to be financed. Consequently, tax revenues
do not decrease as much as before, leading to a faster reduction in the fiscal authority’s
debt. However, since the fiscal authority is temporarily shortsighted, it does not re-
duce public spending in reaction to the lower seigniorage revenues. The initial amount
of debt is its optimal response to a lower discount factor, and although seigniorage
revenues decline, the fiscal authority does not lower its spending significantly. Instead,
it only reduces the tax cut. As the shortsighted fiscal authority prefers a high present
utility, reducing public spending would actually reduce its utility. Therefore, its opti-
mal response to the money supply reduction is mainly a reduction in the tax rate cut.
As the tax rate’s response is weaker than in the case of the long-run consistent mone-
tary policy, marginal costs do not fall as much as before. This dampens the reaction
of the inflation rate, since firms, which can adjust their prices in the current period,
do not reduce their prices as much as before. In addition, reducing the money supply
does also reduce private consumption, as households are limited in their consumption
by the cash-in-advance constraint.
Table 3.3: Standard deviation (in percentage points) of corresponding variables in the
models with the long-run consistent monetary policy, the optimal monetary policy and
the standard monetary policy (second-order approximation).
Constant Money Optimal Monetary Standard Monetary
Growth Rate Policy Policy
Variable
Income Tax Rate 0.1103 0.0760 0.0754
Inflation 0.0060 0.0014 0.0039
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To conclude, the central bank can reduce both the volatility of the inflation rate
and the labor income tax rate (see Table 3.3), thereby reducing the welfare costs of a
temporarily shortsighted fiscal authority. This increases as expected the overall welfare
compared to a long-run consistent monetary policy.
To calculate the welfare gains I solve the model by using a second-order approxima-
tion. Faia and Monacelli (2007) point out that one cannot rely on first-order approxi-
mation methods to evaluate welfare. In this model, distortions exert an effect both in
the short-run and in the steady-state, while stochastic volatility has an effect on both
the first and second moments of the variables that are critical for welfare. Therefore,
higher-order approximation is necessary.9
The following results are obtained: Households living in an economy with a long-run
consistent monetary policy must be provided with an increase in their consumption by
0.021 percent as a compensation in order to make them equal with households living
in an economy with an optimal monetary policy. In other words, this consumption
compensation is the percentage increase in consumption that would yield the same
welfare level as implied by the optimal policy. This number seems to be small, but
one can notice, using figures for total personal consumption expenditures in the U.S.
in 2013, that the welfare costs are about 2.34 billion U.S.-dollars per year.
This leads to the conclusion that, if the central bank takes fiscal policy into account,
it tries to reduce the fiscal authority’s real debt accumulation. To achieve this goal,
the central bank has to reduce the monetary supply, which reduces the volatility of the
inflation and the tax rate, too. In addition, the smaller decline in the inflation rate
reduces the real debt even further.
Lastly, one could wonder if the optimal monetary reaction is simply a standard
reaction of an uninformed central bank or if the central bank has to modify its policy
when the fiscal authority gets temporarily shortsighted. Therefore, I use the model
described above but modify it slightly so that it becomes a standard New Keynesian
model without any kind of fiscal shortsightedness. Instead, I replace the endogenous
public spending by exogenous public spending, which is modelled using an AR(1)
process. Having this standard model I can find the optimal standard New Keynesian
9See also Kim and Kim (2003) and Kim and Kim (2005) for an analysis of the inaccuracy of welfare
calculations based on linear approximations.
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monetary policy reaction to an increase in public spending. I derive this optimal central
bank reaction by solving a standard Ramsey planner problem where public spending
is an exogenous variable. After that I approximate the optimal standard central bank
policy by running a linear regression. This is similar to the derivation of linear rules
for the fiscal authority’s instruments in Section 3.3.1. This time, however, I do it for
the central bank instrument - the real money supply. The following regression (3.24)
has the dependent variable mtpit, and since Yt = Gt+Ct, and mt = νmCt the regression
(3.24) can be rewritten as a simple money growth rate rule. Therefore, it has a similar
interpretation to the standard monetary rule proposed by Taylor (1993). Concretely,
the linear regression has the following form:
mtpit − (msspiss) =φgmb(bt−1 − bss) + φgmS(St−1 − Sss) + φgmY (Yt−1 − Y ss)
+ φgmpi(pit−1 − piss) + φgmG(Gt−1 −Gss) + φgmi(it−1 − iss),
(3.24)
The estimated parameter values are shown in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: Estimated parameters for the central bank policy after solving a standard
New-Keynesian model with a first-order approximation and simulating the model for
50,000 periods.
Parameter φgmb φgmS φgmY φgmpi φgmG φgmi
Value -0.0115 -57.553 0.5273 0.0308 -0.5098 6.94e-01
I use this linear monetary policy rule along with the two linear fiscal authority policy
rules (3.21) and (3.22) to describe the standard New Keynesian monetary policy. Fig-
ure 3.1 presents the reaction of this type of central bank to a temporarily shortsighted
fiscal authority. The standard central bank policy lies between the constant real money
growth rate policy and the optimal policy, indicating that the standard central bank
policy cannot mimic the optimal policy completely. The volatility of the labor income
tax rate is nearly the same as under the optimal monetary policy; however, the volatil-
ity of the inflation rate is nearly three times larger. Consequently, the mean of the
economy’s welfare is lower than under the optimal policy. Interestingly, in contrast
to the constant real money growth rate rule, the standard New Keynesian monetary
policy implies a reduction in the money supply similar to the optimal monetary policy.
However, this reduction is smaller compared with the optimal monetary policy. There-
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fore, the central bank has to modify its standard behavior in case of a temporarily
shortsighted fiscal authority by decreasing money supply more than it would normally
do.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I evaluate the stabilizing properties of an optimal monetary policy
under a temporarily shortsighted fiscal authority. Both the central bank and the fis-
cal authority act under full commitment and the fiscal authority is only temporarily
shortsighted. One aspect of the fiscal shortsightedness is fiscal myopia. The other is
that the fiscal authority does not internalize the reaction of a benevolent central bank
to a temporarily shortsighted fiscal policy.
The findings are as follows: If the fiscal authority is hit by a temporary shock evok-
ing fiscal shortsightedness, the fiscal authority increases public spending, and decreases
labor income tax financed by accumulation of public debt. A lower labor income tax
lowers the marginal cost of the producers, leading them to lower their prices. Thus,
inflation falls; however, the volatility of inflation and the price dispersion increase. As
the volatility of the tax rate and of the inflation rate rise, the distortions in the economy
increase, too. Therefore, the central bank’s optimal response is to reduce these distor-
tions by decreasing the money supply in order to reduce seigniorage revenues. Lower
seigniorage revenues decrease the fiscal authority’s seigniorage income. Consequently,
the fiscal authority cannot lower the tax rate as much as under the long-run consistent,
i.e. a constant real money growth rate rule, or under a standard New Keynesian mon-
etary policy (similar to the one proposed by Taylor (1993)). Higher tax revenues lead
to less debt accumulation and to less movements in goods’ prices. Thus, the volatility
of the inflation rate shrinks and price dispersion declines. Therefore, the central bank
can lower the volatility of inflation and the labor income tax rate, thereby reducing
welfare costs and increasing overall welfare.
However, the model studied in this chapter leaves out several features that are
important for understanding business fluctuations. Incorporating nominal wage stick-
iness, real frictions such as habit formation, capital adjustment costs, and variable
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capacity utilization would enrich the model and improve its realism. I leave it to fu-
ture research to integrate these feature, and to check how introducing these elements
would influence my results.
In addition, an interesting extension would be to ask the same question in the
context of a monetary union. One could expand the model to a two-country model in
order to derive the optimal monetary response to a temporarily shortsighted behavior
of only one of the two fiscal authorities. The central bank would try to stabilize the
overall inflation rate of the monetary union.
In addition, as public spending is unproductive in my model, an interesting future
research direction would be to investigate if the results are robust when introducing
productive public spending.
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3.A Appendix
3.A.1 Derivation of the implementability constraint
This appendix shows in detail how to derive the sequence of implementability con-
straints. We start with the households’ period-by-period budget constraint
Ct +
(
bt
1 + it
)
+ Φ2 b
2
t +mt =
bt−1
pit
+mt−1
1
pit
+ (1− τWt )wtNt + tt. (3.25)
By using the households’ FOCs to substitute out 11+it and (1− τWt )wt and by using the
definition of real firms’ profits tt = N1−αt S−1t −MCt(1− α)N−αt S−1t Nt one can rewrite
(3.25) as follows:
Ct + btEt
(
β
λt+1
λt
1
pit+1
− Φbt
)
+ Φ2 b
2
t +mt =
bt−1
1
pit
+mt−1
1
pit
− UN,t
λt
Nt +N1−αt S−1t −MCt(1− α)N−αt S−1t Nt.
(3.26)
Rewrite (3.26) as
bt−1
1
pit
=Ct + btEt
(
β
λt+1
λt
1
pit+1
− Φbt
)
+ Φ2 b
2
t +mt
−mt−1 1
pit
+ UN,t
λt
Nt −N1−αt S−1t +MCt(1− α)N−αt S−1t Nt.
(3.27)
For convenience, define
zt ≡ Ct−Φb2t +
Φ
2 b
2
t +mt−mt−1
1
pit
+UN,t
λt
Nt−N1−αt S−1t +MCt(1−α)N−αt S−1t Nt. (3.28)
Using this definition one can rewrite (3.27) as
bt−1 = ztpit + pitβEt
(
λt+1
λt
1
pit+1
bt
)
. (3.29)
Then iterate forward (3.29)
bt−1 = ztpit+βpitEt
(
λt+1
λt
zt+1
)
+β2pitEt
(
λt+2
λt
zt+2
)
+...+βj+1pitEt
(
λt+j+1
λt
1
pit+j+1
bt+j
)
.
(3.30)
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Letting j → ∞ and using the transversality condition yields the sequence of imple-
mentability constraints
λtbt−1
1
pit
= Et
∞∑
j=0
βjλt+jzt+j. (3.31)
Or by using the definition of zt
λtbt
1
pit
= Et
∞∑
j=0
βjλt+j
[
Ct+j − Φb2t+j +
Φ
2 b
2
t+j +mt+j −mt+j−1
1
pit+j
+ UN,t+j
λt+j
Nt+j
−N1−αt+j S−1t+j +MCt+j(1− α)N−αt+jS−1t+jNt+j
]
.
(3.32)
3.A.2 The central bank’s optimization problem
Setting up the central bank’s as well as the fiscal authority’s optimization problem one
has to be aware of the infinite double sum, thus one rewrites it recursively following
Aiyagari et al. (2002).10 The central bank’s optimization problem is described by
10One solves the double sum by defining a new Lagrangian multiplier λ0,jt = λ
0,j
t−1+χtωt, j = {f,m},
where ωt is the Lagrangian multiplier of (3.20) and λ0,j−1 is assumed to be zero. In addition one
uses the law of iterated expectations. In the case of the central bank, χt equals one. The complete
derivation can be found in Appendix 3.A.4.
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max
{Ct,Nt,P˜ ∗t ,St,x1,t,x2,t,pit,MCt,mt,λt,µt,bt,Gt}
Jmt = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
U(Ct, Nt, Gt) + λ0,mt
(
λtCt
+mtλt −mt−1 1
pit
λt + UN,tNt
− λtN
1−α
t
St
+ λtMCt(1− α)S−1t N1−αt
− Φ2 b
2
tλt
)
+
(
λ0,mt−1 − λ0,mt
) λt
pit
bt−1
+ λ1,mt
(
N1−αt
St
− Ct −Gt
)
+ λ2,mt
(

− 1x1,t − x2,t
)
+ λ3,mt
x1,t
− (P˜ ∗t )−1−
N1−αt
St
MCt − θEt
(
βλt+1
λt
1
pit+1
− Φbt
)
pit+1
(
P˜t
∗
P˜ ∗t+1
)−1−
x1,t+1

+λ4,mt
x2,t− N1−αt
St
(P˜ ∗t )−− θEt
(
βλt+1
λt
1
pit+1
− Φbt
)
pi−1t+1
(
P˜t
∗
P˜ ∗t+1
)−
x2,t+1

+ λ5,mt
(
1− θpi−1+t − (1− θ)
(
P˜ ∗t
)1−)
+ λ6,mt
(
St − (1− θ)(P˜ ∗t )− − θpitSt−1
)
+ λ7,mt
(
UC,t − λt(1− µtνM)
)
+ λ8,mt
(
λt(1 + µt)− λt+1β 1
pit+1
)
+ λ9,mt
(
−mt + νMCt
)
+ λ10,mt
(
bt − bss
− φbb(bt−1 − bss)− φbχ(χt−1 − χss)
− φbS(St−1 − Sss)− φbm(mt−1 −mss)
− φbλ(λt−1 − λss)− φbP˜ ∗(P˜ ∗t−1 − P˜ ∗ss)
− φbχχt
)
+ λ11,mt
(
Gt −Gss − φGb(bt−1 − bss)
− φGχ(χt−1 − χss)− φGS(St−1 − Sss)
− φGm(mt−1 −mss)− φGλ(λt−1 − λss)
− φGP˜ ∗(P˜ ∗t−1 − P˜ ∗ss)− φbχχt
)]
,
(3.33)
where the last two conditions are the linear policy functions describing the fiscal
authority’s behavior. The first order conditions of the central bank’s optimization
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problem are:
∂Jmt
∂Ct
= UC,t + λ0,mt λt + λ1,mt (−1) + λ7,mt UCC,t + λ9,mt νM = 0, (3.34)
∂Jmt
∂Nt
= UN,t + λ0,mt
(
UNN,tNt + UN,t − λt(1− α)N−αt S−1t + λtMCt(1− α)2S−1t N−αt
)
+ λ1,mt (1− α)N−αt S−1t − λ3,mt (1− α)S−1t N−αt MCt(P˜ ∗t )−1−
+ λ4,mt (−1)(1− α)N−αt S−1t (P˜ ∗t )−
= 0,
(3.35)
∂Jmt
∂P˜ ∗t
= −λ3,mt θEt
(
βλt+1
λt
1
pit+1
− Φbt
)
(pit+1)(−− 1)
(
P˜ ∗t
P˜ ∗t+1
)−−2 1
P˜ ∗t+1
x1,t+1
+ λ4,mt (−1)θEt
(
βλt+1
λt
1
pit+1
− Φbt
)
(pit+1)−1(−)
(
P˜ ∗t
P˜ ∗t+1
)−−1 1
P˜ ∗t+1
x2,t+1
+ λ5,mt (−1)(1− θ)(1− )(P˜ ∗t )− + λ6,mt (−1)(1− θ)(−)(P˜ ∗t )−−1
+ λ3,mt (−1)(−1− )(P˜ ∗t )−−2N1−αt S−1t MCt + λ4,mt (−1)N1−αt S−1t (−)(P˜ ∗t )−−1
+ (β)−1
(
λ3,mt−1(−1)θ
(
βλt
λt−1
1
pit
− Φbt−1
)
pit(−− 1)
(
P˜ ∗t−1
P˜ ∗t
)−−2
P˜ ∗t−1(P˜ ∗t )−2(−1)x1,t
+ λ4,mt−1(−1)θ
(
βλt
λt−1
1
pit
− Φbt−1
)
pi−1t (−)
(
P˜ ∗t−1
P˜ ∗t
)−−1
P˜ ∗t−1(P˜ ∗t )−2(−1)x2,t
)
+ βEtλ11,mt+1 (−φGP˜ ∗) + βEtλ10,mt+1 (−φbP˜ ∗) = 0,
(3.36)
∂Jmt
∂St
= λ1,mt N1−αt (−1)S−2t + λ6,mt + λ0,mt
(
−N1−αt S−2t λt(−1)
− λtMCt(1− α)S−2t N1−αt
)
+ λ3,mt (−1)(P˜ ∗t )−1−N1−αt (−1)S−2t MCt
+ λ4,mt (−1)(P˜ ∗t )−N1−αt (−1)S−2t
+ (β)Etλ6,mt+1(−1)θpit+1 + βEt(−λ10,mt+1 φbS − Etλ11,mt+1 φGS) = 0,
(3.37)
∂Jmt
∂x1,t
= λ2,mt

(− 1) + λ
3,m
t + (β)−1λ3,mt−1(−1)θ
(
β
λt
λt−1
1
pit
− Φbt−1
)
pit
(
P˜ ∗t−1
P˜ ∗t
)−−1
= 0,
(3.38)
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∂Jmt
∂x2,t
= λ2,mt (−1) + λ4,mt + (β)−1λ4,mt−1(−1)θ
(
β
λt
λt−1
1
pit
− Φbt−1
)
pi−1t
(
P˜ ∗t−1
P˜ ∗t
)−
= 0,
(3.39)
(3.40)
∂Jmt
∂pit
= λ5,mt (−θ)(− 1)pi−2t + λ6,mt (−θ)pi−1t St−1
+ (β)−1λ3,mt−1(−θ)
(
β
λt
λt−1
1
pit
− Φbt−1
)
pi−1t 
(
P˜ ∗t−1
P˜ ∗t
)−−1
x1,t
+ (β)−1λ4,mt−1(−θ)
(
β
λt
λt−1
1
pit
− Φbt−1
)
pi−2t (− 1)
(
P˜ ∗t−1
P˜ ∗t
)−
x2,t
+ λ0,mt λt(−1)mt−1
1
pi2t
(−1) + β−1λ8,mt−1λtβ
1
pi2t
+ (λ0,mt−1 − λ0,mt )
λtbt−1
pi2t
(−1)
+ β−1λ3,mt−1(−θ)β
λt
λt−1
1
pi2t
(−1)pit
(
P˜ ∗t−1
P˜ ∗t
)−−1
x1,t
+ β−1λ4,mt−1(−θ)β
λt
λt−1
1
pi2t
(−1)pi−1t
(
P˜ ∗t−1
P˜ ∗t
)−
x2,t
= 0,
∂Jmt
∂MCt
= λ0,mt (1− α)λt − λ3,mt (P˜ ∗t )−1− = 0, (3.41)
∂Jmt
∂λt
= λ0,mt
(
Ct +mt −mt−1 1
pit
−N1−αt S−1t +MCt(1− α)S−1t N1−αt −
Φ
2 b
2
t
)
+
(
λ0,mt−1 − λ0,mt
) bt−1
pit
+ λ3,mt (−θ)βEt
λt+1
(λt)2
(−1)pit+1
(
P˜ ∗t
P˜ ∗t+1
)−1−
x1,t+1
+ λ4,mt (−θ)βEt
λt+1
(λt)2
(−1)pi−1t+1
(
P˜ ∗t
P˜ ∗t+1
)−
x2,t+1
+ λ7,mt (−1)(1− µtνM) + λ8,mt (1 + µt) + (β)−1
(
λ3,mt−1(−θ)β
1
λt−1
pit
(
P˜ ∗t−1
P˜ ∗t
)−1−
x1,t
+ λ4,mt−1(−θ)β
1
λt−1
pi−1t
(
P˜ ∗t−1
P˜ ∗t
)−
x2,t + λ8,mt−1(−1)β
1
pit
)
+ βEtλ11,mt+1 (−φGλ) + βEtλ10,mt+1 (−φbλ) = 0,
(3.42)
79
∂Jmt
∂µt
= λ7,mt λtνM + λ8,mt λt = 0, (3.43)
∂Jmt
∂mt
= λ0,mt λt + λ9,mt (−1) + βλ0,mt+1(−1)
1
pit+1
λt+1 + βEt(−λ10,mt+1 φbm − λ11,mt+1 φGm) = 0,
(3.44)
∂Jmt
∂bt
= λ0,mt λt(−Φ)bt + (β)Et
(
λ0,mt − λ0,mt+1
) λt+1
pit+1
+ λ3,mt Et(−θ)(−Φ)pit+1
(
P˜ ∗t
P˜ ∗t+1
)−1−
x1,t+1
+ λ4,mt Et(−θ)(−Φ)pi−1t+1
(
P˜ ∗t
P˜ ∗t+1
)−
x2,t+1 + βEt(−λ10,mt+1 φbb − λ11,mt+1 φGb) + λ10,mt = 0,
(3.45)
∂Jmt
∂Gt
= UG,t + λ1,mt (−1) + λ11,mt = 0. (3.46)
3.A.3 The fiscal authority’s optimization problem
The fiscal authority’s optimization problem is described by
max
{Ct,Nt,P˜ ∗t ,St,x1,t,x2,t,pit,MCt,λt,µt,bt,Gt,mt}
Jft =
= E0
∞∑
t=0
χtβ
t
[
U(Ct, Nt, Gt) +
λ0,ft
χt
(
λtCt +mtλt −mt−1 1
pit
λt + UN,tNt − λtN
1−α
t
St
+ λtMCt(1− α)S−1t N1−αt −
Φ
2 b
2
tλt
)
+
(
λ0,ft−1 − λ0,ft
χt
)
λt
pit
bt−1
(3.47)
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+ λ1,ft
(
N1−αt
St
− Ct −Gt
)
+ λ2,ft
(

− 1x1,t − x2,t
)
+ λ3,ft
x1,t − (P˜ ∗t )−1−N1−αtSt MCt − θEt
(
βλt+1
λt
1
pit+1
− Φbt
)
pit+1
(
P˜t
∗
P˜ ∗t+1
)−1−
x1,t+1

+ λ4,ft
x2,t − N1−αt
St
(P˜ ∗t )− − θEt
(
βλt+1
λt
1
pit+1
− Φbt
)
pi−1t+1
(
P˜t
∗
P˜ ∗t+1
)−
x2,t+1

+ λ5,ft
(
1− θpi−1+t − (1− θ)
(
P˜ ∗t
)1−)
+ λ6,ft
(
St − (1− θ)(P˜ ∗t )− − θpitSt−1
)
+ λ7,ft
(
UC,t − λt(1− µtνM)
)
+ λ8,ft
(
λt(1 + µt)− λt+1β 1
pit+1
)
+ λ9,ft
(
−mt + νMCt
)
+ λ10,ft
(
mt
mt−1
pit − piSS
)]
,
(3.48)
The first order conditions of the fiscal authority’s optimization problem are:11
∂Jft
∂Ct
= UC,t +
λ0,ft
χt
λt + λ1,ft (−1) + λ7,ft UCC,t + λ9,ft νM = 0, (3.49)
∂Jft
∂Nt
= UN,t +
λ0,ft
χt
(
UNN,tNt + UN,t − λt(1− α)N−αt S−1t + λtMCt(1− α)2S−1t N−αt
)
+ λ1,ft (1− α)N−αt S−1t − λ3,ft (1− α)S−1t N−αt MCt(P˜ ∗t )−1−
+ λ4,ft (−1)(1− α)N−αt S−1t (P˜ ∗t )− = 0,
(3.50)
11U· stands for the first derivative of the utility function with respect to the corresponding variable.
U·· stands for the second derivative of the utility function with respect to the corresponding variable.
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∂Jft
∂P˜ ∗t
= −λ3,ft θEt
(
βλt+1
λt
1
pit+1
− Φbt
)
(pit+1)(−− 1)
(
P˜ ∗t
P˜ ∗t+1
)−−2 1
P˜ ∗t+1
x1,t+1
+ λ4,ft (−1)θEt
(
βλt+1
λt
1
pit+1
− Φbt
)
(pit+1)−1(−)
(
P˜ ∗t
P˜ ∗t+1
)−−1 1
P˜ ∗t+1
x2,t+1
+ λ5,ft (−1)(1− θ)(1− )(P˜ ∗t )− + λ6,ft (−1)(1− θ)(−)(P˜ ∗t )−−1
+ λ3,ft (−1)(−1− )(P˜ ∗t )−−2N1−αt S−1t MCt + λ4,ft (−1)N1−αt Sα−1t (−)(P˜ ∗t )−−1
+ χt−1
χt
(β)−1
(
λ3,ft−1(−1)θ
(
βλt
λt−1
1
pit
− Φbt−1
)
pit(−− 1)
(
P˜ ∗t−1
P˜ ∗t
)−−2
P˜ ∗t−1(P˜ ∗t )−2(−1)x1,t
+ λ4,ft−1(−1)θ
(
βλt
λt−1
1
pit
− Φbt−1
)
pi−1t (−)
(
P˜ ∗t−1
P˜ ∗t
)−−1
P˜ ∗t−1(P˜ ∗t )−2(−1)x2,t
)
= 0,
(3.51)
(3.52)
∂Jft
∂St
= λ1,ft N1−αt (−1)S−2t + λ6,ft +
λ0,ft
χt
(
−N1−αt S−2t λt(−1)
− λtMCt(1− α)S−2t N1−αt
)
+ λ3,ft (−1)(P˜ ∗t )−1−N1−αt (−1)S−2t MCt
+ λ4,ft (−1)(P˜ ∗t )−N1−αt (−1)S−2t +
χt+1
χt
(β)Etλ6,ft+1(−1)θpit+1
= 0,
∂Jft
∂x1,t
= λ2,ft

(− 1)+λ
3,f
t +
χt−1
χt
(β)−1λ3,ft−1(−1)θ
(
β
λt
λt−1
1
pit
− Φbt−1
)
pit
(
P˜ ∗t−1
P˜ ∗t
)−−1
= 0,
(3.53)
∂Jft
∂x2,t
= λ2,ft (−1) + λ4,ft +
χt−1
χt
(β)−1λ4,ft−1(−1)θ
(
β
λt
λt−1
1
pit
− Φbt−1
)
pi−1t
(
P˜ ∗t−1
P˜ ∗t
)−
= 0,
(3.54)
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∂Jft
∂pit
= λ5,ft (−θ)(− 1)pi−2t + λ6,ft (−θ)pi−1t St−1
+ χt−1
χt
(β)−1λ3,ft−1(−θ)
(
β
λt
λt−1
1
pit
− Φbt−1
)
pi−1t 
(
P˜ ∗t−1
P˜ ∗t
)−−1
x1,t
+ χt−1
χt
(β)−1λ4,ft−1(−θ)
(
β
λt
λt−1
1
pit
− Φbt−1
)
pi−2t (− 1)
(
P˜ ∗t−1
P˜ ∗t
)−
x2,t
+ λ
0,f
t
χt
λt(−1)mt−1 1
pi2t
(−1) + χt−1
χt
β−1λ8,ft−1λtβ
1
pi2t
+ λ10,ft
mt
mt−1
+ λ
0,f
t−1 − λ0,ft
χt
λtbt−1
pi2t
(−1)
+ χt−1
χt
β−1λ3,ft−1(−θ)β
λt
λt−1
1
pi2t
(−1)pit
(
P˜ ∗t−1
P˜ ∗t
)−−1
x1,t
+ χt−1
χt
β−1λ4,ft−1(−θ)β
λt
λt−1
1
pi2t
(−1)pi−1t
(
P˜ ∗t−1
P˜ ∗t
)−
x2,t = 0,
(3.55)
∂Jft
∂MCt
= λ
0,f
t
χt
(1− α)λt − λ3,ft (P˜ ∗t )−1− = 0, (3.56)
∂Jft
∂λt
= λ
0,f
t
χt
(
Ct +mt −mt−1 1
pit
−N1−αt S−1t +MCt(1− α)S−1t N1−αt −
Φ
2 b
2
t
)
+
(
λ0,ft−1 − λ0,ft
χt
)
bt−1
pit
+ λ3,ft (−θ)βEt
λt+1
(λt)2
(−1)pit+1
(
P˜ ∗t
P˜ ∗t+1
)−1−
x1,t+1
+ λ4,ft (−θ)βEt
λt+1
(λt)2
(−1)pi−1t+1
(
P˜ ∗t
P˜ ∗t+1
)−
x2,t+1
+ λ7,ft (−1)(1− µtνM) + λ8,ft (1 + µt) +
χt−1
χt
(β)−1
(
λ3,ft−1(−θ)β
1
λt−1
pit
(
P˜ ∗t−1
P˜ ∗t
)−1−
x1,t
+ λ4,ft−1(−θ)β
1
λt−1
pi−1t
(
P˜ ∗t−1
P˜ ∗t
)−
x2,t + λ8,ft−1(−1)β
1
pit
)
= 0,
(3.57)
∂Jft
∂µt
= λ7,ft λtνM + λ8,ft λt = 0, (3.58)
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∂Jft
∂bt
= λ
0,f
t
χt
λt(−Φ)bt + χt+1
χt
βEt
(
λ0,ft − λ0,ft+1
χt+1
)
λt+1
1
pit+1
+ λ3,ft (−θ)(−Φ)Etpit+1
(
P˜ ∗t
P˜ ∗t+1
)−1−
x1,t+1
+ λ4,ft (−θ)(−Φ)Etpi−1t+1
(
P˜ ∗t
P˜ ∗t+1
)−
x2,t+1 = 0,
(3.59)
∂Jft
∂Gt
= UG,t − λ1,ft = 0, (3.60)
∂Jft
∂mt
= λ
0,f
χt
λt + λ9,ft (−1) + λ10,ft
pit
mt−1
+ χt+1
χt
βEt
(
−λ
0,f
t+1
χt+1
1
pit+1
λt+1 + λ10,ft+1 pit+1
mt+1
m2t
(−1)
)
= 0.
(3.61)
3.A.4 Derivation of the infinite double sum
This appendix shows how the infinite double sum of the fiscal authority’s optimization
problem
E0
∞∑
t=0
χtβ
tωtEt
∞∑
j=0
βjzt+j (3.62)
where ωt is the Lagrange multiplier of Equation (3.20). Equation (3.62) can be rewrit-
ten as12
E0
∞∑
t=0
χtβ
tλ
0,k
t
χt
zt, k = {f,m}, (3.63)
where ωt is the Lagrange multiplier of the implementability constraint (3.20) and
zt+j ≡λt+j
(
Ct+j − Φb2t+j +
Φ
2 b
2
t+j +mt+j −mt+j−1
1
pit+j
+ UN,t+j
λt+j
Nt+j
−N1−αt+j S−1t+j +MCt+j(1− α)N−αt+jS−1t+jNt+j
)
.
(3.64)
12The derivation follows closely Rieth (2011).
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Write out the sum on the left hand side and make use of the law of iterated expectations
LHS =E0[χ0ω0z0 + χ0ω0βz1 + χ0ω0β2z2 + ...
+ χ1ω1βz1 + χ1ω1β2z2 + χ1ω1β3z3 + ...
+ χ2ω2β2z2 + χ3ω3β3z3 + χ4ω4β4z4 + ...]
=E0[χ0ω0z0 + β(χ0ω0 + χ1ω1)z1
+ β2(χ0ω0 + χ1ω1 + χ2ω2)z2 + ...].
(3.65)
Now, define the round brackets recursively through the sequence of λ0,kt = λ0,kt−1 +χtωt,
with λ0,k−1 = 0. Then the LHS can be written as
LHS =E0
∞∑
t=0
χtβ
tλ
0,k
t
χt
zt
= RHS,
(3.66)
whereby for k = m: χt = 1,∀t.
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Chapter 4
The Effect of Government Bonds
on a Long-run Optimal Equity
Requirement Constraint
4.1 Introduction
Since the financial crisis of 2007, the regulation of the banking sector stands in the
focus of the current political and academic debate. The regulation of the financial
sector is motivated by banks’ economic importance. Thus, the stability and soundness
of the banking system are the main goals of these regulations. The accumulation of
extraordinary risk in banks’ balance sheets over the previous years is one of the reasons
to introduce stricter banking regulations. In fact, the negative economic consequences
of the financial crisis of 2007, caused a growing consensus about the necessity of mi-
croprudential and macroprudential regulations (see BIS 2010). The aim is to reduce
the negative effects of a banking crisis on the economy.
The first steps have involved adjusting the Basel II banking regulations. This
reform is known as Basel III (see BIS 2010). The aim of this stricter regulation package
is to reduce the overall probability and consequences of a future banking crisis. One of
the arguments in favor of the reform of the Basel II regulation is the skin-in-the-game
argument mentioned by authors such as Harris, Opp, and Opp (2014). It says that if
banks are forced to hold more equity, the incentive to act more responsibly and in a
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risk-averse manner increases. In addition, in case of a failure of one or more banks,
there is more equity, which could be used to pay out the banks’ creditors.
On the whole, the implications of the crisis beginning in 2007 underline the impor-
tance of a higher equity ratio in the banks’ balance sheets. If banks have to significantly
hold more equity, they can better absorb severe, surprising reductions in their asset
value. This capacity is important since severe losses require banks to recapitalize or
deleverage. However, deleveraging could have serious implications for the real econ-
omy, as an asset price shock has a negative spillover effect on the banks’ credit supply.
Since firms’ financing depends partly on bank credit, this reduction amplifies the initial
shock by reducing the firms’ investment capacity as Iacoviello (2015) shows. He finds
that financial shocks account for two-thirds of the output collapse during the Great
Recession in the U.S. To minimize these negative spillover effects, the Basel Commit-
tee on Banking Supervision revised the Basel II requirements and set a higher minimal
equity level up to 10.5 percent of risk-weighted assets in order to improve the banks’
hedging of their assets. Some authors, however, argue that these weights are still too
low (see Admati et al. 2013). Moreover, Basel III introduces a stricter equity require-
ment constraint that forces banks to hold more core capital including ordinary shares
and profits. It also introduces a leverage ratio and a liquidity coverage ratio constraint,
which should ensure that banks hold enough liquidity during critical times. Banks also
must accumulate specific countercyclical capital buffers (see BIS 2010).
The recent European implementation of the Basel III regulation package is the
motivation for this research project.1 The European equity requirement constraint
favors government bonds strongly. Banks that invest in European government bonds do
not have to hold any equity against them. All bonds issued by European governments
are seen as riskless assets. Consequently, their risk-weight, which measures how much
of the total investment volume has to be financed with equity, is set to zero. Therefore,
I investigate in this chapter the effects of government bonds on the optimal design of
this equity requirement constraint. I analyze the long-run optimality and thus the
maximization of the welfare’s steady-state value. As the equity requirement regulation
has a long-term perspective, and not a business cycle perspective like the countercyclical
1See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32013R0462; last accessed
August 24, 2017.
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capital buffers, I choose to focus on the model’s stationary competitive equilibrium.
The following is observed: The higher the amount of government bonds, the stricter
the equity requirement constraint must be. This has the following reason: The key
role of banks in this model is the identification of good debtors by exerting costly
search effort. However, the model contains an agency problem between banks and
their creditors: Hidden action. Therefore, the banks’ effort is not observable. As
shown by various authors such as Spremann (1987), a hidden action problem leads to
an effort level lower than the socially optimal one. Only if banks have a sufficiently
high amount of equity, the incentives of exerting search effort are increased. Thus, an
equity requirement constraint mitigates the distortions caused by the hidden action
problem: A higher amount of equity leads to a higher amount of effort as shown by
Christiano and Ikeda (2014). Consequently, the classic skin-in-the-game argument
applies. Apart from the hidden effort problem, a binding limited liability constraint is
present. Both lead to the fact that the Modigliani-Miller theorem does not apply here.
Thus, an increase in the banks’ leverage reduces the bank’s incentive to exert costly
search effort. As this chapter shows, the limited liability constraint distorts the banks’
choice of exerting costly search effort to find good debtors. The distortion is caused by
the non-zero interest spread stemming from the binding limited liability constraint: As
effort is non-observable, the banks’ creditors demand state-dependent interest rates as
the creditors of banks with poorly performing assets must share in losses. If the bankers’
creditors do not offer a contingent debt contract, there will be no compensation for the
possibility that the bank receives a low return on its investment and simply defaults.
Therefore, banks have to pay a higher interest rate to their creditors in case they have
found a good debtor as Christiano and Ikeda (2014) show. In addition, I can show
that a higher amount of government bonds reduces the interest rate spread charged
by the banks’ creditors: An increase in government bonds increases the return also of
banks with poorly performing assets, leading to a less tight limited liability constraint.
This reduces the interest spread paid by the banks and increases the incentive to
exert costly effort. Therefore, government bonds have a positive effect on the banks’
effort. Moreover, they are safe assets and thus banks cannot influence the return of
government bonds by increasing the search effort. Thus, the higher the amount of
89
government bonds, the lower the incentive to search for good loans tends to be. In
addition, following the European implementation of Basel III, government bonds can
be fully financed with debt. Thus, the higher the amount of government bonds, the
higher the amount of banks’ debt is, increasing the banks’ leverage. As long as the
limited liability is binding, increasing debt increases this distortion of the effort choice.
To compensate for this, a stricter equity requirement regulation is necessary.
To sum up, there are two frictions in the model: A hidden action problem and a
limited liability constraint. Therefore, a second-best argument would be the following:
To reach the first-best case, one needs two instruments. These are the government
bonds and the equity requirement regulation. In fact, the chapter shows that one can
reach the first-best case by increasing both the amount of government bonds and the
risk-weight on loans, i.e. a stricter equity requirement constraint.
Recent papers have proved the optimality of introducing an equity requirement con-
straint using models with financial frictions (see Christiano and Ikeda 2014). Macroe-
conomic models with financial frictions are better understood thanks to the contri-
butions of Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) and Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2014) have built
New Keynesian models with credit market imperfections. They find that even small
temporary shocks can exert persistent effects on the economy amplified by financial
frictions. Many of the ideas in this chapter build on macroeconomic modeling that
treats banks as intermediaries between savers and borrowers. Recent contributions
include Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), Angeloni and Faia (2013), Gerali et al.
(2010), Iacoviello (2015), Kiley and Sim (2011), Kollmann, Enders, and Müller (2011),
Meh and Moran (2010), Williamson (2012), and Heuvel (2008). I mainly follow Chris-
tiano and Ikeda (2014), who have developed a business cycle model with a financial
sector in a general equilibrium setting. This model introduces a banking sector into an
otherwise standard medium-sized DSGE model such as Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007).
Several studies focus on identifying reasons why an equity requirement constraint
is useful. In addition, many authors investigate the economic effects of introducing
these constraints. Heuvel (2008) is one of the first to use a general equilibrium growth
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model with liquidity demand of private households to analyze the effects of an equity
requirement constraint on the overall welfare. He finds that an equity requirement
reduces the deposit and that the current requirement is too high. Others such as
Christiano and Ikeda (2014) study leverage constraints in a New Keynesian model
where banks have an unobservable effort choice. In their paper, a leverage constraint
is welfare enhancing as it increases banks’ equity and consequently the incentive to
increase costly search effort. This enhances the banking system efficiency. Authors
such as Martinez-Miera and Suarez (2012) analyze the effects of equity requirements
on the banks’ endogenous systemic risk taking. Bigio (2014) looks at risky financial
intermediation under asymmetric information and analyzes how equity requirements
change the overall risk level. Nguyen (2014) derives the optimal equity requirement in
the case of no aggregate uncertainty. In all these papers, a stricter constraint reduces
the riskiness of the banking system but at the costs of less lending leading to a lower
output level. However, Begenau (2015) finds that, with preferences for liquidity, the
trade-off of a higher equity requirement with regard to banks’ lending activities is
reversed: Since households value bank debt more when it is relatively scarce, they are
willing to accept an even higher discount on the interest rate on bank debt. This in
turn lowers the overall funding costs of bank assets, leading to more, not less, lending
in the economy (see Begenau 2015). All these papers focus on finding reasons why an
equity requirement constraint is useful and analyze the effects of a stricter constraint
on the economy. However, none of them analyze how the optimal design an equity
requirement constraint is influenced by the amount of safe assets. The present chapter
seeks to close this gap.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the economic
model; Section 4.3 shows the calibration strategy; Section 4.4 presents the first-best
case of the model; Section 4.5 shows the main results of the chapter and describes the
effects of government bonds on the optimal design of the equity requirement constraint;
Section 4.6 concludes.
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4.2 The model
The model is a simplified version of the model of Christiano and Ikeda (2014). I
extend their model by introducing safe assets (e.g. government bonds). In contrast to
Christiano and Ikeda (2014), banks are not only able to give credit to firms but also
to buy government bonds. The description of the model follows Christiano and Ikeda
(2014).2
4.2.1 The general setup
The model contains the following agents: A representative household composed of equal
sized fraction of savers and bankers, good and bad firms, final goods producers, mutual
funds, and a government. The private savers consume the final output goods and save
by investing in riskless bonds issued by mutual funds. They own the banks and the
firms. The mutual funds use the savers’ deposits to provide loans to a diversified set
of banks. Free entry and perfect competitions among the mutual funds lead to zero
profits. Banks borrow from the mutual funds. They offer firms loans. The banks make
loans to one firm each making their asset side risky as they do not know the type of
the firm and thus do not know whether their return will be high or low. However,
banks can increase the probability to find firms of the good type by exerting costly
unobservable search effort. In addition, banks can invest in riskless government bonds.
Each firm has access to a constant return to scale investment technology. There are
two types of firms - a good firm and a bad firm. Good firms earn higher returns than
bad firms. The sole source of funds available to a firm is the funds received from banks.
The firm uses these funds to acquire raw capital and convert it into effective capital
used in the production of final goods. The final goods producers use the effective
capital to produce final goods for private and public consumption and investments.
The government finances its public unproductive consumption by government bonds
and a lump-sum tax.
2Additionally, parts of the model descriptions borrow from the lecture notes on ”Advanced Macroe-
conomics” (Spring, 2014) of Tony Yates and the presentation of Christiano and Ikeda at the ”Macro
Financial Modeling” at the NYU Stern in March, 2015.
92
4.2.2 The contract between the banks and the mutual funds
Private households deposit funds with mutual funds, whereupon mutual funds make
loans to a diversified set of banks. There is a contract between the mutual funds and
the banks. This contract defines the amount of the mutual funds’ loans, the interest
payments, and the exerted search effort. However, by assumption the effort choice
of the banks is unobservable, implying a hidden effort problem: Neither the private
household, nor the mutual funds can monitor the banks’ exerted effort. To find the
optimal contract between mutual funds and banks, both interact in a competitive
market for deposit-loan contracts, which define the amount of deposits/loans dt, the
state-contingent interest rates Rdg,t+1 and Rdb,t+1, and the effort level et.3 As effort is not
observable, a bank always chooses its privately optimal effort level ex post, whatever
the specified et in the contract. Following Christiano and Ikeda (2014), I assume that
banks choose the most preferred contract from a set of contracts. As banks’ effort is
not observed by their creditors (the mutual funds), a debt contract between banks and
mutual funds cannot be made contingent on the banks’ search effort. Therefore, the
contract can only be second-best.
After the contract is settled, the banks decide how much they invest in riskless
government bonds and risky firm loans. The return of government bonds is independent
of the exerted search effort. However, the return of firm loans depends on the amount of
search effort exerted by the banks. The role of the banks is to exert costly unobservable
search effort to increase the probability of identifying a good borrower. Since the chosen
effort only affects the probability to find a good firm, the level of the returns do not
reveal the banks’ chosen effort.
Thus, the key point of the model is that effort is non-observable. Consequently,
the mutual funds are forced to implement a debt contract that is contingent upon
whether the banks have found a good or a bad firm. If they do not offer a contingent
debt contract, there will be no compensation for the possibility that the bank receives
a low return on its investment and simply defaults.4 Therefore, banks have to pay
3For mutual funds, the contract is a deposit contract. However, for banks the mutual fund deposits
are liabilities, which is why this contract is a loan contract for them.
4See the description of Tony Yates: https://tonyyateshomepage.files.wordpress.com/2015/04/
lazy-banker-assignment-solutions1.pdf, last accessed August 24, 2017
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a higher interest rate to the mutual funds in case they have found a good debtor:
Rdg,t+1 > R
d
b,t+1. However, this reduces the incentive of exerting any search effort, as
the profit from increasing effort by one extra unit gets smaller. Thus, there is an
incentive problem: Banks are motivated to reduce their effort since they do not receive
the full profit from increasing effort. Consequently, banks search less for good debtors,
and the share of good firms is reduced. If in contrast, funding costs are independent
of whether the returns are high or low, the banks capture all the returns of any extra
marginal effort.5 Nevertheless, such a contract requires banks’ net worth to be high
enough so that they can pay back their creditors in case the firm turns out to be a bad
one. If net worth is low, they cannot fulfill their obligations and the contract has to be
modified in such a way that the depositors are compensated by higher returns in case
the bank has found a good creditor (see Christiano and Ikeda 2014).
4.2.3 Two constraints and the government bonds
There are two binding constraints that need to be taken into account when design-
ing the contract. These constraints are: A limited liability constraint and an equity
requirement constraint.
As in Christiano and Ikeda (2014), it is assumed that a bank’s only source of funds
for repaying the mutual funds is the return on its investments in loans and government
bonds. There is no external equity. These constraints guarantee that the bank can
pay out the mutual funds, whether the firm is a good one or a bad one. In fact, if the
net worth of banks Nt is high enough, this limited liability constraint is not binding
and the mutual funds do not have to worry if the bank has found a good or a bad
firm. Thus, it can set Rdg,t+1 equal to Rdb,t+1 and the socially optimal level of effort is
obtained. However, if the net worth of banks is too low, the limited liability constraint
is binding. This means that the creditors of banks with poorly performing assets must
share in losses (see Christiano and Ikeda 2014), inducing a positive spread between
both interest rates Rdg,t+1 and Rdb,t+1. This reduces the incentive to exert effort as
banks’ return in case of finding a good firm falls. Therefore, an equity (net worth)
5See the description of Tony Yates: https://tonyyateshomepage.files.wordpress.com/2015/04/
macroeconomics-and-financial-frictions-lazy-banker-model.pdf, last accessed August 24,
2017.
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constraint that raises the equity held by the banks is welfare-improving, as it lowers
this interest spread and increases the exerted effort. In other words, when banks have
to increase equity in relation to the banks’ debt due to a stricter equity requirement
regulation, they are relatively more invested with their own funds in the projects they
finance. Therefore, they have a higher incentive to increase the probability of finding
good debtors by raising their search effort than when where their equity is lower.
Another source of inefficiency in the unobserved effort case is the presence of a
market interest in the incentive constraint creating an externality.6 This is based on
the following: The private cost of the banks of higher deposits dt is just the interest
rate paid on deposits that equals the market interest rate due to the zero profits of
mutual funds. However, the social cost of a higher dt is higher. It comprises the market
interest rate plus the distortion of the banks’ effort choice due to the binding limited
liability constraint. A binding limited liability constraint has the effect that Rdb,t+1
decreases ceteris paribus with higher deposits. This increases Rdg,t+1, thereby reducing
the incentive of exerting costly effort. Thus, as the private cost of a higher dt are lower
than the social cost, banks’ deposits may be too high, in which case a constraint is
welfare-enhancing (see Christiano and Ikeda 2014).
Besides, a binding limited liability constraint, there is a binding equity requirement
constraint. The equity requirement constraint forces banks to hold a specific amount
of equity relative to the amount of risky assets in their balance sheet. Following the
European implementation of Basel III, government bonds have a risk-weight of zero,
meaning that banks can finance their investments in government bonds fully by de-
posits. This has a direct implication for the model’s equilibrium: If government bonds
rise, deposits rise equally. The higher amount of deposits increases the banks’ leverage.
As the limited liability constraint is binding, the Modigliani-Miller theorem does not
apply here and the increase in the leverage reduces the bank’s incentive to exert costly
search effort. However, as a higher amount of government bonds also increases the
profits of those banks that have found a bad firm, the limited liability constraint gets
less tight reducing the interest spread, and as explained above, increasing the incen-
6This is not mentioned in the original paper, but in a presentation held by Christiano and Ikeda at
the ”Macro Financial Modeling” at the NYU Stern in March, 2015. https://bfi.uchicago.edu/
sites/default/files/file_uploads/Stern_handout.pdf, last accessed August 24, 2017.
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tive to exert effort. Thus, government bonds have reverse effects on the incentives of
banks. In Section 4.5.1 I will analyze how government bonds affect the optimal equity
regulation.
4.2.4 The representative household
The representative household is composed of equal sized fraction of savers and bankers.
Its utility function is the equally-weighted average across the utility of all savers and
bankers. Banks’ behaviour is described in Section 4.2.5.
The savers maximize the infinite sum of discounted period-utility7
max
{Ct, BMt }
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt log(Ct), 0 < β < 1,
where Ct is private consumption, and BMt are riskless bonds issued by mutual funds. Et
denotes the mathematical expectation operator conditional upon information available
in period t. The maximization problem is restricted by a period budget constraint:
Ct +BMt = RMt−1BMt−1 + Πt − Tt, (4.1)
where RMt is the gross payoff of the non-state contingent one-period bond BMt , which
is issued by mutual funds. Πt are dividends from ownership of firms and banks. Tt is
a lump-sum tax.
The corresponding first-order conditions to the savers’ maximization problem are:
λt =
1
Ct
,
−λt + Et
(
λt+1 β R
M
t
)
= 0,
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint (4.1).
7As the model should be as simple as possible in order to analyze the pure effect of the government
bonds on the banking system I abstract from a labor decision.
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4.2.5 The financial market
The discussion begins in period t after goods production for that period has occurred
(see Christiano and Ikeda 2014). The financial market consists of three sub-markets
summarized by the following diagrams:
1. The deposit market:
savers
BMt−−−−→←−−−−
RMt
mutual funds
dt−−−−→←−−−−
Rbd,t+1,R
g
d,t+1
banks
2. The loan market:
banks
Lt−−−−→←−−−−
Rbt+1,R
g
t+1
firms
3. The bond market:
banks
BGt−−−−→←−−−−
RGt
government
Mutual funds take deposits BMt from the savers and make loans dt to a diversified set
of banks (see Christiano and Ikeda 2014). There is a mass of banks with net worth
Nt in a competitive market. Banks acquire deposits dt from mutual funds. Then they
lend their net worth and debt to firms in the form of loans Lt and to the government
in the form of government bonds BGt .
Firms need loans from banks to finance the buying of raw capital, which they
convert into effective capital necessary for the output production. Each firm has access
to a constant returns to scale investment technology. Firms are competitive and earn
zero profit. The bank from which a firm receives its loan gets the return earned by this
firm on its projects. There are good and bad firms. Good firms are better than bad
firms in converting raw to effective capital and thus earn a higher return than bad firms.
The gross rate of return on their period t investment is denoted by Rgt+1 and Rbt+1. It
holds that Rgt+1 is strictly bigger than Rbt+1 in all periods. A key function of banks is
to identify good firms. To do this, banks exert costly search effort et. This effort is not
observable to mutual funds. The bank identifies a good firm with probability p(et) and
a bad firm with probability 1− p(et). The probability function p(et) has the following
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form:
p(et) = min{1, a¯+ b¯et}, a¯, b¯ > 0, (4.2)
where a¯ and b¯ will be chosen so that p(et) is strictly bigger than zero and smaller than
one. Since b¯ is positive, an increase in the banks’ search effort et leads to a higher
probability of finding good firms. Thus, the higher the search effort of the bank, the
higher the share of good firms is in the economy increasing the accumulation of effective
capital.
Mutual funds are the banks’ creditors. They are competitive and perfectly diver-
sified across banks. Free market entry drives their profits down to zero:
(
p(et)Rdg,t+1 + (1− p(et))Rdb,t+1
)
−RMt = 0,
or by using balance sheet identity dt = BMt :
(
p(et)Rdg,t+1 + (1− p(et))Rdb,t+1
)
dt −RMt dt = 0. (4.3)
Similar to Christiano and Ikeda (2014) the zero-profit condition hold in each period
t + 1 state of nature. Rdg,t+1 and Rdb,t+1 denote the gross return received from a good
bank and a bad bank respectively. A good bank is a bank whose debtor is a good
firm. A bad bank is a bank whose debtor is a bad firm. BMt are the deposits from
savers that mutual funds lend to the banks in the form of deposits dt. The first part
of Equation (4.3) represents the expected amount banks pay back to mutual funds:
With probability p(et), the bank is a good bank and can pay an interest rate of Rdg,t+1.
With probability 1 − p(et), the bank is a bad bank and pays back an interest rate of
Rdb,t+1. Both interest rates are part of the deposit-loan contract between mutual funds
and banks. The first part of Equation (4.3) therefore represents the mutual funds’
revenues, whereas the last part of Equation (4.3) denotes the mutual funds’ financing
costs.
As mentioned above the banks’ search effort et is not observable by mutual funds.
Thus, a bank always chooses et ex post to maximize its expected profit. This is a
classical hidden action problem. It is solved by backward induction (see for example
Kräkel 2015):
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1. The agent chooses its optimal effort level.
2. Given the optimal effort level of the agent, the principal chooses an optimal
contract.
In this case, the agent is the bank and the principal is the mutual fund, the depositor.
However, in this model, the bank is the one that chooses the optimal contract from a
set of feasible contracts. The contract defines the combination of {dt, et, Rbg,t+1, Rdb,t+1}
given the optimally chosen effort level e∗,ex postt . e∗,ex postt is the profit-maximizing effort
level that a bank chooses after the contract is signed. The effort is unobservable by
the mutual fund and thus is not negotiable. The contract is restricted by several
constraints:
1. The participation constraint of the mutual fund: In this model, it is the zero-
profit condition (4.3) due to free entry and perfect competition among mutual
funds.
2. The incentive constraint of the bank: In this model, it is the optimal ex post
chosen effort level e∗,ex postt , whatever {dt, Rbg,t+1, Rdb,t+1, et} is set in the contract.
Since et is unobservable, mutual funds know that whatever value for et is written
into the contract, et will always be set according to the incentive constraint.
3. A limited liability constraint for the bank: It is assumed that the banks’ only
source of funds for repaying mutual funds is the earnings on its investments in
loans and government bonds. There is no external equity (see Christiano and
Ikeda 2014).
4. The balance sheet constraint of the bank.
5. A mandatory equity requirement constraint that demands a minimum level of
equity relative to the bank’s assets.
Each bank has a net worth Nt. It is assumed that the inflow or outflow of equity into
the banks is exogenous and is not subject to the control of the bank. The only control
banks have over Nt is their control over deposits (and their investment decision) and
the resulting impact on their earnings (see Christiano and Ikeda 2014). This is in line
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with a number of models presented, for example, in Freixas and Rochet (2008). Equity
is accumulated by using part of the banks’ profit. The law of motion for Nt is then
given by:
Nt = γΠBt−1 + T˜ , 0 < γ < 1, T˜ > 0, (4.4)
where γ measures the amount of the profit ΠBt−1 banks use to accumulate equity. T˜ is
an exogenous influx of new equity. Profits are the only endogenous source to increase
net worth, as similar to Christiano and Ikeda (2014) I assume that there is no outside
equity available. The profit ΠBt−1 of the banks is defined as:
ΠBt−1 = BGt−1RGt−1+(Nt−1+dt−1−BGt−1)(p(et−1)Rgt+(1−p(et−1))Rbt)−(p(et−1)Rdg,t+(1−p(et−1))Rdb,t)dt−1,
(4.5)
where RGt is the interest on government bonds. In addition, the bank’s balance sheet
needs to be balanced:
Lt +BGt = Nt + dt. (4.6)
Equation (4.6) shows that the amount of liabilities has to be equal to the amount of
assets.
Following the described procedure for solving hidden action problems, I derive the
ex post effort choice of the bank. The bank maximizes its ex ante reward from a loan
contract
max
et
Etλt+1
[
BGt R
G
t +
(
Lt(p(et)Rgt+1 + (1− p(et))Rbt+1)− (p(et)Rdg,t+1 + (1− p(et))Rdb,t+1)dt
) ]
− 12e
2
t
(4.7)
λt+1 is the value of marginal consumption from funds remitted by the banks to the
households. 12e
2
t measures the utility costs of exerting effort. Here the effort cost are
pure utility cost and cause no resource costs. I thereby follow the modeling strategy
of Christiano and Ikeda (2014). In addition, the effort cost are fixed costs and conse-
quently there are economies of scale effects. The relative costs fall if the balance sheet
grows. Here I follow Christiano and Ikeda (2014), however, one could also extend the
model by introducing effort cost that are proportional to the amount of loans.
Considering the probability function (4.2), the first-order condition of the maxi-
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mization problem (4.7) is given by:
et = Etλt+1(Ltp′(et)(Rgt+1 −Rbt+1)− dtp′(et)(Rdg,t+1 −Rdb,t+1)). (4.8)
Equation (4.8) describes the ex post optimal effort choice of the banks when effort is
unobservable. Based on Equation (4.6), Equation (4.8) can be written as:
et = Etλt+1((Nt + dt −BGt )p′(et)(Rgt+1 −Rbt+1)− dtp′(et)(Rdg,t+1 −Rdb,t+1)). (4.9)
Mutual funds understand that the bank will always choose et according to (4.9). Equa-
tion (4.9) shows that the banks’ search effort increases when the equity Nt increases.
This is the skin-in-the-game argument mentioned, among others, by Harris, Opp, and
Opp (2014). The more the banks are invested with their funds, the higher their incen-
tive to exert search effort is. Additionally, if the spread Rdg,t+1 − Rdb,t+1 is positive and
rises, effort falls, since the banks’ profit from one unit of extra effort decreases. Equa-
tion (4.9) also shows the negative effect of government bonds on the banks’ optimal
level of search effort. A higher amount of government bonds leads ceteris paribus to
a lower banks’ effort. Since the amount of riskless assets in the banks’ balance sheet
increases the amount of riskless effort-independent returns increases, too. This reduces
the incentive to exert search effort. However, as I will show later, the government
bonds also have a positive effect on the banks’ search effort.
Next, I describe the optimal deposit-loan contract. The bank chooses the most
preferred contract from the set of contracts to maximize its utility of the expected
profit minus the utility costs of the exerted search effort. This means the optimization
problem is defined by the bank’s choice of the optimal contract {dt, et, Rbg,t+1, Rdb,t+1}
given the ex post chosen effort level and given the abovementioned constraints.
Before describing this optimization problem, I present these constraints in more
detail. By assumption, there is no external equity. Therefore, a limited liability con-
straint holds. As in Christiano and Ikeda (2014) it is assumed that the banks’ only
source of funds for repaying mutual funds is the earnings on its investments. A feasible
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contract has to take into account that
BGt R
G
t + LtR
g
t+1 −Rdg,t+1dt ≥ 0, (4.10)
BGt R
G
t + LtRbt+1 −Rdb,t+1dt ≥ 0. (4.11)
In other words, what the banks get from their investments in firms and government
bonds has to be greater than or equal to what the banks promise to pay out to mutual
funds. Mutual funds are only interested in contracts that are feasible, so the above
inequalities represent restrictions on the set of contracts that both parties are willing to
consider. In practice, only the second inequality is binding. Christiano and Ikeda (2014)
show that either both Equations (4.10) and (4.11) do not bind, or only Equation (4.11)
binds. So only the limited liability constraint in the bad state is relevant. Intuitively,
if banks earn enough to pay back mutual funds in the bad state, then they will have
enough earned if their debtor turns out to be one of the good type. Therefore, only
economies, in which constraint (4.11) is binding, are investigated. This means that the
mutual fund shares in losses if its debtor is a bad bank - a bank that has found a bad
firm. That means Rdb,t+1 is low, and Rdg,t+1 has to be high. However, the higher the
spread Rdg,t+1 −Rdb,t+1 is, the lower is the incentive to exert search effort (see Equation
(4.9)). Thus, a binding limited liability constraint has a negative effect on the search
effort of the banks, since in the case Rdg,t+1 > Rdb,t+1 the bank has to compensate the
mutual fund for low returns from bad debtors with high returns Rdg,t+1 in the good case
reducing the profit from increasing the share of good debtors by increasing the effort
level. Therefore, the bigger this interest spread, the bigger are the distortions caused
on the effort choice through the term dtp′(et)(Rdg,t+1 −Rdb,t+1)8(see Equation (4.9)).
One can rewrite Equation (4.11) using the balance sheet constraint (4.6):
BGt (RGt −Rbt+1) + (Nt + dt)Rbt+1 ≥ Rdb,t+1dt (4.12)
8 If the limited liability constraint is not binding a possible equilibrium would be that Rdg,t+1 = Rdb,t+1
and the term mentioned would be zero. There would be no distortion of the banks’ effort choice.
In Section 4.4 one can find a more detailed comparison of an economy where the limited liability
constraint is not binding with an economy where it is binding. The economy, where the limited
liability constraint is not binding, will be the economy, where effort is observable. This will be the
first-best case.
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As long as RGt > Rbt+1, an increase in the government bonds tends to lead to a ceteris
paribus higher Rdb,t+1. A higher Rdb,t+1 reduces Rdg,t+1 due to the zero-profit condition
(4.3) of mutual funds and the spread Rdg,t+1−Rdb,t+1 falls, which increases the incentive
to exert search effort (see Equation (4.9)). Thus, government bonds can also have a
positive effect on the search effort of the bank, since a higher amount of government
bonds reduces the negative effect of a binding limited liability constraint on et.
In addition, a regulation of the bank’s debt is present:
ΓBGBGt + ΓLLt ≥ dt, 0 ≤ {ΓBG,ΓL} ≤ 1, (4.13)
where ΓL (ΓBG) measures how much of the investment in loans (government bonds)
can be financed by debt. The lower this weight the less debt banks can have and the
smaller is their leverage. Thus, the lower ΓL and ΓBG are, the stricter is the leverage
constraint. In Europe ΓBG is set to one. All bonds issued by European governments
are seen as riskless assets by the European implementation of the Basel III regulation
package and can be fully financed by debt. This means that an increase in government
bonds leads to a one-for-one increase in dt.
One can slightly rewrites Equation (4.13):
ΓN,BGBGt + ΓN,LLt ≤ Nt, 0 ≤ {ΓN,BG,ΓN,L} ≤ 1, (4.14)
with ΓN,BG = 1 − ΓBG and ΓN,L = 1 − ΓL. Thus, the debt constraint can also be
interpreted as an equity requirement constraint. The higher ΓN,BG and ΓN,L are the
stricter is the constraint and the more equity banks are forced to hold.
Both banks and mutual funds are only interested in feasible contracts. Therefore,
the contract has to take into account the limited liability constraint (4.11), the ex post
chosen effort level (4.9), and the zero-profit condition (4.3) of the mutual fund, the
balance sheet identity (4.6), and the leverage constraint (4.13). The bank faces the
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following maximization problem when choosing the optimal deposit-loan contract:
max
{et, Rdg,t+1, Rdb,t+1, dt}
Et
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
λt+1
[
BGt R
G
t + Lt(p(et)R
g
t+1 + (1− p(et))Rbt+1)−
(p(et)Rdg,t+1 + (1− p(et))Rdb,t+1)dt
]
− 12e
2
t
+ µt+1[p(et)Rdg,t+1dt + (1− p(et))Rdb,t+1dt −RMt dt]
+ ηt
[
et − λt+1((Nt + dt −BGt )p′(et)(Rgt+1 −Rbt+1)− dtp′(et)(Rdg,t+1 −Rdb,t+1))
]
+ νt+1[BGt RGt + (Nt + dt −BGt )Rbt+1 −Rdb,t+1dt]
+ χt[(1− ΓN,BG)BGt + (1− ΓN,L)(Nt + dt −BGt )− dt]
]
,
where µt+1, νt+1 and χt have to be non-negative and as shown in the Appendix 4.A.2
ηt has to be negative. The Lagrange multiplier ηt on (4.9) is not contingent on the
realizations of the period t+ 1 state, since the constraint is on the effort level exerted
by the bank in period t (see Christiano and Ikeda 2014). Note that the zero-profit
condition and the limited liability constraint have to be satisfied in each period t + 1
state of nature, which is indicated by the fact that the multipliers, µt+1 an νt+1, are
contingent upon the realization of period t + 1 uncertainty (see Christiano and Ikeda
2014). The corresponding first-order conditions for the solution of this maximization
problem can be found in Appendix 4.A.1.
After the deposit-loan contract is settled, the bank makes its investment decision. It
can decide how much of its liabilities Nt+dt it invests in riskless government bonds and
in risky loans. The bank chooses the amount of loans and the amount of government
bonds given the deposit-loan contract {dt, et, Rbg,t+1, Rdb,t+1} and given the balance sheet
identity (4.6). This leads to the following optimization problem:
max
BGt
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtλt+1
[
BGt R
G
t + (Nt + dt −BGt )(p(et)Rgt+1 + (1− p(et))Rbt+1)−RMt dt −
1
2e
2
t
]
,
(4.15)
where the balance sheet identity (4.6) and the zero-profit condition (4.3) are already
inserted. One gets the following equilibrium condition:
RGt = ptR
g
t+1 + (1− pt)Rbt+1. (4.16)
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This equation says that, if the investments in government bonds and loans should be
strictly positive, the returns of both investment have to be equal in each period t + 1
state of nature.
4.2.6 Capital production
Each firm has access to a constant returns-to-scale investment technology. The tech-
nology requires an investment at the end of goods production in period t and produces
output during production in t+ 1 (see Christiano and Ikeda 2014). The sole source of
funds available to a firm is the funds received from its bank. A firm uses these funds
to acquire raw capital, K˜t+1. Good (bad) firms convert one unit of raw capital into
exp(g) (exp(b)) units of effective capital K¯t+1 used for producing an output good. g is
strictly bigger than b. Consequently, good firms are better than bad firms in converting
raw capital into effective capital. Once this conversion is accomplished, firms rent their
homogeneous effective capital on the t + 1 capital market. Thus, in period t + 1 the
quantity of effective capital is given by:
K¯t+1 = (p(et) exp(g) + (1− p(et)) exp(b)) K˜t+1. (4.17)
As explained, the firms rent the services of effective capital in a competitive capital
market. The equilibrium rental rate in this market is RKt+1. Its value is determined
in the final good sector. Firms’ effective capital, K¯t+1, depreciates at the rate δ while
it is being used by firms to produce output. After production firms sell used effective
capital to capital producers, which produce new raw capital, which they sell back to
the firms. The rates of return of good and bad firms are given by
Rgt+1 = exp(g)RK¯t+1, (4.18)
Rbt+1 = exp(b)RK¯t+1, (4.19)
where
RK¯t = rK¯t + (1− δ).
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RK¯t is the return on capital. R
g
t+1 and Rbt+1 are the firms’ type-specific returns on
effective capital. One can see that the factors exp(g) and exp(b) scale the capital
return up or down, depending on the type of the firm. rK¯t is the return on effective
capital, which is paid by the firms for using effective capital for the production of the
final output good.
There is a large number of identical capital producers. The representative capital
producer purchases effective capital in t and investment goods It to produce new, raw
capital. Thus, it holds:
K˜t+1 = It + K¯t (1− δ) . (4.20)
Equations (4.17) and (4.20) show, that if et is low in period t, then the stock of effective
capital is low in period t + 1. A reduction in the search effort has a persistent effect,
because effective capital is the input factor for the production of new raw capital. This
effect of banks’ effort on the quantity of effective capital reflects their role in allocating
capital between good and bad firms. Thus, p(et) exp(g)+(1− p(et)) exp(b) is a measure
for the allocative effectiveness of the banking system (see Christiano and Ikeda 2014).
4.2.7 Final goods production
The output goods Yt used for investments, private and public consumption is produced
by firms in a perfect competitive environment using effective capital K¯t as the only
input factor. For simplicity, I set labor to one. The production function is given by
Yt = K¯αt , 0 < α < 1.
Given the production function the return on effective capital rK¯t is defined by the
marginal productivity of capital:
rK¯t = αK¯α−1t .
As labor is constant and equal one, the capital returns decline when capital increases.
106
4.2.8 The public sector
The government consumes Gt and finances its consumption by issuing government
bonds BGt and a lump-sum tax Tt. Thus, its period budget constraint is given by:
Gt +BGt−1RGt−1 = BGt + Tt,
Gt is unproductive and does not increase household’s welfare.
4.2.9 Equilibrium
I restrict my analysis to symmetric equilibria, where all savers, banks, and firms behave
in an identical way. There will be no arbitrage opportunities and all markets will be
clear. The clearing of the good market requires
Yt = Ct + It +Gt.
4.3 Calibration
In this chapter I describe my calibration strategy. The baseline model is the one
in which the search effort is not observable and no equity requirement constraint is
imposed. δ and β are set following standard parameter values used in the literature.
The value for the share of capital α in the output production function comes from
the Annual Macroeconomic Database. The return parameter of good firms exp(g) is
normalized to one. Table 4.1 presents the chosen parameter values.
Table 4.1: Non-estimated parameter values
Parameter Value Source
α 0.4370 Annual Macroeconomic Database (AMECO)
δ 0.0250 In line with Iacoviello and Neri (2010)
β 0.9987 In line with Christiano and Ikeda (2014)
exp(g) 1.0000 Normalization of the return parameter, good firms
The rest of the parameters are calibrated using a moment-matching strategy. From
Bloomberg, I get quarterly financial data for banks in the euro area from 2000 until
2014. As targets, I choose the mean ratio of non-performing assets to total assets,
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the mean leverage ratio, the mean cross-sectional standard deviation of the return on
equity (ROE), 9 the mean return on equity,10 the mean public-debt-to-GDP-ratio, and
the mean public-consumption-to-GDP-ratio in the euro area. As public debt is a stock
variable and the model is calibrated to quarterly frequency, quarterly GDP is only one
fourth of annual GDP, implying that the quarterly debt to GDP ratio in the data is
4 × 74.37 percent (see Pfeifer 2017). Moreover, I use the allocative efficiency of the
banking system in Europe as a target for the calibration. The data are taken from
Tsionas, Assaf, and Matousek (2015). Considering these empirical targets, I choose
a¯, b¯, b, γ, G¯, and B¯G to minimize the squared relative distance between the model’s
moments in the steady-state and the corresponding empirical targets. The estimated
parameters as well as the comparison of the model’s moments and the corresponding
empirical moments can be found in Table 4.2. In order to find reasonable parameter
values many constraints are set for the optimization routine: All Lagrange multipliers
have to be of the right sign and the probability of finding a good debtor has to be
strictly smaller than one also for the first-best case, where effort is observable and no
leverage constraint is present. In addition, profits of the banks, the return on equity
and the chosen effort have to be positive. The overall fit of the model is quite good.
However, the return on equity is too small.
4.4 The first-best case
To understand the subsequent sections, it is important to describe the first-best case,
where effort is observable. Consequently, there is no hidden action problem and a
regulation of the banking sector is not necessary. The equity requirement constraint is
thus not-existent. In the following, it will be shown that the limited liability constraint
does not hold anymore and that government bonds are neutral for the steady-state of
the economy. Thus, the Modigliani-Miller theorem applies and Ricardian equivalence
holds.
As effort is observable in the first-best case, banks can commit to an effort level.
9Defined as [p(et)(1− p(et))]0.5 R
G
t B
G
t +R
g
t+1Lt−Rdg,t+1dt
Nt
similar to Christiano and Ikeda (2014).
10Defined as 400 ·
(
(((Nt+dt−BGt )(p(et)Rgt+1+(1−p(et))Rbt+1)+BGt RGt )−RMt dt)
Nt
− 1
)
similar to Christiano and
Ikeda (2014).
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Table 4.2: Estimated parameter values and the model’s goodness of fit
Targets Empirical value Model’s value
Non-performing loans/total assets 0.0557 0.0513
Leverage ratio 14.292 14.295
Return on equity (ROE) 0.0591 0.0052
Cross-sectional standard deviation of ROE 0.2073 0.2327
Allocative efficiency 0.8780 0.9861
Public debt/GDP 0.7437*4 0.7445*4
Public consumption/GDP 0.2037 0.2034
Parameter Meaning Estimated value
a¯ Slope of effort function 0.9423
b¯ Constant of effort function 0.0479
b Return parameter, bad firms -0.3153
T˜ Exogenous influx of new equity 1.2477
γ Fraction of profit for new equity 0.7985
B¯G Steady-state public debt 18.985
G¯ Steady-state public consumption 1.2984
Notes: For the calibration a moment-matching strategy is used. To find the squared relative
distance minimizing parameter values I use the NOMAD algorithm from the OPTI-Toolbox for
MatLab.
Thus, the contract is described by:
max
{et, Rdg,t+1, Rdb,t+1, dt}
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
λt+1
[
BGt R
G
t + Lt(p(et)R
g
t+1 + (1− p(et))Rbt+1)−
(p(et)Rdg,t+1 + (1− p(et))Rdb,t+1)dt
]
− 12e
2
t
+ µt+1[p(et)Rdg,t+1dt + (1− p(et))Rdb,t+1dt −RMt dt]
+ νt+1[BGt RGt + (Nt + dt −BGt )Rbt+1 −Rdb,t+1dt]
]
.
One can see that in the first-best case the ex post set effort of banks is not relevant.
There is no hidden action problem, which means banks cannot set effort ex post. The
corresponding first-order conditions for the solution of this maximization problem can
be found in the Appendix 4.A.4.
In addition, as shown in the Appendix 4.A.6 the limited liability constraint is not
binding, leading to the following first-best effort choice (as shown in the Appendix
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4.A.7):
et = p′(et)Etλt+1Lt(Rgt+1 −Rbt+1)
⇔ et = p′(et)Etλt+1(Nt + dt −BGt )(Rgt+1 −Rbt+1)
(4.21)
Comparing the first-best effort (Equation (4.21)) with the chosen effort level when
effort is unobservable (Equation (4.9)), one can see that in the first-best case the effort
level is no longer negatively dependent on the level of the deposits. Equation (4.21)
simply says that the higher the amount of loans and the higher the spread between
the returns of a good firm and those of a bad firm, the higher the search effort of the
banks. In addition, equity and deposits have the same positive effect on effort. Thus,
in the first-best case the total amount of the balance is relevant for the effort choice
and not the exact composition as it is the case when effort is unobservable. Thus, the
Modigliani-Miller theorem applies. ”By committing to care for dt as if these were the
banker’s own funds, the banker is able to obtain better contract terms from the mutual
fund. The banker is able to commit to the effort in (4.21) because et is observable to
the mutual fund.” (see Christiano and Ikeda 2014, p. 222) Therefore, in the first-best
case, optimality leads the banks and the mutual funds to act as if they were one person.
In addition, as Christiano and Ikeda (2014) show, the state-contingent interest
rates on the deposits of the banks are not uniquely pinned down. The reason is that
the limited liability constraint is not binding anymore. It would be, however, compat-
ible with the zero-profit constraint to set non state-contingent interest rates Rdg,t+1 =
Rdb,t+1 = RMt or state contingent interest rates Rdg,t+1 = R
g
t+1 and Rdb,t+1 = Rbt+1.
Both the Modigliani-Miller theorem and Ricardian equivalence apply. One might
think that the amount of government bonds has a negative effect on the effort level (see
Equation (4.21)). However, government bonds are in fact neutral for the steady-state
level of this economy. For the proof, start with Equation (4.42) and insert (4.45) as
well as (4.44). This leads to the following equation:
RMt = p(et)R
g
t+1 + (1− p(et))Rbt+1.
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Using Equation (4.16) this leads to:
RMt = RGt .
The profit of the bank is therefore given by:
ΠBt+1 ≡ RMt (BGt + Lt − dt)
⇔ ΠBt+1 = RMt Nt.
(4.22)
Insert Equation (4.22) into the law of motion for equity (4.4):
Nt = γRMt−1Nt−1 + T˜ . (4.23)
In the steady-state, Equation (4.23) can be written as:
N ss = T˜(
1− γ
β
) . (4.24)
Since the value in the bracket of Equation (4.24) is strictly non-zero, equity is constant
and exogenously given by T˜ , γ, and β. Thus, one can see from the balance sheet
identity that an increase in the government bonds leads ceteris paribus to a one-for-
one increase in deposits. This one-for-one increase in BG and d cancels each other out
in Equation (4.21). Thus, government bonds have no effect on the effort level of the
banks, nor do they have any effect on the accumulation of capital. See also Figure 4.1,
which shows the effect of government bonds on the steady-state of the economy in the
first-best case.
The fact that neither debt nor taxes show up anywhere in the equilibrium conditions
(expect in the non-binding limited liability constraint) means that the mix of debt and
taxes is both indeterminate and irrelevant. Thus, Ricardian equivalence hold that,
given constant government consumption, an increase in the government bonds increases
the lump-sum taxes. However, this also increases the banks’ profits, thus canceling each
other out in the household budget constraint.
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Figure 4.1: The effect of government bonds in the first-best case
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Notes: This figure shows the effect of different values of the government bonds BG on
the long-run equilibrium of the economy, in the case effort is observable and no equity
requirement constraint is imposed.
4.4.1 First-best effort versus ex post chosen effort
The ex post effort choice (Equation (4.9)) and the first-best effort choice (Equation
(4.21)) differ only in one term. This term, which I call ∆t, is defined as:
∆t ≡ Etλt+1dtp′(et)(Rdg,t+1 −Rdb,t+1). (4.25)
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∆t measures the inefficiency and distortion caused by the hidden action problem. This
distortion stems from the binding limited liability constraint. If effort is unobservable,
the mutual fund sets state-dependent interest rates Rdg,t+1 and Rdb,t+1, leading to a
positive spread Rdg,t+1 −Rdb,t+1, which reduces the incentive to exert search effort.
This can be shown if one rewrites Equation (4.25) in the following way (see Ap-
pendix 4.A.3):
∆t = − ηt1− ηtp′(et)
p(et)
. (4.26)
For ηt it holds (see Appendix 4.A.2):
ηt = −Et p(et)νt+1
λt+1p′(et)
. (4.27)
νt+1 is the Lagrange multiplier for the limited liability constraint. One can see that
the higher νt+1 is, the smaller is ηt by continuity and the bigger is the distortion of the
effort decision measured by ∆t. Thus, νt+1 is a measure for the degree of sub-optimality
caused by the hidden action problem. If the limited liability constraint is not binding,
meaning νt+1 is zero, ∆t would also be zero, which means that the bank would set the
effort level in an efficient way equal to the first-best effort level.
In addition, Equation (4.25) shows that the distortion measured by ∆t increases in
the amount of deposits. A higher deposits amount dt leads to a stricter limited liability
constraint (see Equation (4.11)), which tends to increase the spread Rdg,t+1 − Rdb,t+1,
reducing the incentives for the bank to exert search effort. As I show later, a higher
amount of government bonds leads to a higher amount of deposits, which tends to lead
to a stricter limited liability constraint if the investment in government bonds can be
fully financed by debt.
4.5 Overview
Many different model variations have been discussed so far. Therefore, I briefly sum-
marize the main insights. The economy with observable effort is the first-best case.
The economy with unobservable effort has a hidden action problem, leading to a lower
effort level than in the first-best case. This problem can be reduced by introducing an
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equity requirement constraint, which increases the amount of equity of the banks and
leads to higher incentive to exert costly search effort. Imposing an equity requirement
constraint in the case of observable effort is sub-optimal since an equity requirement
constraint is not needed in this economy. There is no hidden action problem, which
needs to be solved. If effort is observable, the limited liability constraint is not binding.
If effort is unobservable, the limited liability constraint is generally binding, leading
to a distortion of the effort choice as described above measured by the term ∆. Next
the effects of the possibility to invest into government bonds are discussed. As will be
shown later, government bonds have an effect on ∆ and thus on the allocation of the
economy. Consequently, the amount of government bonds will influence the optimal
equity requirement constraint. These effects are described in the following sections.
4.5.1 The effect of government bonds on the long-run equilib-
rium
Prior to investigating how government bonds influence the long-run optimal leverage
constraint, I analyze the effect of an increasing amount of government bonds on the
long-run equilibrium of the economy for a given value of ΓN,L. The steady-state of
the economy describes this long-run equilibrium. Figure 4.2 shows the effect of an
increasing amount of government bonds for a given ΓN,L. Here I choose the value for
ΓN,L to be 0.105 in line with the current regulation. In the European implementation
of the Basel III regulation, government bonds are seen as riskless assets. I follow this
regulation and set ΓN,BG equal to zero. Additionally, I choose very high values for BG
to show the asymptotic properties of an increasing amount of government bonds on
the economy’s steady-state.
The amount of government bonds has reverse effects on the effort choice of banks.
The first effect, which influences the effort choice positively, operates through the
banks’ profit. Equation (4.5) shows that an increase in the government bonds tends
to increase the profit (see also Figure 4.2). A higher profit increases the amount of
equity (see Equation (4.4) and Figure 4.2). A higher amount of equity improves banks’
incentive to search for good firms (see Equation (4.9)). However, government bonds
also have reverse effects on the effort choice, which operates through the limited liability
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Figure 4.2: Effect of BG given ΓN,L on the model’s steady state
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Notes: This figure shows the effect of different values of the government bonds given a
chosen value for ΓN,L = 0.105 on the long-run equilibrium of the economy. The green
line in the plot for the welfare shows the value of the welfare in the first-best case.
Welfare is defined as: U(Css,ess)1−β , where U(C
ss, ess) is steady-state utility of the private
household: log(Css)− Φe2 (ess)2.
constraint. As Equations (4.12) and (4.3) show, a higher amount of government bonds
tends to reduce the spread between Rdg and Rdb , which increases the incentive to exert
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the search effort e (see Equation (4.9)). Government bonds generate a safe return also
in the case in which the bank has found a bad debtor (see Equation (4.12)). Thus,
mutual funds can set a higher Rdb and accordingly a lower Rdg. This makes implementing
the costly search effort more attractive for the banks (see Equation (4.9)). However,
since government bonds can be completely financed with debt d (see Equation (4.13))
a higher amount of government bonds leads to an equally higher amount of deposits d
(see Figure 4.2). This tends to reduce the incentive to exert search effort (see Equation
(4.9)). The limited liability constraint gets tighter, as one can see from the increasing
positive ν in Figure 4.2. The explanation is that the binding limited liability constraint
has a negative effect on the effort choice of the bank. This is measured by the increase
in ∆ (see Equation (4.26)). ∆ measures the negative effect of a binding limited liability
constraint on the effort for given values of government bonds. Thus, a bigger ∆ means
a stronger negative effect of the binding limited liability constraint on the effort choice
of the banks. It can be seen that a bigger amount of government bonds means a bigger
∆. Thus, an increase in the government bonds increases the distortion of the effort
choice.
However, considering all the effects, one can see that the positive effect dominants
the negative one. Therefore, when government bonds increase the effort increases as
well. This increases the allocative effectiveness of the banking system and thus the ac-
cumulation of capital. This results in an increase in the final goods production. Higher
output leads to higher private consumption. The increase in the private consumption
outweighs the increase in the effort level, which has a negative effect on the overall
welfare. Hence, the welfare level rises, although ∆ becomes greater. However, the
increasing ∆ prevents the economy to reach the first-best case.
4.5.2 The effect of government bonds on the long-run optimal
equity requirement constraint
This section describes the effect of the amount of government bonds on the long-
run optimal equity requirement constraint. The long-run is described by the model’s
steady-state. I choose to look at the long-run, since the aim of an equity requirement
constraint is a sustainable, stable, and sound banking system. Thus, the focus of this
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regulation lies on the long-run stability of financial system and not on the short-run
dynamics.11 Therefore, it is natural to analyze the long-run effects of an equity re-
quirement constraint and to find the optimal design for this regulation. As already
mentioned, the European regulation does not require any equity holdings when invest-
ing in European government bonds. Therefore, I set ΓN,BG to zero. An optimal value
for ΓL then maximizes the overall welfare Ωt defined as:
Ωt =
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
log(Ct)− 12e
2
t
]
. (4.28)
The optimal value for ΓL,∗ in the steady-state is then given by:
ΓL,∗ = argmax Ω(Css, ess) = argmax U(C
ss, ess)
1− β , (4.29)
where
U(Css, ess) = log(Css)− Φ
e
2 (e
ss)2 .
Of course, the optimal ΓL,∗ leads directly to the optimal equity requirement ΓN,L,∗ =
1− ΓL,∗.
To understand the effects of an equity requirement constraint, I present at first
how different values for ΓN,L, given two arbitrary chosen values for the amount of the
government bonds, influence the steady-state of the economy. Figure 4.3 shows the
results. Table 4.3 summarizes them. It shows that introducing an equity requirement
constraint increases welfare, as it reduces the bank’s leverage and therefore increases
its incentive to exert costly search effort, which reduces ∆. To begin with, one sees
that a stricter equity regulation (a higher ΓN,L) leads, up to a certain point, to a higher
welfare level. Therefore, in the present case the effort is unobservable. A stricter equity
requirement constraint therefore increases the incentive of the banks to exert costlier
search effort. As Equation (4.9) shows, the composition of the liability side of the
bank is relevant for its effort decision. The higher the amount of equity relative to the
amount of debt (deposits) is, the more attractive it is for the bank to search for good
firms. Therefore, as Figure 4.3 shows, a reduction in debt d, stemming from the stricter
leverage constraint, leads to an increase in e. e increases because the spread (Rdg −Rdb)
11Short-run dynamics are in the focus of regulations such as anti-cyclical capital buffer.
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Figure 4.3: Effect of ΓN,L given BG on the model’s steady-state
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Notes: This figure shows the effect of different values for ΓN,L given two arbitrary
chosen values for the government bonds on the long-run equilibrium of the economy.
The green line in the plot for the welfare shows the welfare level of an economy where
effort is observable and no leverage constraint is imposed (the first-best case). This is
the first-best case. Welfare is defined as: U(Css,ess)1−β , where U(C
ss, ess) is steady-state
utility of the private household: log(Css)− Φe2 (ess)2.
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Table 4.3: Effect a binding equity requirement constraint given BG =
18.985 on the model’s steady-state
Variable non-observable effort, non-observable effort,
no equity constraint binding equity constraint
Leverage ratio 14.295 13.591
Effort 0.1324 0.1377
∆ 0.2549 0.2406
Welfare 659.722 659.905
ΓN,L,∗ N.A. 0.0940
Notes: Welfare is defined as: U(Css,ess)1−β , where U(C
ss, ess) is steady-
state utility of the private household: log(Css) − Φe2 (ess)2. ΓN,L,∗ is
set such that welfare is maximized.
decreases. It falls since debt d falls, leading to a higher Rdb (see Equation (4.12)) and
a lower Rdg (see Equation (4.3)). This improves the bank’s incentive to exert a higher
amount of search effort (see Equation (4.9)). In fact, the limited liability constraint
that distorts the effort choice of banks, as already explained, gets slacker, as the falling
Lagrange multiplier ν shows. As effort rises and the limited liability constraint gets
less tight, the term ∆ measuring the inefficiency due to the non-observability of effort
falls too.
Consequently, with a higher search effort in the steady-state the banks allocative
efficiency rises, and along with the accumulation of effective capital. However, the
reduction in deposits is greater than the increase in equity, which increases since banks’
profit increases. Therefore, total assets fall and total loans decrease, too. As total
loans are equal to total raw capital and total raw capital is used to produce effective
capital, total effective capital declines as well. Lower capital accumulation reduces the
investments, outweighing here the reduction in output and leading to higher private
consumption.
As Figure 4.2 shows, a higher amount of government bonds increases the overall
welfare. Therefore, the maximum welfare for BG = 300 is higher than for BG = 0 (see
Figure 4.3). However, one can also see that the maximum of the welfare function shifts
right. Thus, if government bonds increase, only a stricter equity requirement constraint
leads to the welfare’s maximum. With an increasing level of government bonds, there is
an inefficiency stemming from a more binding limited liability constraint, as explained
in Section 4.5.1. To compensate for this effect, a stricter equity requirement constraint
119
is necessary in order to reach optimum welfare. In addition, in the case of BG = 0 the
welfare is lower than in the first-best case. Even if an equity requirement constraint is
introduced, one cannot reach the first-best case, because two distortions are present in
this model: The hidden effort problem and the limited liability constraint. Thus, two
distortions cannot be solved with one instrument. However, having two instruments
(an equity requirement constraint and government bonds), one can reach the first-best
case. The second-best argument applies here. In Figure 4.4, I summarize this result.
Figure 4.4 shows for different values of the government bonds the corresponding
welfare maximizing ΓN,L,∗. As already explained in Section 4.5.1, a higher amount of
government bonds leads to a higher amount of debt (deposits). This higher deposits
amount tends to reduce the incentive of banks to exert costly search effort (see Equation
(4.9)), since in the case of unobservable effort the composition of the bank’s balance
sheet is important for the level of the search effort. Therefore, in line with Figure 4.4,
the higher the amount of government bonds, the higher the amount of debt (deposits)
is and the stricter the equity requirement constraint has to be in order to maximize
the overall welfare. The stricter equity requirement constraint compensates for the
higher amounts of deposits, leading to a lower loan-to-equity-ratio. Therefore, a greater
amount of loans is financed by the banks’ own equity, improving the incentives to exert
a higher amount of search effort (see Figure 4.4). Additionally, the stricter equity
requirement constraint reduces the Lagrange multiplier ν and the distortions caused by
the binding limited liability constraint as the interest spread decreases. Consequently,
the term ∆ measuring the inefficiency due to the non-observability of effort and the
binding limited liability constraint decreases, as well. This indicates that, due to the
stricter equity requirement constraint and the higher amount of safe assets (government
bonds), the economy gets closer to the first-best case. In fact, if one increases the
government bonds further, one can reach the first-best level, although this happens
only if one chooses an unrealistically high amount of government bonds. In addition,
one can see, as soon as equity is so high, that the limited liability constraint is not
binding anymore (ν = 0), the optimal ΓN,L,∗ does not increase further, and a stricter
equity requirement regulation is not necessary anymore. In fact, if the limited liability
constraint is not binding anymore and consequently effort is equal to the first-best
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Figure 4.4: Effect of BG on the optimal ΓN,L,∗
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Notes: This figure shows for different values of BG the corresponding welfare maxi-
mizing ΓN,L and the corresponding steady-state for the given optimal ΓN,L. The green
line in the plot for the welfare shows the welfare level of an economy where effort is
observable and no leverage constraint is imposed (the first-best case).
effort level, a stricter equity requirement constraint is no longer necessary. Therefore,
restricting the amount of debt further would decrease welfare. However, increasing the
amount of government bonds would increase welfare further.
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4.6 Conclusion
In the present chapter, I have analyzed how a safe asset, in this case government bonds,
influences a long-run optimal bank equity requirement regulation. A key finding of the
presented analysis is that the higher the amount of government bonds, the stricter the
equity requirement regulation needs to be in order to reach optimum welfare.
The European implementation of the Basel III banking regulation strongly favors
government bonds issued by EU member countries. They are seen as riskless assets.
Consequently, the risk weight is zero and no equity has to be held by banks, in case
they buy these assets. In my model, that regulation design translates into the following
channel: Government bonds have reverse effects on the search effort of banks. As there
is a hidden action problem, this search effort is too low in comparison with the first-
best case with observable effort. Government bonds have a positive effect on the effort
choice of the banks. A higher amount of government bonds reduces the interest rate
spread charged by banks’ creditors. This enhances the benefits of increasing the search
effort as banks that find a good debtor have to pay a smaller interest rate to the mutual
funds. Therefore, the higher the amount of governments bonds is, the higher the search
effort will be. Overall, this leads to a higher welfare level. However, as government
bonds can be fully financed with debt, the higher the amount of government bonds, the
higher the amount of banks’ debt is. This increases the banks’ leverage. As the limited
liability constraint is binding, a higher amount of debt tends to lead to a more binding
limited liability constraint. The limited liability constraint distorts the banks’ choice
of exerting costly search effort to find good debtors. Therefore, to compensate for
this distortion, a stricter equity requirement constraint is needed to achieve maximum
welfare.
It would be interesting to extend the model by introducing effort costs that are
dependent on the loan amount in the economy. In addition, having distortionary
taxes on the labor income could also be an interesting extension. I leave it to future
researchers to analyze the effects of these extensions on the design of an optimal equity
requirement constraint.
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4.A Appendix
4.A.1 First order conditions of the bank’s optimization prob-
lem
With respect to et:
Etλt+1((Nt + dt −BGt )(Rgt+1 −Rbt+1)− dt(Rdg,t+1 −Rdb,t+1))p′(et)− et
+ Etµt+1(Rdg,t+1 −Rdb,t+1)p′(et)dt + ηt = 0.
(4.30)
With respect to Rdg,t+1:
− Etλt+1p(et) + Etµt+1p(et) + ηtEtλt+1p′(et) = 0. (4.31)
With respect to Rdb,t+1:
− Etλt+1(1− p(et)) + Etµt+1(1− p(et))− ηtEtλt+1p′(et)− νt+1 = 0. (4.32)
With respect to dt:
Etλt+1
(
p(et)Rgt+1 + (1− p(et))Rbt+1 − (p(et)Rdg,t+1 + (1− p(et))Rdb,t+1)
)
+ Etνt+1(Rbt+1 −Rdb,t+1)
+ Etµt+1(Rdg,t+1p(et) + (1− p(et))Rdb,t+1 −RMt )
+ Etηt(−λt+1p′(et))((Rgt+1 −Rbt+1)− (Rdg,t+1 −Rdb,t+1))− χtΓN,L = 0.
4.A.2 Proof 1
Subtract Equation (4.31) from Equation (4.32):
µt+1 = λt+1 + νt+1. (4.33)
Substitute out µt+1 in Equation (4.31):
Etνt+1p(et) + Etηtλt+1p′(et) = 0
⇔ ηt = −Et p(et)νt+1
λt+1p′(et)
.
(4.34)
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Since p(et), p′(et), λt and νt are strictly positive. ηt is always negativ.
4.A.3 Proof 2
Use Equation (4.33) to substitute out µt+1 in Equation (4.30):
Etλt+1((Nt + dt −BGt )(Rgt+1 −Rbt+1)− dt(Rdg,t+1 −Rdb,t+1))p′(et)− et
+ Et(λt+1 + νt+1)(Rdg,t+1 −Rdb,t+1)p′(et)dt + ηt = 0
⇔ Etλt+1((Nt + dt −BGt )(Rgt+1 −Rbt+1))p′(et)− et
+ Etνt+1(Rdg,t+1 −Rdb,t+1)p′(et)dt + ηt = 0.
(4.35)
Insert the Equation (4.9) into Equation (4.35):
Etλt+1((Nt + dt −BGt )(Rgt+1 −Rbt+1))p′(et)
− λt+1((Nt + dt −BGt )p′(et)(Rgt+1 −Rbt+1)− dtp′(et)(Rdg,t+1 −Rdb,t+1))
+ Etνt+1(Rdg,t+1 −Rdb,t+1)p′(et)dt + ηt = 0,
(4.36)
which is equivalent to:
Et(νt+1 + λt+1)(Rdg,t+1 −Rdb,t+1)p′(et)dt + ηt = 0 (4.37)
Insert νt+1 = −ηtλt+1p′(et)p(et) from Equation (4.27):
Et
(
−ηtλt+1p
′(et)
p(et)
+ λt+1
)
(Rdg,t+1 −Rdb,t+1)p′(et)dt + ηt = 0
⇔ Etλt+1(Rdg,t+1 −Rdb,t+1)p′(et)dt = −
ηt
1− ηtp′(et)
p(et)
⇔ ∆t = − ηt1− ηtp′(et)
p(et)
.
(4.38)
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4.A.4 First order conditions of the bank’s optimization prob-
lem in the first-best case
With respect to et:
Etλt+1(Lt(Rgt+1−Rbt+1)−dt(Rdg,t+1−Rdb,t+1))p′(et)+Etµt+1(Rdg,t+1−Rdb,t+1)p′(et)dt−et = 0.
(4.39)
With respect to Rdg,t+1:
−Etλt+1p(et) + Etµt+1p(et) = 0. (4.40)
With respect to Rdb,t+1:
−Etλt+1(1− p(et)) + Etµt+1(1− p(et))− Etνt+1 = 0. (4.41)
With respect to dt:
Etλt+1
((
p(et)Rgt+1 + (1− p(et))Rbt+1)
)
−
(
p(et)Rdg,t+1 + (1− p(et))Rdb,t+1)
))
+
Etµt+1
(
p(et)Rdg,t+1 + (1− p(et))Rdb,t+1 −RMt
)
+ Etνt+1(Rbt+1 −Rdb,t+1) = 0.
(4.42)
4.A.5 Proof 3
Adding Equation (4.40) and Equation (4.41), one gets:
µt+1 = λt+1 + νt+1. (4.43)
Inserting Equation (4.43) into Equation (4.40) leads to:
νt+1 = 0. (4.44)
4.A.6 Proof 4
Adding Equation (4.40) and Equation (4.41), one gets:
µt+1 = λt+1 + νt+1. (4.45)
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Inserting Equation (4.45) into Equation (4.40) leads to:
νt+1 = 0. (4.46)
4.A.7 Proof 5
Using Equations (4.39), (4.45), and (4.46) one gets the following first-best effort choice:
et = p′(et)Etλt+1Lt(Rgt+1 −Rbt+1)
⇔ et = p′(et)Etλt+1(Nt + dt −BGt )(Rgt+1 −Rbt+1)
(4.47)
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